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Ransomware Readiness Assessment

AssessmentChecked

Ransomware readiness assessment: score 36 controls and find your priority gaps

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Governance (4 controls)

Who decides, what is written down, and whether it has been rehearsed.

GV1

Is one named executive accountable for ransomware decisions, with written authority to order systems isolated?

  • 3 pointsYes: a named executive, a deputy, and written authority to isolate systems without waiting for a meeting
  • 2 pointsYes: a named executive, but isolation authority is not written down
  • 1 pointA security manager is the owner; no executive has agreed to the role
  • 0 pointsNo owner is named

Weight 3 (up to 9 points). NIST says ransomware events often cause an immediate loss of business functions, so everyone needs to understand their role, responsibility and authority before an event happens.

Source: NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026), Table 1, GV.RR-02 ransomware application.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 1.A; NIST GV.RR-02, GV.OC-01; RRA RM.

GV2

Does your incident response plan carry ransomware and data-extortion procedures, approved in writing by the CEO or equivalent?

  • 3 pointsYes: ransomware procedures are in the plan, the CEO or equivalent signed it, and a paper copy is kept offline
  • 2 pointsYes: ransomware procedures are in the plan and signed, but no offline copy exists
  • 1 pointThe plan is generic and has no ransomware procedures
  • 0 pointsThere is no written plan

Weight 3 (up to 9 points). The #StopRansomware Guide asks for a plan and communications plan covering ransomware and extortion, approved by the CEO or equivalent in writing, with a hard copy and an offline version available.

Source: CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026), Part 1, Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 1.C; NIST ID.IM-04, RS.MA-01; RRA IR.

GV3

Was the plan exercised against a ransomware scenario in the last 12 months, with executives in the room?

  • 3 pointsYes: a tabletop or live exercise in the last 12 months, executives took part, and fixes were logged
  • 2 pointsYes: an exercise in the last 12 months, but executives did not take part
  • 1 pointAn exercise was held more than 12 months ago
  • 0 pointsNo ransomware exercise has been held

Weight 2 (up to 6 points). CPG 1.C asks that plans are regularly exercised with realistic drills that include all relevant stakeholders. CISA publishes tabletop exercise packages whose scenarios include ransomware.

Source: CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list, Goal 1.C, Manage Incident Response Plans.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 1.C, 2.C; NIST ID.IM-04; RRA IR.

GV4

Are your legal reporting duties for a ransomware event written down, with the clock, the recipient and the owner for each?

  • 3 pointsYes: each duty is listed with its clock, its recipient and a named owner, and counsel has reviewed the list
  • 2 pointsYes: duties are listed, but clocks or owners are missing
  • 1 pointCounsel knows the duties; nothing is written down
  • 0 pointsNo one has listed the duties

Weight 2 (up to 6 points). Duties differ by facts: personal data, health information, public company status, critical infrastructure status. NIST asks organizations to understand and manage legal, regulatory and contractual requirements before an event. The reporting pages of this site set out the duties read at source.

Source: NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026), Table 1, GV.OC-03 and RS.CO-02 ransomware applications.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 5.B; NIST GV.OC-03, RS.CO-02; RRA IR.

Identity and access (4 controls)

How attackers get credentials and how far a stolen one reaches.

ID1

Is phishing-resistant multifactor authentication required for email, remote access, administrator accounts and cloud consoles?

  • 3 pointsYes: phishing-resistant MFA on all four, with exceptions escalated to senior management
  • 2 pointsYes: MFA on all four, but some use codes or push approvals rather than phishing-resistant methods
  • 1 pointMFA covers remote access only
  • 0 pointsMFA is not required for these

Weight 3 (up to 9 points). Compromised credentials are one of the initial access routes the #StopRansomware Guide groups its advice around. NIST says phishing-resistant MFA and zero trust architectures are strongly recommended for authentication. CPG 3.F ranks MFA methods by strength.

Source: CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026), Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Compromised Credentials.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 3.F; NIST PR.AA-03, PR.AA-01; RRA UM.

ID2

Do administrators use separate accounts from their daily email and web accounts, and are privileges reviewed at least quarterly?

  • 3 pointsYes: separate admin accounts, no admin rights on daily accounts, quarterly privilege reviews
  • 2 pointsYes: separate admin accounts, reviewed less than quarterly
  • 1 pointSome administrators use separate accounts
  • 0 pointsAdministrators use one account for everything

Weight 3 (up to 9 points). Attackers use privileged accounts to move across a network and to reach backups. CPG 3.G asks that ordinary user accounts hold no administrator privileges and that admins keep separate accounts for email and browsing; CPG 3.H asks for quarterly access reviews.

Source: CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list, Goals 3.G and 3.H.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 3.G, 3.H; NIST PR.AA-05; RRA UM.

ID3

Are domain controllers and the identity platform hardened, restricted to a small admin group and kept off the internet?

  • 3 pointsYes: small admin group, no internet access from domain controllers, privileged access monitored, current server versions
  • 2 pointsYes: small admin group and no internet access, but no privileged access monitoring
  • 1 pointSome hardening has been done; no review against a checklist
  • 0 pointsDomain controllers are managed like ordinary servers

Weight 2 (up to 6 points). The guide says malicious actors often use domain controllers as a staging point to spread ransomware across a network, and lists steps to secure them, including limiting the Administrators group and blocking internet access from them.

Source: CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026), Part 1, General Best Practices: Secure domain controllers.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 3.H; NIST PR.AA-05, DE.CM-03; RRA UM.

ID4

Are default passwords changed, passwords unique and long, failed logins alerted on, and leavers cut off promptly?

  • 3 pointsYes: all four are enforced by system policy and audited
  • 2 pointsThree of the four are enforced
  • 1 pointOne or two of the four are enforced
  • 0 pointsNone is enforced by policy

Weight 1 (up to 3 points). CPG 3.A to 3.E cover default passwords, minimum strength (16 or more characters where technically feasible), unique credentials, revoking credentials for departing staff and monitoring unsuccessful logins. CISA rates four of the five low cost and 3.E moderate.

Source: CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list, Goals 3.A, 3.B, 3.C, 3.D and 3.E.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 3.A, 3.B, 3.C, 3.D, 3.E; NIST PR.AA-01; RRA UM.

Backups and recovery (4 controls)

Whether you can restore without paying, and how fast.

BR1

Are encrypted backups of critical systems kept offline or immutable, out of reach of your domain administrator credentials?

  • 3 pointsYes: offline or immutable copies, encrypted, and unreachable with domain admin or cloud admin credentials
  • 2 pointsYes: offline or immutable copies, but reachable with administrator credentials
  • 1 pointBackups exist on the network or in the same cloud account as production
  • 0 pointsBackups are not routine

Weight 3 (up to 9 points). The guide says many ransomware variants look for backups to delete or encrypt, so copies should be kept offline. NIST wants a copy stored where the attacker cannot reach it. Microsoft advises restoring from immutable storage that neither attacker nor administrator can modify.

Source: CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026), Part 1, Preparing: offline, encrypted backups.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 3.O; NIST PR.DS-11; RRA DB.

BR2

Has a full restore of your critical systems been tested in the last 12 months, with the elapsed time recorded?

  • 3 pointsYes: a full restore test in the last 12 months, time recorded and compared with the business target
  • 2 pointsYes: file or single-system restores tested, no full test
  • 1 pointBackups are checked for completion but never restored
  • 0 pointsRestores have never been tested

Weight 3 (up to 9 points). A copy that has never been restored is untested. NIST asks that backup integrity be verified before restoration, and the guide asks that backups are regularly tested for availability and integrity in a disaster recovery scenario.

Source: NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026), Table 1, RC.RP-03 ransomware application.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 3.O, 6.A; NIST RC.RP-03, PR.DS-11; RRA DB.

BR3

Do you hold golden images, infrastructure-as-code templates and installers with license keys, stored offline?

  • 3 pointsYes: images, templates and installers are current, version controlled and stored offline
  • 2 pointsYes: images exist but are stored on the network
  • 1 pointImages exist for some systems only
  • 0 pointsNo images or offline installers are kept

Weight 2 (up to 6 points). Rebuilding from images is faster than reinstalling by hand. The guide asks for current golden images, offline copies of cloud templates and stored source code or executables; CPG 3.O asks for a list of backups including installation media and license keys.

Source: CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026), Part 1, Preparing: golden images and infrastructure as code.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 3.O; NIST RC.RP-02; RRA DB.

BR4

Is there a ranked list of systems to restore, with their dependencies, and identity at the front of it?

  • 3 pointsYes: ranked list with dependencies, approved by the business, with identity services first
  • 2 pointsYes: ranked list, but dependencies are not mapped
  • 1 pointIT knows the order informally
  • 0 pointsThere is no recovery order

Weight 2 (up to 6 points). The guide asks for restoration prioritized by a predefined critical asset list covering health and safety, revenue and other critical services, with their dependencies. NIST says asset prioritization is key to scoping an event and ordering recovery.

Source: CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026), Part 2, Detection and Analysis: triage impacted systems.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 2.A, 6.A; NIST ID.AM-05, RC.RP-02; RRA AM.

Detection (4 controls)

Whether someone sees the precursors before the encryption starts.

DT1

Is endpoint detection or centrally managed anti-malware on servers and endpoints, with alerts that reach a person at any hour?

  • 3 pointsYes: on all servers and endpoints, centrally managed, with alerts answered at any hour
  • 2 pointsYes: on all servers and endpoints, but alerts are read in office hours only
  • 1 pointDeployed on some systems; servers or legacy hosts are missing
  • 0 pointsSignature anti-malware only, unmanaged

Weight 3 (up to 9 points). The guide recommends application allowlisting or EDR on all assets, and a centrally managed antivirus that escalates warnings to security staff. CPG 4.A asks for signature and non-signature mechanisms at system endpoints.

Source: CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026), Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Precursor Malware Infection.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 4.A; NIST DE.CM-09, DE.AE-02; RRA AI.

DT2

Are logs from critical systems, firewalls, VPN and identity collected centrally and kept for at least a year?

  • 3 pointsYes: central collection, kept 12 months or more, with PowerShell logging enabled
  • 2 pointsYes: central collection, kept less than 12 months
  • 1 pointLogs stay on each device
  • 0 pointsLogging is off or unknown

Weight 2 (up to 6 points). The guide asks for centralized log management and for backing up logs of critical systems for a minimum of one year if possible. NIST notes that log records support both anomaly detection and forensics during recovery.

Source: CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026), Part 1, General Best Practices: logs and centralized log management.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 3.Q; NIST PR.PS-04; RRA NM.

DT3

Do you alert on ransomware precursors: new privileged accounts, backup or shadow-copy deletion, unexpected remote management tools, large outbound transfers?

  • 3 pointsYes: alerts exist for all four and were tested
  • 2 pointsAlerts exist for two or three
  • 1 pointAn alert exists for one
  • 0 pointsNone of these is monitored

Weight 2 (up to 6 points). The guide lists these exact areas for threat hunting during detection: new or escalated AD accounts, tools used to impair backups and shadow copies, unexpected remote monitoring and management software, and abnormal outbound data.

Source: CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026), Part 2, Detection and Analysis: threat hunting.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 4.B; NIST DE.AE-02, DE.CM-01; RRA NM.

DT4

Does the on-call route reach a person with authority to isolate systems outside business hours?

  • 3 pointsYes: a rota, a phone number staff know, and authority to isolate without escalation
  • 2 pointsYes: a rota, but isolation needs a second approval
  • 1 pointOut-of-hours alerts go to an email inbox
  • 0 pointsNo out-of-hours route exists

Weight 2 (up to 6 points). NIST says immediate execution of the response plan is necessary to stop continuing exfiltration and the spread of infection. CPG 5.A asks for a plan that names stakeholders and the mechanisms for coordination.

Source: NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026), Table 1, RS.MA-01 ransomware application.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 5.A; NIST RS.MA-01; RRA IR.

Segmentation and platform (4 controls)

How far an intruder can travel and what they can reach from the internet.

SG1

Is the network segmented so that a compromised workstation cannot reach servers, backups and management interfaces directly?

  • 3 pointsYes: segments for workstations, servers, backups and management, with filtered traffic between them
  • 2 pointsYes: some segments exist, but workstations reach server and backup networks
  • 1 pointSegmentation is by site only
  • 0 pointsThe network is flat

Weight 2 (up to 6 points). The guide shows a flat network beside a segmented one and advises separating business units and IT from operational technology. CPG 3.I notes that segment boundaries can contain a breach and allow segments to be shut down during an intrusion.

Source: CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list, Goal 3.I, Implement Logical/Physical Network Segmentation.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 3.I; NIST PR.IR-01; RRA NM.

SG2

Is every internet-facing service inventoried, with remote desktop closed to the internet and VPN and edge devices patched?

  • 3 pointsYes: an inventory of exposed services, no exposed remote desktop, edge devices on a patch schedule
  • 2 pointsYes: an inventory exists, but edge patching lags the schedule
  • 1 pointExposed services are known only to the network team
  • 0 pointsNo inventory of exposed services exists

Weight 3 (up to 9 points). The guide says not to expose services such as remote desktop protocol on the web and to update VPNs and network infrastructure devices. CPG 3.S asks organizations to minimize internet-facing assets and keep software current.

Source: CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026), Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Internet-Facing Vulnerabilities and Misconfigurations.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 3.S, 2.B; NIST PR.PS-02, ID.AM-02; RRA PM.

SG3

Do you patch known exploited vulnerabilities on internet-facing systems within a time limit you set, and scan for gaps?

  • 3 pointsYes: a written time limit, regular scanning and tracked exceptions
  • 2 pointsYes: regular scanning, no written time limit
  • 1 pointPatching is ad hoc and by system owner
  • 0 pointsNo vulnerability scanning is done

Weight 2 (up to 6 points). The guide asks for regular vulnerability scanning and timely patching of internet-facing servers, especially for known exploited vulnerabilities, and points to CISA vulnerability scanning at no cost. CPG 2.B asks for a vulnerability management program.

Source: CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026), Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Internet-Facing Vulnerabilities and Misconfigurations.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 2.B; NIST ID.AM-02, PR.PS-02; RRA PM.

SG4

Is software execution restricted by allowlisting, and are hypervisors, PowerShell and remote tools hardened and logged?

  • 3 pointsYes: allowlisting on servers, hypervisors hardened, PowerShell logging on, remote tools restricted
  • 2 pointsThree of these four are in place
  • 1 pointOne or two are in place
  • 0 pointsNone are in place

Weight 1 (up to 3 points). The guide recommends allowlisting so only authorized software runs, warns that ransomware strategies target hypervisors such as VMware ESXi, and asks for enhanced PowerShell logging and limits on remote monitoring and management tools.

Source: CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026), Part 1, Precursor Malware Infection and General Best Practices.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 3.P; NIST PR.PS-05; RRA AI.

Email and edge (4 controls)

Phishing, social engineering and web filtering in front of users.

EE1

Does email filtering block risky attachments, flag external senders and disable macros by default?

  • 3 pointsYes: attachment filters reviewed twice a year, external sender flag, macros blocked by policy
  • 2 pointsYes: filters and macro policy, no external sender flag or review
  • 1 pointBasic spam filtering only
  • 0 pointsNo attachment or macro controls

Weight 2 (up to 6 points). The guide advises attachment filters, reviewing file types at least semi-annually, flagging external email and disabling macros in Office files received by email. CPG 3.M asks for macros to be disabled by default.

Source: CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026), Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Phishing.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 3.M, 3.L; NIST DE.CM-09; RRA PP.

EE2

Are SPF, DKIM and DMARC set on all mail domains, with DMARC at reject?

  • 3 pointsYes: all three on every domain and DMARC set to reject
  • 2 pointsAll three are on, DMARC is set to monitor or quarantine
  • 1 pointSPF only
  • 0 pointsNone is configured

Weight 1 (up to 3 points). CPG 3.L asks that STARTTLS, SPF, DKIM and DMARC are enabled on corporate email and DMARC is set to reject. The guide notes DMARC protects your domain from being spoofed but does not stop spoofed mail coming in.

Source: CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list, Goal 3.L, Enable Email Security.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 3.L; NIST no cited ID; RRA PP.

EE3

Does training cover phishing and advanced social engineering such as help desk impersonation, and do staff report without blame?

  • 3 pointsYes: annual training, simulations, a help desk verification step and a no-blame reporting route
  • 2 pointsYes: annual training and simulations; no help desk step
  • 1 pointAnnual training only
  • 0 pointsNo security awareness training

Weight 2 (up to 6 points). The guide asks for training that includes advanced forms of social engineering. NIST asks for a culture of incident reporting that does not blame employees. CPG 3.J asks for at least annual training for all users.

Source: NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026), Section 1.2, Basic Ransomware Tips, item 2; Table 1, PR.AT-01.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 3.J; NIST PR.AT-01; RRA PP.

EE4

Is protective DNS or web filtering in place, with remote management tool ports blocked at the perimeter?

  • 3 pointsYes: protective DNS or web filtering for all users, including remote workers, and remote tool ports blocked
  • 2 pointsWeb filtering on the office network only
  • 1 pointBlocklists maintained by hand
  • 0 pointsNeither is in place

Weight 1 (up to 3 points). The guide recommends Protective DNS, sandboxed browsers and blocking inbound and outbound connections on common remote monitoring and management ports at the perimeter. NIST names blocking untrusted web resources as a basic tip.

Source: CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026), Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Advanced Forms of Social Engineering; General Best Practices (RMM).

Maps to: CPG 2.0 no direct goal; NIST ID.AM-03, DE.CM-01; RRA BM.

Response readiness (4 controls)

Contacts, authority and evidence handling on the day.

RR1

Is there an out-of-band way to reach responders and staff, and a paper contact list with 24-hour numbers?

  • 3 pointsYes: an out-of-band channel tested this year and a paper contact list with 24-hour numbers
  • 2 pointsYes: a contact list, no tested out-of-band channel
  • 1 pointContacts sit in email or a shared drive
  • 0 pointsNo contact list exists

Weight 3 (up to 9 points). The guide asks for isolation coordinated by out-of-band communication such as phone calls, and for a response contacts table with 24x7 numbers. NIST asks that planning include a strategy for out-of-band communications if normal channels are disrupted.

Source: CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026), Part 2, Detection and Analysis and Contact Information (Table 1).

Maps to: CPG 2.0 5.A; NIST RS.CO-02, RC.CO-03; RRA IR.

RR2

Do you have an incident response firm and breach counsel on retainer or pre-agreed terms, and does your insurer know the process?

  • 3 pointsYes: a retainer or pre-agreed terms with an IR firm and counsel, and the insurer notification step is written down
  • 2 pointsYes: an IR firm or counsel on retainer, not both
  • 1 pointYou would search for a firm after an incident starts
  • 0 pointsNothing is arranged

Weight 2 (up to 6 points). The guide lists managed security service providers and cyber insurance among the response contacts to fill in beforehand. NIST asks that a list of contacts including law enforcement, legal counsel and incident response resources is kept current.

Source: NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026), Section 1.2, Basic Ransomware Tips, item 6.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 6.A; NIST RS.CO-02, RS.CO-03, GV.RM-03; RRA IR.

RR3

Is there a written path for a ransom payment decision, including a sanctions screening step and contact with law enforcement first?

  • 3 pointsYes: decider named, sanctions screening and law enforcement contact are mandatory steps, counsel and insurer consulted
  • 2 pointsYes: a decider is named but screening is not written down
  • 1 pointThe decision would be taken on the day
  • 0 pointsNo one has thought about it

Weight 2 (up to 6 points). OFAC says facilitating a payment may violate sanctions rules, and treats early reporting to law enforcement and cooperation as significant mitigating factors. NIST notes that event impact informs a cost-benefit analysis when deciding if a ransom should be paid.

Source: OFAC: Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments, 21 September 2021, Updated advisory of 21 September 2021.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 5.B; NIST DE.AE-04, GV.RM-02; RRA RM.

RR4

Can responders capture memory and disk images and keep a time-stamped decision log from the first hour?

  • 3 pointsYes: tools, a trained person and a log template are ready
  • 2 pointsA log template exists; imaging would rely on an outside firm
  • 1 pointResponders would improvise
  • 0 pointsNo preservation process exists

Weight 1 (up to 3 points). The guide asks responders to take a system image and memory capture of a sample of affected devices and to preserve volatile evidence such as memory and Windows Security logs. Powering off loses volatile memory, so the choice should be made knowingly.

Source: CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026), Part 2, Containment and Eradication.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 no direct goal; NIST RS.MI-01; RRA IR.

Third parties (4 controls)

Vendors and managed service providers who hold access or backups.

TP1

Do vendor and service provider contracts require incident notice within a set time?

  • 3 pointsYes: all critical vendors must notify within a stated number of hours or days
  • 2 pointsYes: some contracts do
  • 1 pointNotice is promised but no time is set
  • 0 pointsContracts say nothing about notice

Weight 2 (up to 6 points). CPG 1.D asks that procurement documents and contracts stipulate that vendors notify the customer of security incidents within a risk-informed time frame. NIST asks that roles and responsibilities of suppliers, customers and partners are communicated.

Source: CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list, Goal 1.D, Supply Chain Incident Reporting.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 1.D; NIST GV.SC-02, GV.SC-08; RRA RM.

TP2

Is managed service provider access limited by least privilege, MFA and logging, and do you audit remote management tools?

  • 3 pointsYes: limited roles, MFA, logged sessions, and a quarterly audit of provider accounts and remote tools
  • 2 pointsYes: limited roles and MFA, no regular audit
  • 1 pointProviders have broad standing access
  • 0 pointsAccess held by providers is not known

Weight 3 (up to 9 points). The guide notes that managed service providers have been an infection vector for ransomware and asks for least privilege and separation of duties for third parties and an audit of remote access tools. CPG 1.E covers managed service provider risk.

Source: CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026), Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Third Parties and Managed Service Providers.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 1.E; NIST DE.CM-06, GV.SC-02; RRA UM.

TP3

If a provider keeps your backups or runs your systems, does the contract require the same backup practices you use?

  • 3 pointsYes: contract language requires offline copies, tested restores and notice of failures
  • 2 pointsYes: the practices are assumed, not contracted
  • 1 pointYou know the provider practice informally
  • 0 pointsThe provider backup practice has never been asked about

Weight 2 (up to 6 points). The guide says that if a third party or managed service provider is responsible for maintaining and securing your organization backups, it should follow the same best practices, and asks that contract language formalizes this.

Source: CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026), Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Third Parties and Managed Service Providers.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 1.E; NIST GV.SC-08; RRA DB.

TP4

Are key providers on your contact list and in your exercises, and is cyber insurance in place?

  • 3 pointsYes: key providers take part in exercises, are on the contact list, and a cyber policy is in force
  • 2 pointsProviders are on the contact list; no joint exercise
  • 1 pointProviders would be called after the event
  • 0 pointsNo

Weight 1 (up to 3 points). NIST says ransomware contingency planning should be coordinated with suppliers and third-party providers and include testing. It lists cyber insurance as a way to ease financial pressure during response and recovery.

Source: NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026), Table 1, GV.SC-08 and Section 1.2 item 6.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 1.D; NIST GV.SC-08, GV.RM-03; RRA RM.

Operational technology (4 controls)

For sites with plants, pipelines, building systems or lab equipment. Mark the whole group not applicable if you run none.

OT1

Are IT and OT networks separated by a demilitarized zone, with industrial protocols barred from the IT network?

  • 3 pointsYes: a DMZ between IT and OT, zones by criticality, industrial protocols kept off the IT network
  • 2 pointsYes: a DMZ exists, but zones are not defined
  • 1 pointA firewall separates them with broad rules
  • 0 pointsIT and OT share a network

Weight 3 (up to 9 points). CISA and FBI advise strong segmentation between IT and OT networks, a DMZ that removes unregulated communication, logical zones by criticality, and prohibiting industrial control system protocols from traversing the IT network.

Source: CISA and FBI advisory AA21-131A: DarkSide ransomware, best practices for preventing business disruption, Mitigations: segmentation between IT and OT.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 3.I; NIST PR.IR-01; RRA NM.

OT2

Have you tested running the plant manually, and isolating OT from IT, within the last 12 months?

  • 3 pointsYes: a manual operation test and an isolation test in the last 12 months, with the result recorded
  • 2 pointsYes: a paper exercise only
  • 1 pointDiscussed but not exercised
  • 0 pointsNever considered

Weight 3 (up to 9 points). AA21-131A asks owners to identify IT and OT interdependencies, build workarounds or manual controls so the ICS network can be isolated, and test them regularly so safety-critical functions run through an incident. CPG 6.A mentions degraded operation.

Source: CISA and FBI advisory AA21-131A: DarkSide ransomware, best practices for preventing business disruption, Mitigations: manual controls and isolation.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 6.A, 1.C; NIST RC.RP-01; RRA IR.

OT3

Is there a current inventory of OT assets and a network topology diagram, stored offline?

  • 3 pointsYes: inventory and topology reviewed within 12 months, with offline copies
  • 2 pointsYes: inventory exists but is older than 12 months
  • 1 pointPartial lists held by plant engineers
  • 0 pointsNo inventory

Weight 2 (up to 6 points). CPG 2.A asks that critical IT and OT assets be inventoried and updated more often. CPG 2.E asks for accurate network topology documentation across IT and OT networks, reviewed annually. The guide asks for offline copies of network documentation.

Source: CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list, Goals 2.A and 2.E.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 2.A, 2.E; NIST ID.AM-03; RRA AM.

OT4

Are backups and gold images of controllers, HMIs and engineering workstations kept offline and restore-tested?

  • 3 pointsYes: offline backups and gold images for all three, restore-tested
  • 2 pointsYes: offline backups, restore not tested
  • 1 pointBackups kept on the OT network
  • 0 pointsNo OT backups exist

Weight 2 (up to 6 points). AA21-131A asks for regular backups on both IT and OT networks, offline storage, tested restores, gold images of critical systems and retained backup hardware.

Source: CISA and FBI advisory AA21-131A: DarkSide ransomware, best practices for preventing business disruption, Mitigations: backups on IT and OT networks.

Maps to: CPG 2.0 3.O; NIST PR.DS-11, RC.RP-03; RRA DB.

What is a ransomware readiness assessment?

A ransomware readiness assessment is a self-check of the controls that decide whether an attack stops early and whether you can recover from it. This one has 36 controls in 9 groups. Each control is a question with four answers worth 3, 2, 1 or 0 points, a weight of 1 to 3, a reason it matters and the source it comes from.

Tick one answer per control, multiply by the weight, add up, and divide by the total available. Four bands turn the percent into a reading. Any weight-3 control answered with 0 points is listed as a priority gap whatever the total. The full rules are on the method page, and the control mapping shows how each control relates to CISA and NIST documents.

Bands as published in the scoring rules. Total available: 234 points with the OT group, 204 without it.
BandPercent of points availableReading
Critical gaps0 to 29Basic protections are missing. A ransomware event would likely stop the business until rebuilt.
Partial30 to 54Some controls are in place, but one or more of the main routes in or the route back is open.
Established55 to 79Most controls exist. The remaining work is testing, written authority and coverage of edge cases.
Tested80 to 100Controls exist and have been exercised. Keep the evidence and repeat the test each year.

Is there a ransomware readiness assessment checklist you can print?

Yes. This page is the checklist: every question and answer is in plain HTML, so it prints and works with scripts off. Print it, tick one answer per control, and write the points beside each. The table at the end collects the totals. Shorter versions are the leadership checklist and the technical checklist.

Download the control set as CSV or JSON.

Where do you add up the result?

Write your points per group below, then total them. Leave the OT row out of both columns if you run no operational technology.

Percent = points earned / points available x 100.
GroupPoints earnedPoints available
Governance[ ]30
Identity and access[ ]27
Backups and recovery[ ]30
Detection[ ]27
Segmentation and platform[ ]24
Email and edge[ ]18
Response readiness[ ]24
Third parties[ ]24
Operational technology[ ]30
Total[ ]234 (204 without OT)

Cite this

Ransomware Readiness Assessment, "Ransomware Readiness Assessment: 36 controls", edition 16 November 2026, https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/assessment/ (CC BY 4.0).

Sources

Read 16 November 2026, the day this page was last reviewed, unless a line shows another date.

  1. CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026)
  2. NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026)
  3. CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list
  4. CISA and FBI advisory AA21-131A: DarkSide ransomware, best practices for preventing business disruption
  5. Microsoft Learn: Prepare for ransomware attacks with a backup and recovery plan
  6. OFAC: Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments, 21 September 2021
  7. CISA: Tabletop Exercise Packages

Last reviewed 16 November 2026.