{
 "name": "Ransomware Readiness Assessment: control set",
 "edition": "2026-11-16",
 "read_date": "2026-11-16",
 "source": "https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/datasets/",
 "license": "CC BY 4.0",
 "cite": "Ransomware Readiness Assessment, \"Ransomware Readiness Assessment: 36 controls\", edition 16 November 2026, https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/assessment/ (CC BY 4.0)",
 "description": "Thirty-six ransomware readiness controls with four answer options and points, weights, reasons and sources.",
 "rows": [
  {
   "control_id": "GV1",
   "group": "Governance",
   "weight": 3,
   "question": "Is one named executive accountable for ransomware decisions, with written authority to order systems isolated?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: a named executive, a deputy, and written authority to isolate systems without waiting for a meeting",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: a named executive, but isolation authority is not written down",
   "answer_1_point": "A security manager is the owner; no executive has agreed to the role",
   "answer_0_points": "No owner is named",
   "max_points": 9,
   "why_it_matters": "NIST says ransomware events often cause an immediate loss of business functions, so everyone needs to understand their role, responsibility and authority before an event happens.",
   "source_url": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf",
   "source_note": "Table 1, GV.RR-02 ransomware application",
   "lists": "leadership",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "GV2",
   "group": "Governance",
   "weight": 3,
   "question": "Does your incident response plan carry ransomware and data-extortion procedures, approved in writing by the CEO or equivalent?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: ransomware procedures are in the plan, the CEO or equivalent signed it, and a paper copy is kept offline",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: ransomware procedures are in the plan and signed, but no offline copy exists",
   "answer_1_point": "The plan is generic and has no ransomware procedures",
   "answer_0_points": "There is no written plan",
   "max_points": 9,
   "why_it_matters": "The #StopRansomware Guide asks for a plan and communications plan covering ransomware and extortion, approved by the CEO or equivalent in writing, with a hard copy and an offline version available.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide",
   "source_note": "Part 1, Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents",
   "lists": "leadership",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "GV3",
   "group": "Governance",
   "weight": 2,
   "question": "Was the plan exercised against a ransomware scenario in the last 12 months, with executives in the room?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: a tabletop or live exercise in the last 12 months, executives took part, and fixes were logged",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: an exercise in the last 12 months, but executives did not take part",
   "answer_1_point": "An exercise was held more than 12 months ago",
   "answer_0_points": "No ransomware exercise has been held",
   "max_points": 6,
   "why_it_matters": "CPG 1.C asks that plans are regularly exercised with realistic drills that include all relevant stakeholders. CISA publishes tabletop exercise packages whose scenarios include ransomware.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0",
   "source_note": "Goal 1.C, Manage Incident Response Plans",
   "lists": "leadership",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "GV4",
   "group": "Governance",
   "weight": 2,
   "question": "Are your legal reporting duties for a ransomware event written down, with the clock, the recipient and the owner for each?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: each duty is listed with its clock, its recipient and a named owner, and counsel has reviewed the list",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: duties are listed, but clocks or owners are missing",
   "answer_1_point": "Counsel knows the duties; nothing is written down",
   "answer_0_points": "No one has listed the duties",
   "max_points": 6,
   "why_it_matters": "Duties differ by facts: personal data, health information, public company status, critical infrastructure status. NIST asks organizations to understand and manage legal, regulatory and contractual requirements before an event. The reporting pages of this site set out the duties read at source.",
   "source_url": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf",
   "source_note": "Table 1, GV.OC-03 and RS.CO-02 ransomware applications",
   "lists": "leadership",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "ID1",
   "group": "Identity and access",
   "weight": 3,
   "question": "Is phishing-resistant multifactor authentication required for email, remote access, administrator accounts and cloud consoles?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: phishing-resistant MFA on all four, with exceptions escalated to senior management",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: MFA on all four, but some use codes or push approvals rather than phishing-resistant methods",
   "answer_1_point": "MFA covers remote access only",
   "answer_0_points": "MFA is not required for these",
   "max_points": 9,
   "why_it_matters": "Compromised credentials are one of the initial access routes the #StopRansomware Guide groups its advice around. NIST says phishing-resistant MFA and zero trust architectures are strongly recommended for authentication. CPG 3.F ranks MFA methods by strength.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide",
   "source_note": "Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Compromised Credentials",
   "lists": "technical; smb",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "ID2",
   "group": "Identity and access",
   "weight": 3,
   "question": "Do administrators use separate accounts from their daily email and web accounts, and are privileges reviewed at least quarterly?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: separate admin accounts, no admin rights on daily accounts, quarterly privilege reviews",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: separate admin accounts, reviewed less than quarterly",
   "answer_1_point": "Some administrators use separate accounts",
   "answer_0_points": "Administrators use one account for everything",
   "max_points": 9,
   "why_it_matters": "Attackers use privileged accounts to move across a network and to reach backups. CPG 3.G asks that ordinary user accounts hold no administrator privileges and that admins keep separate accounts for email and browsing; CPG 3.H asks for quarterly access reviews.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0",
   "source_note": "Goals 3.G and 3.H",
   "lists": "technical; smb",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "ID3",
   "group": "Identity and access",
   "weight": 2,
   "question": "Are domain controllers and the identity platform hardened, restricted to a small admin group and kept off the internet?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: small admin group, no internet access from domain controllers, privileged access monitored, current server versions",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: small admin group and no internet access, but no privileged access monitoring",
   "answer_1_point": "Some hardening has been done; no review against a checklist",
   "answer_0_points": "Domain controllers are managed like ordinary servers",
   "max_points": 6,
   "why_it_matters": "The guide says malicious actors often use domain controllers as a staging point to spread ransomware across a network, and lists steps to secure them, including limiting the Administrators group and blocking internet access from them.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide",
   "source_note": "Part 1, General Best Practices: Secure domain controllers",
   "lists": "technical",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "ID4",
   "group": "Identity and access",
   "weight": 1,
   "question": "Are default passwords changed, passwords unique and long, failed logins alerted on, and leavers cut off promptly?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: all four are enforced by system policy and audited",
   "answer_2_points": "Three of the four are enforced",
   "answer_1_point": "One or two of the four are enforced",
   "answer_0_points": "None is enforced by policy",
   "max_points": 3,
   "why_it_matters": "CPG 3.A to 3.E cover default passwords, minimum strength (16 or more characters where technically feasible), unique credentials, revoking credentials for departing staff and monitoring unsuccessful logins. CISA rates four of the five low cost and 3.E moderate.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0",
   "source_note": "Goals 3.A, 3.B, 3.C, 3.D and 3.E",
   "lists": "technical; smb",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "BR1",
   "group": "Backups and recovery",
   "weight": 3,
   "question": "Are encrypted backups of critical systems kept offline or immutable, out of reach of your domain administrator credentials?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: offline or immutable copies, encrypted, and unreachable with domain admin or cloud admin credentials",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: offline or immutable copies, but reachable with administrator credentials",
   "answer_1_point": "Backups exist on the network or in the same cloud account as production",
   "answer_0_points": "Backups are not routine",
   "max_points": 9,
   "why_it_matters": "The guide says many ransomware variants look for backups to delete or encrypt, so copies should be kept offline. NIST wants a copy stored where the attacker cannot reach it. Microsoft advises restoring from immutable storage that neither attacker nor administrator can modify.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide",
   "source_note": "Part 1, Preparing: offline, encrypted backups",
   "lists": "technical; smb; leadership",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "BR2",
   "group": "Backups and recovery",
   "weight": 3,
   "question": "Has a full restore of your critical systems been tested in the last 12 months, with the elapsed time recorded?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: a full restore test in the last 12 months, time recorded and compared with the business target",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: file or single-system restores tested, no full test",
   "answer_1_point": "Backups are checked for completion but never restored",
   "answer_0_points": "Restores have never been tested",
   "max_points": 9,
   "why_it_matters": "A copy that has never been restored is untested. NIST asks that backup integrity be verified before restoration, and the guide asks that backups are regularly tested for availability and integrity in a disaster recovery scenario.",
   "source_url": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf",
   "source_note": "Table 1, RC.RP-03 ransomware application",
   "lists": "technical; leadership",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "BR3",
   "group": "Backups and recovery",
   "weight": 2,
   "question": "Do you hold golden images, infrastructure-as-code templates and installers with license keys, stored offline?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: images, templates and installers are current, version controlled and stored offline",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: images exist but are stored on the network",
   "answer_1_point": "Images exist for some systems only",
   "answer_0_points": "No images or offline installers are kept",
   "max_points": 6,
   "why_it_matters": "Rebuilding from images is faster than reinstalling by hand. The guide asks for current golden images, offline copies of cloud templates and stored source code or executables; CPG 3.O asks for a list of backups including installation media and license keys.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide",
   "source_note": "Part 1, Preparing: golden images and infrastructure as code",
   "lists": "technical",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "BR4",
   "group": "Backups and recovery",
   "weight": 2,
   "question": "Is there a ranked list of systems to restore, with their dependencies, and identity at the front of it?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: ranked list with dependencies, approved by the business, with identity services first",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: ranked list, but dependencies are not mapped",
   "answer_1_point": "IT knows the order informally",
   "answer_0_points": "There is no recovery order",
   "max_points": 6,
   "why_it_matters": "The guide asks for restoration prioritized by a predefined critical asset list covering health and safety, revenue and other critical services, with their dependencies. NIST says asset prioritization is key to scoping an event and ordering recovery.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide",
   "source_note": "Part 2, Detection and Analysis: triage impacted systems",
   "lists": "technical; leadership",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "DT1",
   "group": "Detection",
   "weight": 3,
   "question": "Is endpoint detection or centrally managed anti-malware on servers and endpoints, with alerts that reach a person at any hour?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: on all servers and endpoints, centrally managed, with alerts answered at any hour",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: on all servers and endpoints, but alerts are read in office hours only",
   "answer_1_point": "Deployed on some systems; servers or legacy hosts are missing",
   "answer_0_points": "Signature anti-malware only, unmanaged",
   "max_points": 9,
   "why_it_matters": "The guide recommends application allowlisting or EDR on all assets, and a centrally managed antivirus that escalates warnings to security staff. CPG 4.A asks for signature and non-signature mechanisms at system endpoints.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide",
   "source_note": "Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Precursor Malware Infection",
   "lists": "technical; smb",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "DT2",
   "group": "Detection",
   "weight": 2,
   "question": "Are logs from critical systems, firewalls, VPN and identity collected centrally and kept for at least a year?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: central collection, kept 12 months or more, with PowerShell logging enabled",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: central collection, kept less than 12 months",
   "answer_1_point": "Logs stay on each device",
   "answer_0_points": "Logging is off or unknown",
   "max_points": 6,
   "why_it_matters": "The guide asks for centralized log management and for backing up logs of critical systems for a minimum of one year if possible. NIST notes that log records support both anomaly detection and forensics during recovery.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide",
   "source_note": "Part 1, General Best Practices: logs and centralized log management",
   "lists": "technical",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "DT3",
   "group": "Detection",
   "weight": 2,
   "question": "Do you alert on ransomware precursors: new privileged accounts, backup or shadow-copy deletion, unexpected remote management tools, large outbound transfers?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: alerts exist for all four and were tested",
   "answer_2_points": "Alerts exist for two or three",
   "answer_1_point": "An alert exists for one",
   "answer_0_points": "None of these is monitored",
   "max_points": 6,
   "why_it_matters": "The guide lists these exact areas for threat hunting during detection: new or escalated AD accounts, tools used to impair backups and shadow copies, unexpected remote monitoring and management software, and abnormal outbound data.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide",
   "source_note": "Part 2, Detection and Analysis: threat hunting",
   "lists": "technical",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "DT4",
   "group": "Detection",
   "weight": 2,
   "question": "Does the on-call route reach a person with authority to isolate systems outside business hours?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: a rota, a phone number staff know, and authority to isolate without escalation",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: a rota, but isolation needs a second approval",
   "answer_1_point": "Out-of-hours alerts go to an email inbox",
   "answer_0_points": "No out-of-hours route exists",
   "max_points": 6,
   "why_it_matters": "NIST says immediate execution of the response plan is necessary to stop continuing exfiltration and the spread of infection. CPG 5.A asks for a plan that names stakeholders and the mechanisms for coordination.",
   "source_url": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf",
   "source_note": "Table 1, RS.MA-01 ransomware application",
   "lists": "technical; leadership",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "SG1",
   "group": "Segmentation and platform",
   "weight": 2,
   "question": "Is the network segmented so that a compromised workstation cannot reach servers, backups and management interfaces directly?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: segments for workstations, servers, backups and management, with filtered traffic between them",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: some segments exist, but workstations reach server and backup networks",
   "answer_1_point": "Segmentation is by site only",
   "answer_0_points": "The network is flat",
   "max_points": 6,
   "why_it_matters": "The guide shows a flat network beside a segmented one and advises separating business units and IT from operational technology. CPG 3.I notes that segment boundaries can contain a breach and allow segments to be shut down during an intrusion.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0",
   "source_note": "Goal 3.I, Implement Logical/Physical Network Segmentation",
   "lists": "technical",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "SG2",
   "group": "Segmentation and platform",
   "weight": 3,
   "question": "Is every internet-facing service inventoried, with remote desktop closed to the internet and VPN and edge devices patched?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: an inventory of exposed services, no exposed remote desktop, edge devices on a patch schedule",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: an inventory exists, but edge patching lags the schedule",
   "answer_1_point": "Exposed services are known only to the network team",
   "answer_0_points": "No inventory of exposed services exists",
   "max_points": 9,
   "why_it_matters": "The guide says not to expose services such as remote desktop protocol on the web and to update VPNs and network infrastructure devices. CPG 3.S asks organizations to minimize internet-facing assets and keep software current.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide",
   "source_note": "Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Internet-Facing Vulnerabilities and Misconfigurations",
   "lists": "technical; smb",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "SG3",
   "group": "Segmentation and platform",
   "weight": 2,
   "question": "Do you patch known exploited vulnerabilities on internet-facing systems within a time limit you set, and scan for gaps?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: a written time limit, regular scanning and tracked exceptions",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: regular scanning, no written time limit",
   "answer_1_point": "Patching is ad hoc and by system owner",
   "answer_0_points": "No vulnerability scanning is done",
   "max_points": 6,
   "why_it_matters": "The guide asks for regular vulnerability scanning and timely patching of internet-facing servers, especially for known exploited vulnerabilities, and points to CISA vulnerability scanning at no cost. CPG 2.B asks for a vulnerability management program.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide",
   "source_note": "Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Internet-Facing Vulnerabilities and Misconfigurations",
   "lists": "technical",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "SG4",
   "group": "Segmentation and platform",
   "weight": 1,
   "question": "Is software execution restricted by allowlisting, and are hypervisors, PowerShell and remote tools hardened and logged?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: allowlisting on servers, hypervisors hardened, PowerShell logging on, remote tools restricted",
   "answer_2_points": "Three of these four are in place",
   "answer_1_point": "One or two are in place",
   "answer_0_points": "None are in place",
   "max_points": 3,
   "why_it_matters": "The guide recommends allowlisting so only authorized software runs, warns that ransomware strategies target hypervisors such as VMware ESXi, and asks for enhanced PowerShell logging and limits on remote monitoring and management tools.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide",
   "source_note": "Part 1, Precursor Malware Infection and General Best Practices",
   "lists": "technical",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "EE1",
   "group": "Email and edge",
   "weight": 2,
   "question": "Does email filtering block risky attachments, flag external senders and disable macros by default?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: attachment filters reviewed twice a year, external sender flag, macros blocked by policy",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: filters and macro policy, no external sender flag or review",
   "answer_1_point": "Basic spam filtering only",
   "answer_0_points": "No attachment or macro controls",
   "max_points": 6,
   "why_it_matters": "The guide advises attachment filters, reviewing file types at least semi-annually, flagging external email and disabling macros in Office files received by email. CPG 3.M asks for macros to be disabled by default.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide",
   "source_note": "Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Phishing",
   "lists": "technical; smb",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "EE2",
   "group": "Email and edge",
   "weight": 1,
   "question": "Are SPF, DKIM and DMARC set on all mail domains, with DMARC at reject?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: all three on every domain and DMARC set to reject",
   "answer_2_points": "All three are on, DMARC is set to monitor or quarantine",
   "answer_1_point": "SPF only",
   "answer_0_points": "None is configured",
   "max_points": 3,
   "why_it_matters": "CPG 3.L asks that STARTTLS, SPF, DKIM and DMARC are enabled on corporate email and DMARC is set to reject. The guide notes DMARC protects your domain from being spoofed but does not stop spoofed mail coming in.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0",
   "source_note": "Goal 3.L, Enable Email Security",
   "lists": "technical",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "EE3",
   "group": "Email and edge",
   "weight": 2,
   "question": "Does training cover phishing and advanced social engineering such as help desk impersonation, and do staff report without blame?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: annual training, simulations, a help desk verification step and a no-blame reporting route",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: annual training and simulations; no help desk step",
   "answer_1_point": "Annual training only",
   "answer_0_points": "No security awareness training",
   "max_points": 6,
   "why_it_matters": "The guide asks for training that includes advanced forms of social engineering. NIST asks for a culture of incident reporting that does not blame employees. CPG 3.J asks for at least annual training for all users.",
   "source_url": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf",
   "source_note": "Section 1.2, Basic Ransomware Tips, item 2; Table 1, PR.AT-01",
   "lists": "technical; smb; leadership",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "EE4",
   "group": "Email and edge",
   "weight": 1,
   "question": "Is protective DNS or web filtering in place, with remote management tool ports blocked at the perimeter?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: protective DNS or web filtering for all users, including remote workers, and remote tool ports blocked",
   "answer_2_points": "Web filtering on the office network only",
   "answer_1_point": "Blocklists maintained by hand",
   "answer_0_points": "Neither is in place",
   "max_points": 3,
   "why_it_matters": "The guide recommends Protective DNS, sandboxed browsers and blocking inbound and outbound connections on common remote monitoring and management ports at the perimeter. NIST names blocking untrusted web resources as a basic tip.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide",
   "source_note": "Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Advanced Forms of Social Engineering; General Best Practices (RMM)",
   "lists": "technical",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "RR1",
   "group": "Response readiness",
   "weight": 3,
   "question": "Is there an out-of-band way to reach responders and staff, and a paper contact list with 24-hour numbers?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: an out-of-band channel tested this year and a paper contact list with 24-hour numbers",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: a contact list, no tested out-of-band channel",
   "answer_1_point": "Contacts sit in email or a shared drive",
   "answer_0_points": "No contact list exists",
   "max_points": 9,
   "why_it_matters": "The guide asks for isolation coordinated by out-of-band communication such as phone calls, and for a response contacts table with 24x7 numbers. NIST asks that planning include a strategy for out-of-band communications if normal channels are disrupted.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide",
   "source_note": "Part 2, Detection and Analysis and Contact Information (Table 1)",
   "lists": "technical; leadership",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "RR2",
   "group": "Response readiness",
   "weight": 2,
   "question": "Do you have an incident response firm and breach counsel on retainer or pre-agreed terms, and does your insurer know the process?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: a retainer or pre-agreed terms with an IR firm and counsel, and the insurer notification step is written down",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: an IR firm or counsel on retainer, not both",
   "answer_1_point": "You would search for a firm after an incident starts",
   "answer_0_points": "Nothing is arranged",
   "max_points": 6,
   "why_it_matters": "The guide lists managed security service providers and cyber insurance among the response contacts to fill in beforehand. NIST asks that a list of contacts including law enforcement, legal counsel and incident response resources is kept current.",
   "source_url": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf",
   "source_note": "Section 1.2, Basic Ransomware Tips, item 6",
   "lists": "leadership; smb",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "RR3",
   "group": "Response readiness",
   "weight": 2,
   "question": "Is there a written path for a ransom payment decision, including a sanctions screening step and contact with law enforcement first?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: decider named, sanctions screening and law enforcement contact are mandatory steps, counsel and insurer consulted",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: a decider is named but screening is not written down",
   "answer_1_point": "The decision would be taken on the day",
   "answer_0_points": "No one has thought about it",
   "max_points": 6,
   "why_it_matters": "OFAC says facilitating a payment may violate sanctions rules, and treats early reporting to law enforcement and cooperation as significant mitigating factors. NIST notes that event impact informs a cost-benefit analysis when deciding if a ransom should be paid.",
   "source_url": "https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/912981/download?inline",
   "source_note": "Updated advisory of 21 September 2021",
   "lists": "leadership",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "RR4",
   "group": "Response readiness",
   "weight": 1,
   "question": "Can responders capture memory and disk images and keep a time-stamped decision log from the first hour?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: tools, a trained person and a log template are ready",
   "answer_2_points": "A log template exists; imaging would rely on an outside firm",
   "answer_1_point": "Responders would improvise",
   "answer_0_points": "No preservation process exists",
   "max_points": 3,
   "why_it_matters": "The guide asks responders to take a system image and memory capture of a sample of affected devices and to preserve volatile evidence such as memory and Windows Security logs. Powering off loses volatile memory, so the choice should be made knowingly.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide",
   "source_note": "Part 2, Containment and Eradication",
   "lists": "technical",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "TP1",
   "group": "Third parties",
   "weight": 2,
   "question": "Do vendor and service provider contracts require incident notice within a set time?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: all critical vendors must notify within a stated number of hours or days",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: some contracts do",
   "answer_1_point": "Notice is promised but no time is set",
   "answer_0_points": "Contracts say nothing about notice",
   "max_points": 6,
   "why_it_matters": "CPG 1.D asks that procurement documents and contracts stipulate that vendors notify the customer of security incidents within a risk-informed time frame. NIST asks that roles and responsibilities of suppliers, customers and partners are communicated.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0",
   "source_note": "Goal 1.D, Supply Chain Incident Reporting",
   "lists": "leadership; technical",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "TP2",
   "group": "Third parties",
   "weight": 3,
   "question": "Is managed service provider access limited by least privilege, MFA and logging, and do you audit remote management tools?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: limited roles, MFA, logged sessions, and a quarterly audit of provider accounts and remote tools",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: limited roles and MFA, no regular audit",
   "answer_1_point": "Providers have broad standing access",
   "answer_0_points": "Access held by providers is not known",
   "max_points": 9,
   "why_it_matters": "The guide notes that managed service providers have been an infection vector for ransomware and asks for least privilege and separation of duties for third parties and an audit of remote access tools. CPG 1.E covers managed service provider risk.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide",
   "source_note": "Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Third Parties and Managed Service Providers",
   "lists": "technical; leadership; smb",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "TP3",
   "group": "Third parties",
   "weight": 2,
   "question": "If a provider keeps your backups or runs your systems, does the contract require the same backup practices you use?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: contract language requires offline copies, tested restores and notice of failures",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: the practices are assumed, not contracted",
   "answer_1_point": "You know the provider practice informally",
   "answer_0_points": "The provider backup practice has never been asked about",
   "max_points": 6,
   "why_it_matters": "The guide says that if a third party or managed service provider is responsible for maintaining and securing your organization backups, it should follow the same best practices, and asks that contract language formalizes this.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide",
   "source_note": "Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Third Parties and Managed Service Providers",
   "lists": "technical",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "TP4",
   "group": "Third parties",
   "weight": 1,
   "question": "Are key providers on your contact list and in your exercises, and is cyber insurance in place?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: key providers take part in exercises, are on the contact list, and a cyber policy is in force",
   "answer_2_points": "Providers are on the contact list; no joint exercise",
   "answer_1_point": "Providers would be called after the event",
   "answer_0_points": "No",
   "max_points": 3,
   "why_it_matters": "NIST says ransomware contingency planning should be coordinated with suppliers and third-party providers and include testing. It lists cyber insurance as a way to ease financial pressure during response and recovery.",
   "source_url": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf",
   "source_note": "Table 1, GV.SC-08 and Section 1.2 item 6",
   "lists": "leadership",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "OT1",
   "group": "Operational technology",
   "weight": 3,
   "question": "Are IT and OT networks separated by a demilitarized zone, with industrial protocols barred from the IT network?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: a DMZ between IT and OT, zones by criticality, industrial protocols kept off the IT network",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: a DMZ exists, but zones are not defined",
   "answer_1_point": "A firewall separates them with broad rules",
   "answer_0_points": "IT and OT share a network",
   "max_points": 9,
   "why_it_matters": "CISA and FBI advise strong segmentation between IT and OT networks, a DMZ that removes unregulated communication, logical zones by criticality, and prohibiting industrial control system protocols from traversing the IT network.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-131a",
   "source_note": "Mitigations: segmentation between IT and OT",
   "lists": "ot; technical",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "OT2",
   "group": "Operational technology",
   "weight": 3,
   "question": "Have you tested running the plant manually, and isolating OT from IT, within the last 12 months?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: a manual operation test and an isolation test in the last 12 months, with the result recorded",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: a paper exercise only",
   "answer_1_point": "Discussed but not exercised",
   "answer_0_points": "Never considered",
   "max_points": 9,
   "why_it_matters": "AA21-131A asks owners to identify IT and OT interdependencies, build workarounds or manual controls so the ICS network can be isolated, and test them regularly so safety-critical functions run through an incident. CPG 6.A mentions degraded operation.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-131a",
   "source_note": "Mitigations: manual controls and isolation",
   "lists": "ot; technical",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "OT3",
   "group": "Operational technology",
   "weight": 2,
   "question": "Is there a current inventory of OT assets and a network topology diagram, stored offline?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: inventory and topology reviewed within 12 months, with offline copies",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: inventory exists but is older than 12 months",
   "answer_1_point": "Partial lists held by plant engineers",
   "answer_0_points": "No inventory",
   "max_points": 6,
   "why_it_matters": "CPG 2.A asks that critical IT and OT assets be inventoried and updated more often. CPG 2.E asks for accurate network topology documentation across IT and OT networks, reviewed annually. The guide asks for offline copies of network documentation.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0",
   "source_note": "Goals 2.A and 2.E",
   "lists": "ot; technical",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  },
  {
   "control_id": "OT4",
   "group": "Operational technology",
   "weight": 2,
   "question": "Are backups and gold images of controllers, HMIs and engineering workstations kept offline and restore-tested?",
   "answer_3_points": "Yes: offline backups and gold images for all three, restore-tested",
   "answer_2_points": "Yes: offline backups, restore not tested",
   "answer_1_point": "Backups kept on the OT network",
   "answer_0_points": "No OT backups exist",
   "max_points": 6,
   "why_it_matters": "AA21-131A asks for regular backups on both IT and OT networks, offline storage, tested restores, gold images of critical systems and retained backup hardware.",
   "source_url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-131a",
   "source_note": "Mitigations: backups on IT and OT networks",
   "lists": "ot; technical",
   "read_date": "2026-11-16"
  }
 ]
}