# Ransomware Readiness Assessment: every page as markdown A ransomware readiness reference: a 36-control self-assessment with published scoring, a mapping of each control to CISA and NIST guidance, a response plan template, a playbook, the first 24 hours, and the decisions and reporting duties that follow an attack. Every fact sourced and dated. --- # Ransomware readiness assessment: score your controls, see the gaps, and plan the response Reference, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A ransomware readiness assessment scores the controls that decide whether an attack stops early and whether you can recover. This site offers one with 36 controls, a table mapping each to CISA and NIST guidance, a response plan, a playbook and the first 24 hours, all read at source. ## What is ransomware readiness? Ransomware readiness is the ability to prevent, detect, respond to and recover from a ransomware event. NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, finalized in June 2026, says its profile helps gauge that readiness and deal with the consequences of events. The [definition page](/readiness/what-is-ransomware-readiness/) sets out the wording used by NIST and CISA. ## The two original assets ### Asset 1: The Ransomware Readiness Assessment 36 controls in nine groups with points, weights, bands and sources. Printable, free, and downloadable as CSV and JSON. [Take the assessment](/assessment/) ### Asset 2: The control mapping What each control maps to in the #StopRansomware Guide, NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, CISA CPG 2.0 and the CISA RRA. [Open the mapping](/mapping/) ### Template: The ransomware response plan A 13-section plan template in full on the page and as a Word file. [Open the template](/plan/ransomware-response-plan-template/) ### In an incident: The first 24 hours An hour-by-hour guide and a 12-line checklist built from the #StopRansomware Guide. [Start the checklist](/response/first-24-hours/) ## Every page, by section Six sections, each with a guide that links to the rest. ### Readiness - [Ransomware readiness: what it covers and how to test it](/readiness/ransomware-readiness/) - [What is ransomware readiness? A plain definition](/readiness/what-is-ransomware-readiness/) - [CISA Ransomware Readiness Assessment (RRA) explained](/readiness/cisa-ransomware-readiness-assessment-rra/) - [NIST ransomware readiness assessment: IR 8374 Rev. 1](/readiness/nist-ransomware-readiness-assessment/) - [Ransomware readiness assessment tools and what they test](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-assessment-tool/) - [Ransomware readiness checklist for a leadership review](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-checklist/) - [Ransomware preparedness checklist for IT teams](/readiness/ransomware-preparedness-checklist/) - [Ransomware readiness for a small business](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-for-small-business/) - [Ransomware readiness board briefing: questions to ask](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-board-briefing/) - [Ransomware readiness assessment cost: what drives it](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-assessment-cost/) - [Backup and Active Directory recovery readiness](/readiness/ransomware-backup-and-identity-recovery-readiness/) ### Response plan - [Ransomware response plan: what it holds and who signs](/plan/ransomware-response-plan/) - [Ransomware response plan template: full text and .docx](/plan/ransomware-response-plan-template/) - [Ransomware response roles: who does what](/plan/ransomware-response-roles/) - [Ransomware communications plan: staff, customers, press](/plan/ransomware-communications-plan/) - [Ransomware decision log template](/plan/ransomware-decision-log/) ### Playbook - [Ransomware playbook: steps for the first 72 hours](/playbook/ransomware-playbook/) - [What is a ransomware playbook, and who holds it?](/playbook/what-is-a-ransomware-playbook/) - [Ransomware playbook flowchart: the decision paths](/playbook/ransomware-playbook-flowchart/) - [Ransomware playbook keyed to NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1](/playbook/ransomware-playbook-nist/) - [Ransomware incident report template, ten sections](/playbook/ransomware-incident-report-template/) ### Incident response - [Ransomware incident response: the whole process explained](/response/ransomware-incident-response/) - [Ransomware incident response steps, in order, with owners](/response/ransomware-incident-response-steps/) - [Ransomware first 24 hours: an hour-by-hour guide](/response/first-24-hours/) - [Ransomware incident response procedure and techniques](/response/ransomware-incident-response-procedure/) ### Decisions - [First hour of a ransomware attack: isolate or shut down?](/decisions/first-hour-of-ransomware/) - [Should you pay a ransom? Legal and practical checks](/decisions/should-you-pay-ransomware/) - [Ransom payment and OFAC sanctions screening](/decisions/ransom-payment-and-sanctions/) - [Ransomware negotiation: what negotiators do](/decisions/ransomware-negotiation/) - [Double extortion ransomware: stolen data and encryption](/decisions/double-extortion/) - [Ransomware and cyber insurance: what to arrange first](/decisions/ransomware-and-cyber-insurance/) - [Ransomware recovery order: what to restore first](/decisions/ransomware-recovery-order/) - [Ransomware in OT environments: a guide](/decisions/ransomware-in-ot-environments/) ### Reporting duties - [Ransomware reporting duties: who to tell and when](/reporting/ransomware-reporting-duties/) - [CIRCIA ransomware reporting: status on 16 November 2026](/reporting/circia-ransomware-reporting-status/) - [SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05 and ransomware: the four-day clock](/reporting/sec-form-8-k-item-1-05/) - [HIPAA breach notification and healthcare ransomware](/reporting/hipaa-breach-notification-ransomware/) - [State breach notification laws: citations by state](/reporting/state-breach-notification-laws/) ### More - [Who offers ransomware readiness assessments and response](/providers/) - [Glossary, 23 terms](/glossary/) - [19 questions answered](/faq/) - [Dated news items](/news/) - [Datasets: CSV and JSON](/datasets/) - [How sources are read](/method/) - [Editorial policy](/editorial-policy/) ## Sources - NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Community Profile (CSRC record): https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8374/r1/final (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/ --- # Ransomware readiness assessment: score 36 controls and find your priority gaps Assessment, edition 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** The ransomware readiness assessment on this page has 36 controls in 9 groups. Each has four answers worth 3, 2, 1 or 0 points and a weight of 1 to 3. A percent places you in one of four bands, and weight-3 controls scored zero are listed as priority gaps. Edition 16 November 2026. ## What is a ransomware readiness assessment? A ransomware readiness assessment is a self-check of the controls that decide whether an attack stops early and whether you can recover from it. This one has 36 controls in 9 groups. Each control is a question with four answers worth 3, 2, 1 or 0 points, a weight of 1 to 3, a reason it matters and the source it comes from. Tick one answer per control, multiply by the weight, add up, and divide by the total available. Four bands turn the percent into a reading. Any weight-3 control answered with 0 points is listed as a priority gap whatever the total. The full rules are on the [method page](/assessment/method/), and the [control mapping](/mapping/) shows how each control relates to CISA and NIST documents. | Band | Percent of points available | Reading | | --- | --- | --- | | Critical gaps | 0 to 29 | Basic protections are missing. A ransomware event would likely stop the business until rebuilt. | | Partial | 30 to 54 | Some controls are in place, but one or more of the main routes in or the route back is open. | | Established | 55 to 79 | Most controls exist. The remaining work is testing, written authority and coverage of edge cases. | | Tested | 80 to 100 | Controls exist and have been exercised. Keep the evidence and repeat the test each year. | Bands as published in the scoring rules. Total available: 234 points with the OT group, 204 without it. ## Is there a ransomware readiness assessment checklist you can print? Yes. This page is the checklist: every question and answer is in plain HTML, so it prints and works with scripts off. Print it, tick one answer per control, and write the points beside each. The table at the end collects the totals. Shorter versions are the [leadership checklist](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-checklist/) and the [technical checklist](/readiness/ransomware-preparedness-checklist/). Download the control set as [CSV](/datasets/ransomware-readiness-controls.csv) or [JSON](/datasets/ransomware-readiness-controls.json). ## Governance (4 controls) Who decides, what is written down, and whether it has been rehearsed. ### GV1. Is one named executive accountable for ransomware decisions, with written authority to order systems isolated? - 3 points: Yes: a named executive, a deputy, and written authority to isolate systems without waiting for a meeting - 2 points: Yes: a named executive, but isolation authority is not written down - 1 points: A security manager is the owner; no executive has agreed to the role - 0 points: No owner is named **Weight 3** (up to 9 points). NIST says ransomware events often cause an immediate loss of business functions, so everyone needs to understand their role, responsibility and authority before an event happens. *Source:* [NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf), Table 1, GV.RR-02 ransomware application. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 1.A; NIST GV.RR-02, GV.OC-01; RRA RM. ### GV2. Does your incident response plan carry ransomware and data-extortion procedures, approved in writing by the CEO or equivalent? - 3 points: Yes: ransomware procedures are in the plan, the CEO or equivalent signed it, and a paper copy is kept offline - 2 points: Yes: ransomware procedures are in the plan and signed, but no offline copy exists - 1 points: The plan is generic and has no ransomware procedures - 0 points: There is no written plan **Weight 3** (up to 9 points). The #StopRansomware Guide asks for a plan and communications plan covering ransomware and extortion, approved by the CEO or equivalent in writing, with a hard copy and an offline version available. *Source:* [CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026)](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), Part 1, Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 1.C; NIST ID.IM-04, RS.MA-01; RRA IR. ### GV3. Was the plan exercised against a ransomware scenario in the last 12 months, with executives in the room? - 3 points: Yes: a tabletop or live exercise in the last 12 months, executives took part, and fixes were logged - 2 points: Yes: an exercise in the last 12 months, but executives did not take part - 1 points: An exercise was held more than 12 months ago - 0 points: No ransomware exercise has been held **Weight 2** (up to 6 points). CPG 1.C asks that plans are regularly exercised with realistic drills that include all relevant stakeholders. CISA publishes tabletop exercise packages whose scenarios include ransomware. *Source:* [CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list](https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0), Goal 1.C, Manage Incident Response Plans. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 1.C, 2.C; NIST ID.IM-04; RRA IR. ### GV4. Are your legal reporting duties for a ransomware event written down, with the clock, the recipient and the owner for each? - 3 points: Yes: each duty is listed with its clock, its recipient and a named owner, and counsel has reviewed the list - 2 points: Yes: duties are listed, but clocks or owners are missing - 1 points: Counsel knows the duties; nothing is written down - 0 points: No one has listed the duties **Weight 2** (up to 6 points). Duties differ by facts: personal data, health information, public company status, critical infrastructure status. NIST asks organizations to understand and manage legal, regulatory and contractual requirements before an event. The reporting pages of this site set out the duties read at source. *Source:* [NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf), Table 1, GV.OC-03 and RS.CO-02 ransomware applications. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 5.B; NIST GV.OC-03, RS.CO-02; RRA IR. ## Identity and access (4 controls) How attackers get credentials and how far a stolen one reaches. ### ID1. Is phishing-resistant multifactor authentication required for email, remote access, administrator accounts and cloud consoles? - 3 points: Yes: phishing-resistant MFA on all four, with exceptions escalated to senior management - 2 points: Yes: MFA on all four, but some use codes or push approvals rather than phishing-resistant methods - 1 points: MFA covers remote access only - 0 points: MFA is not required for these **Weight 3** (up to 9 points). Compromised credentials are one of the initial access routes the #StopRansomware Guide groups its advice around. NIST says phishing-resistant MFA and zero trust architectures are strongly recommended for authentication. CPG 3.F ranks MFA methods by strength. *Source:* [CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026)](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Compromised Credentials. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 3.F; NIST PR.AA-03, PR.AA-01; RRA UM. ### ID2. Do administrators use separate accounts from their daily email and web accounts, and are privileges reviewed at least quarterly? - 3 points: Yes: separate admin accounts, no admin rights on daily accounts, quarterly privilege reviews - 2 points: Yes: separate admin accounts, reviewed less than quarterly - 1 points: Some administrators use separate accounts - 0 points: Administrators use one account for everything **Weight 3** (up to 9 points). Attackers use privileged accounts to move across a network and to reach backups. CPG 3.G asks that ordinary user accounts hold no administrator privileges and that admins keep separate accounts for email and browsing; CPG 3.H asks for quarterly access reviews. *Source:* [CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list](https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0), Goals 3.G and 3.H. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 3.G, 3.H; NIST PR.AA-05; RRA UM. ### ID3. Are domain controllers and the identity platform hardened, restricted to a small admin group and kept off the internet? - 3 points: Yes: small admin group, no internet access from domain controllers, privileged access monitored, current server versions - 2 points: Yes: small admin group and no internet access, but no privileged access monitoring - 1 points: Some hardening has been done; no review against a checklist - 0 points: Domain controllers are managed like ordinary servers **Weight 2** (up to 6 points). The guide says malicious actors often use domain controllers as a staging point to spread ransomware across a network, and lists steps to secure them, including limiting the Administrators group and blocking internet access from them. *Source:* [CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026)](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), Part 1, General Best Practices: Secure domain controllers. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 3.H; NIST PR.AA-05, DE.CM-03; RRA UM. ### ID4. Are default passwords changed, passwords unique and long, failed logins alerted on, and leavers cut off promptly? - 3 points: Yes: all four are enforced by system policy and audited - 2 points: Three of the four are enforced - 1 points: One or two of the four are enforced - 0 points: None is enforced by policy **Weight 1** (up to 3 points). CPG 3.A to 3.E cover default passwords, minimum strength (16 or more characters where technically feasible), unique credentials, revoking credentials for departing staff and monitoring unsuccessful logins. CISA rates four of the five low cost and 3.E moderate. *Source:* [CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list](https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0), Goals 3.A, 3.B, 3.C, 3.D and 3.E. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 3.A, 3.B, 3.C, 3.D, 3.E; NIST PR.AA-01; RRA UM. ## Backups and recovery (4 controls) Whether you can restore without paying, and how fast. ### BR1. Are encrypted backups of critical systems kept offline or immutable, out of reach of your domain administrator credentials? - 3 points: Yes: offline or immutable copies, encrypted, and unreachable with domain admin or cloud admin credentials - 2 points: Yes: offline or immutable copies, but reachable with administrator credentials - 1 points: Backups exist on the network or in the same cloud account as production - 0 points: Backups are not routine **Weight 3** (up to 9 points). The guide says many ransomware variants look for backups to delete or encrypt, so copies should be kept offline. NIST wants a copy stored where the attacker cannot reach it. Microsoft advises restoring from immutable storage that neither attacker nor administrator can modify. *Source:* [CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026)](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), Part 1, Preparing: offline, encrypted backups. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 3.O; NIST PR.DS-11; RRA DB. ### BR2. Has a full restore of your critical systems been tested in the last 12 months, with the elapsed time recorded? - 3 points: Yes: a full restore test in the last 12 months, time recorded and compared with the business target - 2 points: Yes: file or single-system restores tested, no full test - 1 points: Backups are checked for completion but never restored - 0 points: Restores have never been tested **Weight 3** (up to 9 points). A copy that has never been restored is untested. NIST asks that backup integrity be verified before restoration, and the guide asks that backups are regularly tested for availability and integrity in a disaster recovery scenario. *Source:* [NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf), Table 1, RC.RP-03 ransomware application. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 3.O, 6.A; NIST RC.RP-03, PR.DS-11; RRA DB. ### BR3. Do you hold golden images, infrastructure-as-code templates and installers with license keys, stored offline? - 3 points: Yes: images, templates and installers are current, version controlled and stored offline - 2 points: Yes: images exist but are stored on the network - 1 points: Images exist for some systems only - 0 points: No images or offline installers are kept **Weight 2** (up to 6 points). Rebuilding from images is faster than reinstalling by hand. The guide asks for current golden images, offline copies of cloud templates and stored source code or executables; CPG 3.O asks for a list of backups including installation media and license keys. *Source:* [CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026)](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), Part 1, Preparing: golden images and infrastructure as code. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 3.O; NIST RC.RP-02; RRA DB. ### BR4. Is there a ranked list of systems to restore, with their dependencies, and identity at the front of it? - 3 points: Yes: ranked list with dependencies, approved by the business, with identity services first - 2 points: Yes: ranked list, but dependencies are not mapped - 1 points: IT knows the order informally - 0 points: There is no recovery order **Weight 2** (up to 6 points). The guide asks for restoration prioritized by a predefined critical asset list covering health and safety, revenue and other critical services, with their dependencies. NIST says asset prioritization is key to scoping an event and ordering recovery. *Source:* [CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026)](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), Part 2, Detection and Analysis: triage impacted systems. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 2.A, 6.A; NIST ID.AM-05, RC.RP-02; RRA AM. ## Detection (4 controls) Whether someone sees the precursors before the encryption starts. ### DT1. Is endpoint detection or centrally managed anti-malware on servers and endpoints, with alerts that reach a person at any hour? - 3 points: Yes: on all servers and endpoints, centrally managed, with alerts answered at any hour - 2 points: Yes: on all servers and endpoints, but alerts are read in office hours only - 1 points: Deployed on some systems; servers or legacy hosts are missing - 0 points: Signature anti-malware only, unmanaged **Weight 3** (up to 9 points). The guide recommends application allowlisting or EDR on all assets, and a centrally managed antivirus that escalates warnings to security staff. CPG 4.A asks for signature and non-signature mechanisms at system endpoints. *Source:* [CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026)](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Precursor Malware Infection. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 4.A; NIST DE.CM-09, DE.AE-02; RRA AI. ### DT2. Are logs from critical systems, firewalls, VPN and identity collected centrally and kept for at least a year? - 3 points: Yes: central collection, kept 12 months or more, with PowerShell logging enabled - 2 points: Yes: central collection, kept less than 12 months - 1 points: Logs stay on each device - 0 points: Logging is off or unknown **Weight 2** (up to 6 points). The guide asks for centralized log management and for backing up logs of critical systems for a minimum of one year if possible. NIST notes that log records support both anomaly detection and forensics during recovery. *Source:* [CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026)](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), Part 1, General Best Practices: logs and centralized log management. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 3.Q; NIST PR.PS-04; RRA NM. ### DT3. Do you alert on ransomware precursors: new privileged accounts, backup or shadow-copy deletion, unexpected remote management tools, large outbound transfers? - 3 points: Yes: alerts exist for all four and were tested - 2 points: Alerts exist for two or three - 1 points: An alert exists for one - 0 points: None of these is monitored **Weight 2** (up to 6 points). The guide lists these exact areas for threat hunting during detection: new or escalated AD accounts, tools used to impair backups and shadow copies, unexpected remote monitoring and management software, and abnormal outbound data. *Source:* [CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026)](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), Part 2, Detection and Analysis: threat hunting. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 4.B; NIST DE.AE-02, DE.CM-01; RRA NM. ### DT4. Does the on-call route reach a person with authority to isolate systems outside business hours? - 3 points: Yes: a rota, a phone number staff know, and authority to isolate without escalation - 2 points: Yes: a rota, but isolation needs a second approval - 1 points: Out-of-hours alerts go to an email inbox - 0 points: No out-of-hours route exists **Weight 2** (up to 6 points). NIST says immediate execution of the response plan is necessary to stop continuing exfiltration and the spread of infection. CPG 5.A asks for a plan that names stakeholders and the mechanisms for coordination. *Source:* [NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf), Table 1, RS.MA-01 ransomware application. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 5.A; NIST RS.MA-01; RRA IR. ## Segmentation and platform (4 controls) How far an intruder can travel and what they can reach from the internet. ### SG1. Is the network segmented so that a compromised workstation cannot reach servers, backups and management interfaces directly? - 3 points: Yes: segments for workstations, servers, backups and management, with filtered traffic between them - 2 points: Yes: some segments exist, but workstations reach server and backup networks - 1 points: Segmentation is by site only - 0 points: The network is flat **Weight 2** (up to 6 points). The guide shows a flat network beside a segmented one and advises separating business units and IT from operational technology. CPG 3.I notes that segment boundaries can contain a breach and allow segments to be shut down during an intrusion. *Source:* [CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list](https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0), Goal 3.I, Implement Logical/Physical Network Segmentation. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 3.I; NIST PR.IR-01; RRA NM. ### SG2. Is every internet-facing service inventoried, with remote desktop closed to the internet and VPN and edge devices patched? - 3 points: Yes: an inventory of exposed services, no exposed remote desktop, edge devices on a patch schedule - 2 points: Yes: an inventory exists, but edge patching lags the schedule - 1 points: Exposed services are known only to the network team - 0 points: No inventory of exposed services exists **Weight 3** (up to 9 points). The guide says not to expose services such as remote desktop protocol on the web and to update VPNs and network infrastructure devices. CPG 3.S asks organizations to minimize internet-facing assets and keep software current. *Source:* [CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026)](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Internet-Facing Vulnerabilities and Misconfigurations. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 3.S, 2.B; NIST PR.PS-02, ID.AM-02; RRA PM. ### SG3. Do you patch known exploited vulnerabilities on internet-facing systems within a time limit you set, and scan for gaps? - 3 points: Yes: a written time limit, regular scanning and tracked exceptions - 2 points: Yes: regular scanning, no written time limit - 1 points: Patching is ad hoc and by system owner - 0 points: No vulnerability scanning is done **Weight 2** (up to 6 points). The guide asks for regular vulnerability scanning and timely patching of internet-facing servers, especially for known exploited vulnerabilities, and points to CISA vulnerability scanning at no cost. CPG 2.B asks for a vulnerability management program. *Source:* [CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026)](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Internet-Facing Vulnerabilities and Misconfigurations. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 2.B; NIST ID.AM-02, PR.PS-02; RRA PM. ### SG4. Is software execution restricted by allowlisting, and are hypervisors, PowerShell and remote tools hardened and logged? - 3 points: Yes: allowlisting on servers, hypervisors hardened, PowerShell logging on, remote tools restricted - 2 points: Three of these four are in place - 1 points: One or two are in place - 0 points: None are in place **Weight 1** (up to 3 points). The guide recommends allowlisting so only authorized software runs, warns that ransomware strategies target hypervisors such as VMware ESXi, and asks for enhanced PowerShell logging and limits on remote monitoring and management tools. *Source:* [CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026)](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), Part 1, Precursor Malware Infection and General Best Practices. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 3.P; NIST PR.PS-05; RRA AI. ## Email and edge (4 controls) Phishing, social engineering and web filtering in front of users. ### EE1. Does email filtering block risky attachments, flag external senders and disable macros by default? - 3 points: Yes: attachment filters reviewed twice a year, external sender flag, macros blocked by policy - 2 points: Yes: filters and macro policy, no external sender flag or review - 1 points: Basic spam filtering only - 0 points: No attachment or macro controls **Weight 2** (up to 6 points). The guide advises attachment filters, reviewing file types at least semi-annually, flagging external email and disabling macros in Office files received by email. CPG 3.M asks for macros to be disabled by default. *Source:* [CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026)](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Phishing. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 3.M, 3.L; NIST DE.CM-09; RRA PP. ### EE2. Are SPF, DKIM and DMARC set on all mail domains, with DMARC at reject? - 3 points: Yes: all three on every domain and DMARC set to reject - 2 points: All three are on, DMARC is set to monitor or quarantine - 1 points: SPF only - 0 points: None is configured **Weight 1** (up to 3 points). CPG 3.L asks that STARTTLS, SPF, DKIM and DMARC are enabled on corporate email and DMARC is set to reject. The guide notes DMARC protects your domain from being spoofed but does not stop spoofed mail coming in. *Source:* [CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list](https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0), Goal 3.L, Enable Email Security. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 3.L; NIST no cited ID; RRA PP. ### EE3. Does training cover phishing and advanced social engineering such as help desk impersonation, and do staff report without blame? - 3 points: Yes: annual training, simulations, a help desk verification step and a no-blame reporting route - 2 points: Yes: annual training and simulations; no help desk step - 1 points: Annual training only - 0 points: No security awareness training **Weight 2** (up to 6 points). The guide asks for training that includes advanced forms of social engineering. NIST asks for a culture of incident reporting that does not blame employees. CPG 3.J asks for at least annual training for all users. *Source:* [NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf), Section 1.2, Basic Ransomware Tips, item 2; Table 1, PR.AT-01. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 3.J; NIST PR.AT-01; RRA PP. ### EE4. Is protective DNS or web filtering in place, with remote management tool ports blocked at the perimeter? - 3 points: Yes: protective DNS or web filtering for all users, including remote workers, and remote tool ports blocked - 2 points: Web filtering on the office network only - 1 points: Blocklists maintained by hand - 0 points: Neither is in place **Weight 1** (up to 3 points). The guide recommends Protective DNS, sandboxed browsers and blocking inbound and outbound connections on common remote monitoring and management ports at the perimeter. NIST names blocking untrusted web resources as a basic tip. *Source:* [CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026)](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Advanced Forms of Social Engineering; General Best Practices (RMM). *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 no direct goal; NIST ID.AM-03, DE.CM-01; RRA BM. ## Response readiness (4 controls) Contacts, authority and evidence handling on the day. ### RR1. Is there an out-of-band way to reach responders and staff, and a paper contact list with 24-hour numbers? - 3 points: Yes: an out-of-band channel tested this year and a paper contact list with 24-hour numbers - 2 points: Yes: a contact list, no tested out-of-band channel - 1 points: Contacts sit in email or a shared drive - 0 points: No contact list exists **Weight 3** (up to 9 points). The guide asks for isolation coordinated by out-of-band communication such as phone calls, and for a response contacts table with 24x7 numbers. NIST asks that planning include a strategy for out-of-band communications if normal channels are disrupted. *Source:* [CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026)](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), Part 2, Detection and Analysis and Contact Information (Table 1). *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 5.A; NIST RS.CO-02, RC.CO-03; RRA IR. ### RR2. Do you have an incident response firm and breach counsel on retainer or pre-agreed terms, and does your insurer know the process? - 3 points: Yes: a retainer or pre-agreed terms with an IR firm and counsel, and the insurer notification step is written down - 2 points: Yes: an IR firm or counsel on retainer, not both - 1 points: You would search for a firm after an incident starts - 0 points: Nothing is arranged **Weight 2** (up to 6 points). The guide lists managed security service providers and cyber insurance among the response contacts to fill in beforehand. NIST asks that a list of contacts including law enforcement, legal counsel and incident response resources is kept current. *Source:* [NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf), Section 1.2, Basic Ransomware Tips, item 6. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 6.A; NIST RS.CO-02, RS.CO-03, GV.RM-03; RRA IR. ### RR3. Is there a written path for a ransom payment decision, including a sanctions screening step and contact with law enforcement first? - 3 points: Yes: decider named, sanctions screening and law enforcement contact are mandatory steps, counsel and insurer consulted - 2 points: Yes: a decider is named but screening is not written down - 1 points: The decision would be taken on the day - 0 points: No one has thought about it **Weight 2** (up to 6 points). OFAC says facilitating a payment may violate sanctions rules, and treats early reporting to law enforcement and cooperation as significant mitigating factors. NIST notes that event impact informs a cost-benefit analysis when deciding if a ransom should be paid. *Source:* [OFAC: Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments, 21 September 2021](https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/912981/download?inline), Updated advisory of 21 September 2021. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 5.B; NIST DE.AE-04, GV.RM-02; RRA RM. ### RR4. Can responders capture memory and disk images and keep a time-stamped decision log from the first hour? - 3 points: Yes: tools, a trained person and a log template are ready - 2 points: A log template exists; imaging would rely on an outside firm - 1 points: Responders would improvise - 0 points: No preservation process exists **Weight 1** (up to 3 points). The guide asks responders to take a system image and memory capture of a sample of affected devices and to preserve volatile evidence such as memory and Windows Security logs. Powering off loses volatile memory, so the choice should be made knowingly. *Source:* [CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026)](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), Part 2, Containment and Eradication. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 no direct goal; NIST RS.MI-01; RRA IR. ## Third parties (4 controls) Vendors and managed service providers who hold access or backups. ### TP1. Do vendor and service provider contracts require incident notice within a set time? - 3 points: Yes: all critical vendors must notify within a stated number of hours or days - 2 points: Yes: some contracts do - 1 points: Notice is promised but no time is set - 0 points: Contracts say nothing about notice **Weight 2** (up to 6 points). CPG 1.D asks that procurement documents and contracts stipulate that vendors notify the customer of security incidents within a risk-informed time frame. NIST asks that roles and responsibilities of suppliers, customers and partners are communicated. *Source:* [CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list](https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0), Goal 1.D, Supply Chain Incident Reporting. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 1.D; NIST GV.SC-02, GV.SC-08; RRA RM. ### TP2. Is managed service provider access limited by least privilege, MFA and logging, and do you audit remote management tools? - 3 points: Yes: limited roles, MFA, logged sessions, and a quarterly audit of provider accounts and remote tools - 2 points: Yes: limited roles and MFA, no regular audit - 1 points: Providers have broad standing access - 0 points: Access held by providers is not known **Weight 3** (up to 9 points). The guide notes that managed service providers have been an infection vector for ransomware and asks for least privilege and separation of duties for third parties and an audit of remote access tools. CPG 1.E covers managed service provider risk. *Source:* [CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026)](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Third Parties and Managed Service Providers. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 1.E; NIST DE.CM-06, GV.SC-02; RRA UM. ### TP3. If a provider keeps your backups or runs your systems, does the contract require the same backup practices you use? - 3 points: Yes: contract language requires offline copies, tested restores and notice of failures - 2 points: Yes: the practices are assumed, not contracted - 1 points: You know the provider practice informally - 0 points: The provider backup practice has never been asked about **Weight 2** (up to 6 points). The guide says that if a third party or managed service provider is responsible for maintaining and securing your organization backups, it should follow the same best practices, and asks that contract language formalizes this. *Source:* [CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026)](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), Part 1, Initial Access Vector: Third Parties and Managed Service Providers. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 1.E; NIST GV.SC-08; RRA DB. ### TP4. Are key providers on your contact list and in your exercises, and is cyber insurance in place? - 3 points: Yes: key providers take part in exercises, are on the contact list, and a cyber policy is in force - 2 points: Providers are on the contact list; no joint exercise - 1 points: Providers would be called after the event - 0 points: No **Weight 1** (up to 3 points). NIST says ransomware contingency planning should be coordinated with suppliers and third-party providers and include testing. It lists cyber insurance as a way to ease financial pressure during response and recovery. *Source:* [NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026)](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf), Table 1, GV.SC-08 and Section 1.2 item 6. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 1.D; NIST GV.SC-08, GV.RM-03; RRA RM. ## Operational technology (4 controls) For sites with plants, pipelines, building systems or lab equipment. Mark the whole group not applicable if you run none. ### OT1. Are IT and OT networks separated by a demilitarized zone, with industrial protocols barred from the IT network? - 3 points: Yes: a DMZ between IT and OT, zones by criticality, industrial protocols kept off the IT network - 2 points: Yes: a DMZ exists, but zones are not defined - 1 points: A firewall separates them with broad rules - 0 points: IT and OT share a network **Weight 3** (up to 9 points). CISA and FBI advise strong segmentation between IT and OT networks, a DMZ that removes unregulated communication, logical zones by criticality, and prohibiting industrial control system protocols from traversing the IT network. *Source:* [CISA and FBI advisory AA21-131A: DarkSide ransomware, best practices for preventing business disruption](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-131a), Mitigations: segmentation between IT and OT. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 3.I; NIST PR.IR-01; RRA NM. ### OT2. Have you tested running the plant manually, and isolating OT from IT, within the last 12 months? - 3 points: Yes: a manual operation test and an isolation test in the last 12 months, with the result recorded - 2 points: Yes: a paper exercise only - 1 points: Discussed but not exercised - 0 points: Never considered **Weight 3** (up to 9 points). AA21-131A asks owners to identify IT and OT interdependencies, build workarounds or manual controls so the ICS network can be isolated, and test them regularly so safety-critical functions run through an incident. CPG 6.A mentions degraded operation. *Source:* [CISA and FBI advisory AA21-131A: DarkSide ransomware, best practices for preventing business disruption](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-131a), Mitigations: manual controls and isolation. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 6.A, 1.C; NIST RC.RP-01; RRA IR. ### OT3. Is there a current inventory of OT assets and a network topology diagram, stored offline? - 3 points: Yes: inventory and topology reviewed within 12 months, with offline copies - 2 points: Yes: inventory exists but is older than 12 months - 1 points: Partial lists held by plant engineers - 0 points: No inventory **Weight 2** (up to 6 points). CPG 2.A asks that critical IT and OT assets be inventoried and updated more often. CPG 2.E asks for accurate network topology documentation across IT and OT networks, reviewed annually. The guide asks for offline copies of network documentation. *Source:* [CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list](https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0), Goals 2.A and 2.E. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 2.A, 2.E; NIST ID.AM-03; RRA AM. ### OT4. Are backups and gold images of controllers, HMIs and engineering workstations kept offline and restore-tested? - 3 points: Yes: offline backups and gold images for all three, restore-tested - 2 points: Yes: offline backups, restore not tested - 1 points: Backups kept on the OT network - 0 points: No OT backups exist **Weight 2** (up to 6 points). AA21-131A asks for regular backups on both IT and OT networks, offline storage, tested restores, gold images of critical systems and retained backup hardware. *Source:* [CISA and FBI advisory AA21-131A: DarkSide ransomware, best practices for preventing business disruption](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-131a), Mitigations: backups on IT and OT networks. *Maps to:* CPG 2.0 3.O; NIST PR.DS-11, RC.RP-03; RRA DB. ## Where do you add up the result? Write your points per group below, then total them. Leave the OT row out of both columns if you run no operational technology. | Group | Points earned | Points available | | --- | --- | --- | | Governance | [ ] | 30 | | Identity and access | [ ] | 27 | | Backups and recovery | [ ] | 30 | | Detection | [ ] | 27 | | Segmentation and platform | [ ] | 24 | | Email and edge | [ ] | 18 | | Response readiness | [ ] | 24 | | Third parties | [ ] | 24 | | Operational technology | [ ] | 30 | | Total | [ ] | 234 (204 without OT) | Percent = points earned / points available x 100. ## Cite this Ransomware Readiness Assessment, "Ransomware Readiness Assessment: 36 controls", edition 16 November 2026, https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/assessment/ (CC BY 4.0). ## Related pages - [How the assessment is scored](/assessment/method/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) - [Leadership checklist](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-checklist/) - [Technical checklist](/readiness/ransomware-preparedness-checklist/) - [Download the data](/datasets/) - [Ransomware Readiness Assessment: home](/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) - CISA and FBI advisory AA21-131A: DarkSide ransomware, best practices for preventing business disruption: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-131a (read 16 November 2026) - Microsoft Learn: Prepare for ransomware attacks with a backup and recovery plan: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/ransomware/protect-against-ransomware-phase1 (read 16 November 2026) - OFAC: Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments, 21 September 2021: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/912981/download?inline (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Tabletop Exercise Packages: https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/services/cisa-tabletop-exercise-packages (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/assessment/ --- # How the ransomware readiness assessment is scored: points, weights and bands Method, read 16 November 2026 **In short.** Each control has four answers worth 3, 2, 1 or 0 points. Points are multiplied by the control weight, 1 to 3, and summed. The sum divided by the points available gives a percent, read in four bands. A weight-3 control scored zero is a priority gap. Weights are editorial choices, published here. Edition 16 November 2026. ## How is the ransomware readiness score worked out? Points earned for a control = option points x control weight. Total earned / total available = percent. For the OT group, a site with no operational technology marks all four controls not applicable: they are left out of both the earned and the available total. Points earned for a control equal the points of the answer you ticked (3, 2, 1 or 0) times the control weight. Any control with weight 3 that scores 0 points is listed as a priority gap, whatever the band. | Band | From percent | To percent | Reading | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Critical gaps | 0 | 29 | Basic protections are missing. A ransomware event would likely stop the business until rebuilt. | | Partial | 30 | 54 | Some controls are in place, but one or more of the main routes in or the route back is open. | | Established | 55 | 79 | Most controls exist. The remaining work is testing, written authority and coverage of edge cases. | | Tested | 80 | 100 | Controls exist and have been exercised. Keep the evidence and repeat the test each year. | Round the percent down to a whole number before reading the band. Points available are 234 with all four OT controls and 204 without them. ## What does each control weigh? Each control carries a weight of 1, 2 or 3. The table lists the weight and the most points the control can earn. | Control | Group | Weight | Points available | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | GV1 | Governance | 3 | 9 | | GV2 | Governance | 3 | 9 | | GV3 | Governance | 2 | 6 | | GV4 | Governance | 2 | 6 | | ID1 | Identity and access | 3 | 9 | | ID2 | Identity and access | 3 | 9 | | ID3 | Identity and access | 2 | 6 | | ID4 | Identity and access | 1 | 3 | | BR1 | Backups and recovery | 3 | 9 | | BR2 | Backups and recovery | 3 | 9 | | BR3 | Backups and recovery | 2 | 6 | | BR4 | Backups and recovery | 2 | 6 | | DT1 | Detection | 3 | 9 | | DT2 | Detection | 2 | 6 | | DT3 | Detection | 2 | 6 | | DT4 | Detection | 2 | 6 | | SG1 | Segmentation and platform | 2 | 6 | | SG2 | Segmentation and platform | 3 | 9 | | SG3 | Segmentation and platform | 2 | 6 | | SG4 | Segmentation and platform | 1 | 3 | | EE1 | Email and edge | 2 | 6 | | EE2 | Email and edge | 1 | 3 | | EE3 | Email and edge | 2 | 6 | | EE4 | Email and edge | 1 | 3 | | RR1 | Response readiness | 3 | 9 | | RR2 | Response readiness | 2 | 6 | | RR3 | Response readiness | 2 | 6 | | RR4 | Response readiness | 1 | 3 | | TP1 | Third parties | 2 | 6 | | TP2 | Third parties | 3 | 9 | | TP3 | Third parties | 2 | 6 | | TP4 | Third parties | 1 | 3 | | OT1 | Operational technology | 3 | 9 | | OT2 | Operational technology | 3 | 9 | | OT3 | Operational technology | 2 | 6 | | OT4 | Operational technology | 2 | 6 | Weights and maximums for all 36 controls. The same data is in the scoring dataset. ## Why these weights? Weights are editorial judgments, not statistics. They are not derived from incident data and carry no claim of precision. Each is set by one test, applied the same way to every control. - Weight 3: a source read for this site singles out the control as a route in (credentials, exposed services, unmonitored endpoints), as the way back (offline backups and tested restores), or as the authority needed in the first hour (decision rights, contacts). - Weight 2: a source asks for the control and its absence widens the damage or slows recovery, but the control is not a first-line route in or out. - Weight 1: a source asks for the control and it is cheap, or it refines another control. You may disagree. Edit the weights in the JSON file and recompute; the formula is one line. ## What do the answers mean? The top answer (3 points) means the control exists, is enforced or written, and has been tested or evidenced. Two points means it exists with a gap. One point means partial or informal. Zero means absent or unknown. Unknown scores zero, because an attacker also does not wait for you to find out. ## What can the score not tell you? A self-assessed score is not an audit, a certification or a benchmark against other organizations. Bands are interpretive labels. The value is the list of gaps and the dated evidence behind each answer. Re-run it after every major change and each year. ## What changed between editions? First edition, 16 November 2026: 36 controls in 9 groups, weights as above. ## Cite this Ransomware Readiness Assessment, "Scoring rules and weights", edition 16 November 2026, https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/assessment/method/ (CC BY 4.0). ## Related pages - [The assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) - [Download the scoring data](/datasets/) - [How sources are read](/method/) - [Ransomware readiness](/readiness/ransomware-readiness/) - [Ransomware Readiness Assessment: home](/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/assessment/method/ --- # What each ransomware readiness control maps to in the CISA and NIST guidance Control mapping, edition 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** The table below maps each of the 36 assessment controls to four published documents: the #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition), NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 (June 2026), CISA's Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 and the CISA Ransomware Readiness Assessment goals. Only identifiers read at source are used. Edition 16 November 2026. ## Which published guidance does each ransomware control map to? Each row names the section of the #StopRansomware Guide, the NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 subcategory identifiers, the CISA Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 identifiers and the Ransomware Readiness Assessment goal codes that relate to the control. The mapping is a judgment by this site, explained on the [method page](/mapping/method/); it is not a mapping published by CISA or NIST. | Control | Question (shortened) | StopRansomware Guide section | NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 | CPG 2.0 | RRA goal | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [GV1](/assessment/#governance-4-controls) | Is one named executive accountable for ransomware decisions, with written authority to... | Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents | GV.RR-02, GV.OC-01 | 1.A | RM | | [GV2](/assessment/#governance-4-controls) | Does your incident response plan carry ransomware and data-extortion procedures... | Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents | ID.IM-04, RS.MA-01 | 1.C | IR | | [GV3](/assessment/#governance-4-controls) | Was the plan exercised against a ransomware scenario in the last 12 months, with... | Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents | ID.IM-04 | 1.C, 2.C | IR | | [GV4](/assessment/#governance-4-controls) | Are your legal reporting duties for a ransomware event written down, with the clock... | Reporting and Notification | GV.OC-03, RS.CO-02 | 5.B | IR | | [ID1](/assessment/#identity-and-access-4-controls) | Is phishing-resistant multifactor authentication required for email, remote access... | Initial Access Vector: Compromised Credentials | PR.AA-03, PR.AA-01 | 3.F | UM | | [ID2](/assessment/#identity-and-access-4-controls) | Do administrators use separate accounts from their daily email and web accounts, and... | General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | PR.AA-05 | 3.G, 3.H | UM | | [ID3](/assessment/#identity-and-access-4-controls) | Are domain controllers and the identity platform hardened, restricted to a small admin... | General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | PR.AA-05, DE.CM-03 | 3.H | UM | | [ID4](/assessment/#identity-and-access-4-controls) | Are default passwords changed, passwords unique and long, failed logins alerted on... | Initial Access Vector: Compromised Credentials | PR.AA-01 | 3.A, 3.B, 3.C, 3.D, 3.E | UM | | [BR1](/assessment/#backups-and-recovery-4-controls) | Are encrypted backups of critical systems kept offline or immutable, out of reach of... | Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents | PR.DS-11 | 3.O | DB | | [BR2](/assessment/#backups-and-recovery-4-controls) | Has a full restore of your critical systems been tested in the last 12 months, with... | Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents | RC.RP-03, PR.DS-11 | 3.O, 6.A | DB | | [BR3](/assessment/#backups-and-recovery-4-controls) | Do you hold golden images, infrastructure-as-code templates and installers with... | Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents | RC.RP-02 | 3.O | DB | | [BR4](/assessment/#backups-and-recovery-4-controls) | Is there a ranked list of systems to restore, with their dependencies, and identity at... | Detection and Analysis | ID.AM-05, RC.RP-02 | 2.A, 6.A | AM | | [DT1](/assessment/#detection-4-controls) | Is endpoint detection or centrally managed anti-malware on servers and endpoints, with... | Initial Access Vector: Precursor Malware Infection | DE.CM-09, DE.AE-02 | 4.A | AI | | [DT2](/assessment/#detection-4-controls) | Are logs from critical systems, firewalls, VPN and identity collected centrally and... | General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | PR.PS-04 | 3.Q | NM | | [DT3](/assessment/#detection-4-controls) | Do you alert on ransomware precursors: new privileged accounts, backup or shadow-copy... | Detection and Analysis | DE.AE-02, DE.CM-01 | 4.B | NM | | [DT4](/assessment/#detection-4-controls) | Does the on-call route reach a person with authority to isolate systems outside... | Reporting and Notification | RS.MA-01 | 5.A | IR | | [SG1](/assessment/#segmentation-and-platform-4-controls) | Is the network segmented so that a compromised workstation cannot reach servers... | General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | PR.IR-01 | 3.I | NM | | [SG2](/assessment/#segmentation-and-platform-4-controls) | Is every internet-facing service inventoried, with remote desktop closed to the... | Initial Access Vector: Internet-Facing Vulnerabilities and Misconfigurations | PR.PS-02, ID.AM-02 | 3.S, 2.B | PM | | [SG3](/assessment/#segmentation-and-platform-4-controls) | Do you patch known exploited vulnerabilities on internet-facing systems within a time... | Initial Access Vector: Internet-Facing Vulnerabilities and Misconfigurations | ID.AM-02, PR.PS-02 | 2.B | PM | | [SG4](/assessment/#segmentation-and-platform-4-controls) | Is software execution restricted by allowlisting, and are hypervisors, PowerShell and... | Initial Access Vector: Precursor Malware Infection; General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | PR.PS-05 | 3.P | AI | | [EE1](/assessment/#email-and-edge-4-controls) | Does email filtering block risky attachments, flag external senders and disable macros... | Initial Access Vector: Phishing | DE.CM-09 | 3.M, 3.L | PP | | [EE2](/assessment/#email-and-edge-4-controls) | Are SPF, DKIM and DMARC set on all mail domains, with DMARC at reject? | Initial Access Vector: Phishing | none cited | 3.L | PP | | [EE3](/assessment/#email-and-edge-4-controls) | Does training cover phishing and advanced social engineering such as help desk... | Initial Access Vector: Phishing; Initial Access Vector: Advanced Forms of Social Engineering | PR.AT-01 | 3.J | PP | | [EE4](/assessment/#email-and-edge-4-controls) | Is protective DNS or web filtering in place, with remote management tool ports blocked... | Initial Access Vector: Advanced Forms of Social Engineering | ID.AM-03, DE.CM-01 | none | BM | | [RR1](/assessment/#response-readiness-4-controls) | Is there an out-of-band way to reach responders and staff, and a paper contact list... | Detection and Analysis; Reporting and Notification | RS.CO-02, RC.CO-03 | 5.A | IR | | [RR2](/assessment/#response-readiness-4-controls) | Do you have an incident response firm and breach counsel on retainer or pre-agreed... | Reporting and Notification | RS.CO-02, RS.CO-03, GV.RM-03 | 6.A | IR | | [RR3](/assessment/#response-readiness-4-controls) | Is there a written path for a ransom payment decision, including a sanctions screening... | Reporting and Notification | DE.AE-04, GV.RM-02 | 5.B | RM | | [RR4](/assessment/#response-readiness-4-controls) | Can responders capture memory and disk images and keep a time-stamped decision log... | Containment and Eradication | RS.MI-01 | none | IR | | [TP1](/assessment/#third-parties-4-controls) | Do vendor and service provider contracts require incident notice within a set time? | Initial Access Vector: Third Parties and Managed Service Providers | GV.SC-02, GV.SC-08 | 1.D | RM | | [TP2](/assessment/#third-parties-4-controls) | Is managed service provider access limited by least privilege, MFA and logging, and do... | Initial Access Vector: Third Parties and Managed Service Providers | DE.CM-06, GV.SC-02 | 1.E | UM | | [TP3](/assessment/#third-parties-4-controls) | If a provider keeps your backups or runs your systems, does the contract require the... | Initial Access Vector: Third Parties and Managed Service Providers | GV.SC-08 | 1.E | DB | | [TP4](/assessment/#third-parties-4-controls) | Are key providers on your contact list and in your exercises, and is cyber insurance... | Reporting and Notification | GV.SC-08, GV.RM-03 | 1.D | RM | | [OT1](/assessment/#operational-technology-4-controls) | Are IT and OT networks separated by a demilitarized zone, with industrial protocols... | General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | PR.IR-01 | 3.I | NM | | [OT2](/assessment/#operational-technology-4-controls) | Have you tested running the plant manually, and isolating OT from IT, within the last... | General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | RC.RP-01 | 6.A, 1.C | IR | | [OT3](/assessment/#operational-technology-4-controls) | Is there a current inventory of OT assets and a network topology diagram, stored offline? | General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | ID.AM-03 | 2.A, 2.E | AM | | [OT4](/assessment/#operational-technology-4-controls) | Are backups and gold images of controllers, HMIs and engineering workstations kept... | Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents | PR.DS-11, RC.RP-03 | 3.O | DB | Thirty-six controls. Identifiers as printed in the documents read on 16 November 2026. ## Which documents and editions were read? Four documents were read on 16 November 2026. The table gives the edition of each and the kind of identifier used. | Document | Edition read | Identifiers used | | --- | --- | --- | | CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI, NSA: #StopRansomware Guide | September 2023 edition; page read 16 November 2026 | Section titles of Part 1 and Part 2 | | NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, Ransomware Risk Management: A CSF 2.0 Community Profile | Final, June 2026 (11 June 2026) | CSF 2.0 subcategory IDs such as PR.DS-11 | | CISA Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 | Goal list read on cisa.gov 16 November 2026; the page states no edition date | Goal IDs 1.A to 6.A | | CISA Ransomware Readiness Assessment, in CSET | CSET v10.3 release, announced 30 June 2021 | Ten goal codes such as DB and IR | ## Which CISA performance goals do the controls cover? The CPG 2.0 list has 34 goals. 29 map to at least one assessment control and 5 do not, because the assessment is about ransomware rather than all of cybersecurity. The last column shows the controls that touch each goal; cost, impact and ease are CISA's ratings. | CPG 2.0 | Goal title | Cost | Impact | Ease | Assessment controls | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1.A | Establish Cybersecurity Responsibilities | Low | High | Moderate | GV1 | | 1.B | Manage Cybersecurity Oversight | Low | High | Moderate | none | | 1.C | Manage Incident Response Plans | Low | High | Moderate | GV2, GV3, OT2 | | 1.D | “Supply Chain Incident Reporting & Vulnerability Disclosure” | Moderate | Moderate | Complex | TP1, TP4 | | 1.E | Manage Risks from Managed Service Providers | Moderate | Moderate | Complex | TP2, TP3 | | 2.A | Manage Organizational Assets | Low | High | Moderate | BR4, OT3 | | 2.B | Mitigate Known Vulnerabilities | High | High | Complex | SG2, SG3 | | 2.C | Obtain Independent Validation of Cybersecurity Controls | High | High | Complex | GV3 | | 2.D | “Maintain Vulnerability Disclosure/Reporting Process” | Low | Low | Moderate | none | | 2.E | Document Network Topology | Low | High | Moderate | OT3 | | 3.A | Changing Default Passwords | Low | High | Simple | ID4 | | 3.B | Establish Minimum Password Strength | Low | High | Simple | ID4 | | 3.C | Create Unique Credentials | Low | High | Simple | ID4 | | 3.D | Revoking Credentials for Departing Staff | Low | High | Moderate | ID4 | | 3.E | Monitor Unsuccessful (Automated) Login Attempts | Moderate | High | Moderate | ID4 | | 3.F | Implement Multi-factor Authentication | Moderate | High | Moderate | ID1 | | 3.G | Administrators Maintain Separate User and Privileged Accounts | Low | High | Simple | ID2 | | 3.H | Implement the Principles of Least Privilege | Low | High | Simple | ID2, ID3 | | 3.I | Implement Logical/Physical Network Segmentation | High | High | Complex | SG1, OT1 | | 3.J | Implement Cybersecurity Training | Low | High | Moderate | EE3 | | 3.K | Utilize Strong Encryption | Moderate | High | Complex | none | | 3.L | Enable Email Security | Low | High | Moderate | EE1, EE2 | | 3.M | Disable Autorun & Macros By Default | Low | Moderate | Simple | EE1 | | 3.N | Establish Change Management Processes | Moderate | High | Complex | none | | 3.O | Maintain System Backups & Restoration Ability | High | High | Moderate | BR1, BR2, BR3, OT4 | | 3.P | Maintain Hardware & Software Approval Process | Moderate | High | Moderate | SG4 | | 3.Q | Maintain Log Collection & Storage | Moderate | High | Moderate | DT2 | | 3.R | Prohibit Connection of Unauthorized Devices | Moderate | High | Complex | none | | 3.S | Secure Internet Facing Devices | Moderate | High | Complex | SG2 | | 4.A | Establish Malicious Code Detection | Moderate | High | Moderate | DT1 | | 4.B | Identify Adverse Events | Moderate | High | Complex | DT3 | | 5.A | Establish Incident Communication Procedures | Low | High | Moderate | DT4, RR1 | | 5.B | Establish Incident Reporting Procedures | Moderate | High | Moderate | GV4, RR3 | | 6.A | Incident Planning and Preparedness | Moderate | High | Complex | BR2, BR4, RR2, OT2 | ## Which NIST IR 8374 identifiers are used? The document as read cites 43 distinct subcategory identifiers. The controls use 34. Not used: GV.OC-02, ID.RA-01, ID.RA-04, ID.RA-06, ID.RA-09, PR.AA-06, PR.PS-01, RC.CO-04, RS.MI-02. Those are mostly broader risk assessment, physical access and communication outcomes that the 36 questions do not test directly. ## Which RRA goals do the controls cover? | RRA code | Goal (this site's wording) | Assessment controls | | --- | --- | --- | | DB | Data backup | BR1, BR2, BR3, TP3, OT4 | | BM | Web browser management and DNS filtering | EE4 | | PP | Phishing prevention and awareness | EE1, EE2, EE3 | | NM | Network perimeter monitoring | DT2, DT3, SG1, OT1 | | AM | Asset management | BR4, OT3 | | PM | Patch and update management | SG2, SG3 | | UM | User and access management | ID1, ID2, ID3, ID4, TP2 | | AI | Application integrity and allowlisting | DT1, SG4 | | IR | Incident response | GV2, GV3, GV4, DT4, RR1, RR2, RR4, OT2 | | RM | Risk management | GV1, RR3, TP1, TP4 | The exact goal titles in CISA's CSET data are on the RRA walk-through. The exact titles are on the [RRA walk-through](/readiness/cisa-ransomware-readiness-assessment-rra/). Question-level RRA identifiers are not used; they sit inside CSET. ## Cite this Ransomware Readiness Assessment, "Ransomware control mapping", edition 16 November 2026, https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/mapping/ (CC BY 4.0). ## Related pages - [How the mapping was built](/mapping/method/) - [The assessment](/assessment/) - [Download the mapping](/datasets/) - [NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1](/readiness/nist-ransomware-readiness-assessment/) - [The CISA RRA](/readiness/cisa-ransomware-readiness-assessment-rra/) - [Ransomware Readiness Assessment: home](/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Community Profile (CSRC record): https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8374/r1/final (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) - CISA alert, 30 June 2021: CSET adds the Ransomware Readiness Assessment: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2021/06/30/cisas-cset-tool-sets-sights-ransomware-threat (read 16 November 2026) - CISA CSET repository: maturity model data, RRA goal titles: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cisagov/cset/main/CSETWebApi/CSETWeb_Api/CSETWebCore.UpgradeLibrary/VersionUpgrader/SQL/1021_to_1030_data.sql (read 16 November 2026) - CISA CSET repository: RRA mini user guide text: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cisagov/cset/main/CSETWebNg/src/app/dialogs/rra-mini-user-guide/rra-mini-user-guide.component.html (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/mapping/ --- # How the control mapping was built and what it does not claim Method, read 16 November 2026 **In short.** Each control was mapped by reading four documents on 16 November 2026 and recording identifiers only where the document asks for what the control asks. No identifier is carried from memory or from another table. The mapping is this site's judgment, and CISA and NIST have not reviewed it. Edition 16 November 2026. ## How was each control mapped? For each control, the question was read against each document and an identifier was recorded only if the document asks for the same outcome. A document that asks for a broader outcome was recorded when the control is a clear part of it. A control with no direct match shows "none". - #StopRansomware Guide: the Part 1 or Part 2 section heading where the outcome appears. - NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1: subcategory identifiers printed in the document, in its basic tips or Table 1. - CPG 2.0: goal IDs from the goal list on cisa.gov, version 2.0. - CISA RRA: the goal code (such as DB) for the nearest of its ten goals. ## Why are the guide's own CPG tags not used? The #StopRansomware Guide tags some recommendations with CPG identifiers, for example 2.R for offline backups. Those tags follow the first edition of the CPGs. The CPG 2.0 list on cisa.gov numbers the equivalent goal 3.O, Maintain System Backups and Restoration Ability. The mapping uses CPG 2.0 IDs only and takes the guide by section title, so the two numbering schemes are not mixed. ## What are the limits? - The CPG 2.0 page states no edition date, so the read date is the only date. - The RRA is mapped at goal level because question text sits inside CSET and was not reproduced. - A mapping row means the document asks for something close to the control. It does not mean that meeting the control satisfies the document. - Documents change. The editions read are on the mapping page. ## How can you reuse it? The mapping is published as CSV and JSON on the [datasets page](/datasets/) under CC BY 4.0. Cite: Ransomware Readiness Assessment, "Ransomware control mapping", edition 16 November 2026, https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/mapping/. ## Related pages - [The control mapping](/mapping/) - [The assessment](/assessment/) - [Scoring method](/assessment/method/) - [Datasets](/datasets/) - [Ransomware readiness](/readiness/ransomware-readiness/) - [Ransomware Readiness Assessment: home](/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) - CISA alert, 30 June 2021: CSET adds the Ransomware Readiness Assessment: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2021/06/30/cisas-cset-tool-sets-sights-ransomware-threat (read 16 November 2026) - CISA CSET repository: maturity model data, RRA goal titles: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cisagov/cset/main/CSETWebApi/CSETWeb_Api/CSETWebCore.UpgradeLibrary/VersionUpgrader/SQL/1021_to_1030_data.sql (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/mapping/method/ --- # Ransomware readiness is the ability to stop an attack early and recover without relying on the attacker Guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Ransomware readiness is the ability to prevent, detect, respond to and recover from a ransomware event. NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, published in June 2026, organizes those aims under six Cybersecurity Framework functions. This site turns them into a 36-control self-assessment you can score on one page and download. ## What does ransomware readiness cover? Ransomware readiness covers six areas that NIST names as Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and Recover. NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 says its profile can help gauge an organization's level of readiness to counter ransomware threats and to deal with the consequences of events. CISA splits the same ground differently. Its Ransomware Readiness Assessment uses ten goals, from data backup to risk management, with practices tiered as basic, intermediate and advanced. CISA's Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 list 34 goals across the same six functions. ## Where should a security lead start? 1. Score the [36-control assessment](/assessment/) and note every priority gap, meaning a weight-3 control that scored 0. 2. Read [how each control maps](/mapping/) to the CISA and NIST documents, so the findings can be briefed in the language of the framework your auditors use. 3. Test the two things that are easiest to assume: that [backups restore](/readiness/ransomware-backup-and-identity-recovery-readiness/) and that [someone can order isolation](/decisions/first-hour-of-ransomware/) at 3 a.m. 4. Write the [response plan](/plan/ransomware-response-plan/) and the [playbook](/playbook/ransomware-playbook/), then exercise them. ## What is in this section? The pages in this section cover the definitions, the CISA and NIST documents, two checklists, guides for small businesses and boards, the cost drivers and backup recovery. - [What ransomware readiness means in plain words](/readiness/what-is-ransomware-readiness/) - [The CISA Ransomware Readiness Assessment (RRA)](/readiness/cisa-ransomware-readiness-assessment-rra/) - [NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 as a readiness assessment](/readiness/nist-ransomware-readiness-assessment/) - [Ransomware readiness assessment tools compared by what they measure](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-assessment-tool/) - [Ransomware readiness checklist for a leadership review](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-checklist/) - [Ransomware preparedness checklist for IT](/readiness/ransomware-preparedness-checklist/) - [Ransomware readiness for a business without a security team](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-for-small-business/) - [What a board should ask about ransomware readiness](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-board-briefing/) - [What drives the cost of ransomware readiness work](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-assessment-cost/) - [Backup and Active Directory recovery readiness](/readiness/ransomware-backup-and-identity-recovery-readiness/) ## Related pages - [Ransomware readiness assessment cost: what drives it](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-assessment-cost/) - [Backup and Active Directory recovery readiness](/readiness/ransomware-backup-and-identity-recovery-readiness/) - [What is ransomware readiness? A plain definition](/readiness/what-is-ransomware-readiness/) - [CISA Ransomware Readiness Assessment (RRA) explained](/readiness/cisa-ransomware-readiness-assessment-rra/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Community Profile (CSRC record): https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8374/r1/final (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - CISA alert, 30 June 2021: CSET adds the Ransomware Readiness Assessment: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2021/06/30/cisas-cset-tool-sets-sights-ransomware-threat (read 16 November 2026) - CISA CSET repository: RRA mini user guide text: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cisagov/cset/main/CSETWebNg/src/app/dialogs/rra-mini-user-guide/rra-mini-user-guide.component.html (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/readiness/ransomware-readiness/ --- # What is ransomware readiness? It is being able to say what happens in the first hour and the first week Definition, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Ransomware readiness is how well an organization can defend against ransomware and recover from it. CISA describes its self-assessment as a way to evaluate how well equipped an organization is to defend and recover. NIST adds that readiness includes dealing with the consequences. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What is ransomware readiness? Ransomware readiness is the measured ability to defend against a ransomware event, detect it early, respond to it and recover from it. The two U.S. government sources use close wording. CISA calls its Ransomware Readiness Assessment a self-assessment to "better assess how well they are equipped to defend and recover from a ransomware incident". NIST says its profile helps gauge readiness "to counter ransomware threats and to deal with the potential consequences of events". Neither definition stops at prevention. A readiness view assumes that some attacks will get through and asks what the organization can do then. ## What does ransomware mean in these documents? NIST describes ransomware as a malicious attack where attackers encrypt an organization's data and demand payment to restore access. It adds that attackers may also steal information and demand an additional payment in return for not disclosing it to authorities, competitors or the public. That second payment demand is why recovery from backups, on its own, is not the whole of readiness. The [double extortion page](/decisions/double-extortion/) covers the consequences. ## What three questions should a security lead be able to answer? Three questions cover most of the ground. A security lead who can answer all three with evidence is ready in the sense these documents mean. 1. Can an attacker get in easily? This is the identity, edge, email and patching controls in the [assessment](/assessment/). 2. Would we see it before the encryption starts? These are the detection controls, tied to the precursors CISA lists for threat hunting. 3. Could we restore, and who decides what? These are the backup, authority and communications controls, and the [recovery order](/decisions/ransomware-recovery-order/). | Source | How it frames readiness | Edition read | | --- | --- | --- | | NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 | A CSF 2.0 Community Profile to help gauge readiness and develop a countermeasure playbook | June 2026 | | CISA Ransomware Readiness Assessment | A self-assessment of practices tiered basic, intermediate and advanced, in ten goals | CSET v10.3, announced 30 June 2021 | | CISA #StopRansomware Guide | Part 1 prevention best practices and Part 2 response checklist | September 2023 | | CISA Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 | 34 baseline goals with cost, impact and ease ratings | Page read 16 November 2026 | Four published ways of framing readiness. Each source is listed below with its read date. ## Related pages - [Ransomware readiness: what it covers and how to test it](/readiness/ransomware-readiness/) - [Backup and Active Directory recovery readiness](/readiness/ransomware-backup-and-identity-recovery-readiness/) - [CISA Ransomware Readiness Assessment (RRA) explained](/readiness/cisa-ransomware-readiness-assessment-rra/) - [NIST ransomware readiness assessment: IR 8374 Rev. 1](/readiness/nist-ransomware-readiness-assessment/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Community Profile (CSRC record): https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8374/r1/final (read 16 November 2026) - CISA alert, 30 June 2021: CSET adds the Ransomware Readiness Assessment: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2021/06/30/cisas-cset-tool-sets-sights-ransomware-threat (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/readiness/what-is-ransomware-readiness/ --- # The CISA Ransomware Readiness Assessment is a yes or no self-assessment in ten goals Framework walk-through, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** The CISA Ransomware Readiness Assessment is a self-assessment module in the Cyber Security Evaluation Tool, announced on 30 June 2021. It has ten goals and practices tiered basic, intermediate and advanced. Each practice is answered yes or no. CISA says it produces an analysis dashboard of summary and detailed results. ## What is the CISA Ransomware Readiness Assessment (RRA)? The RRA is a module of CISA's Cyber Security Evaluation Tool (CSET), a desktop tool for evaluating information technology and industrial control system network security. CISA announced the module on 30 June 2021 and described it as a self-assessment based on a tiered set of practices. CISA says it fits organizations "regardless of their current cybersecurity maturity". In CSET, a user starts a new assessment, selects Maturity Model, and picks Ransomware Readiness Assessment, according to the v10.3 release notes in CISA's repository. CISA also lists a browser-based "Ransomware Risk Assessment" in its no-cost services catalog, rated at the Foundational readiness level. ## What are the ten RRA goals? The CSET data in CISA's repository names ten goals under the RRA model. The abbreviation after each is the code used in question identifiers. | Code | Goal title in CSET data (as read) | | --- | --- | | DB | "Robust Data Backup" | | BM | "Web Browser Management and DNS Filtering" | | PP | "Phishing Prevention and Awareness" | | NM | "Network Perimeter Monitoring" | | AM | "Asset Management" | | PM | "Patch and Update Management" | | UM | "User and Access Management" | | AI | "Application Integrity and Allowlist" | | IR | "Incident Response" | | RM | "Risk Management" | ## How are RRA questions coded and scored? Each question carries an identifier built from the goal, the level and a question number. CISA's in-tool guide gives AM:I.Q03 as an example: Asset Management, Intermediate level, question 3. The levels are Basic (B), Intermediate (I) and Advanced (A). Answers are yes or no. Yes means the organization fully performs the activity; no means it does not perform it completely. CISA advises organizations new to ransomware to begin with the basic tier, then move up. The CISA alert says results appear on a dashboard with graphs and tables in summary and detailed form. ## How does this site's assessment relate to the RRA? This site's [36-control assessment](/assessment/) is its own instrument, with four answer levels per control rather than yes or no. Every control is tagged with the RRA goal it touches in the [control mapping](/mapping/). The mapping uses goal codes only. It does not reproduce RRA questions, which are in CSET. ## Related pages - [Ransomware readiness: what it covers and how to test it](/readiness/ransomware-readiness/) - [What is ransomware readiness? A plain definition](/readiness/what-is-ransomware-readiness/) - [NIST ransomware readiness assessment: IR 8374 Rev. 1](/readiness/nist-ransomware-readiness-assessment/) - [Ransomware readiness assessment tools and what they test](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-assessment-tool/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA alert, 30 June 2021: CSET adds the Ransomware Readiness Assessment: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2021/06/30/cisas-cset-tool-sets-sights-ransomware-threat (read 16 November 2026) - CISA no-cost services: Ransomware Risk Assessment: https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/services/ransomware-risk-assessment (read 16 November 2026) - CISA CSET repository: release v10.3.0.0, Ransomware Readiness Assessment: https://github.com/cisagov/cset/releases/tag/v10.3.0.0 (read 16 November 2026) - CISA CSET repository: maturity model data, RRA goal titles: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cisagov/cset/main/CSETWebApi/CSETWeb_Api/CSETWebCore.UpgradeLibrary/VersionUpgrader/SQL/1021_to_1030_data.sql (read 16 November 2026) - CISA CSET repository: RRA mini user guide text: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cisagov/cset/main/CSETWebNg/src/app/dialogs/rra-mini-user-guide/rra-mini-user-guide.component.html (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cyber Security Evaluation Tool (CSET): https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/services/cyber-security-evaluation-tool-cset (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/readiness/cisa-ransomware-readiness-assessment-rra/ --- # NIST has no scored ransomware assessment, but IR 8374 Rev. 1 is a profile you can assess against Framework walk-through, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** NIST does not publish a scored ransomware readiness test. NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, finalized on 11 June 2026, is a Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Community Profile that supersedes the 2022 version. It lists CSF outcomes relevant to ransomware and suggests organizations record a current profile and a target profile. ## Is there a NIST ransomware readiness assessment? There is no scored questionnaire from NIST, but there is a profile designed to be assessed against. NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, "Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Community Profile", was finalized on 11 June 2026. It supersedes IR 8374 of 23 February 2022, and a draft of Rev. 1 appeared on 13 January 2025. The document says organizations can use it as a guide for profiling the state of their own readiness, determine a current organizational profile, and set a target profile to identify gaps. ## What does the NIST profile contain? Section 1.2 gives six basic ransomware tips: plan for ransomware events; educate employees; avoid vulnerabilities ransomware could exploit; quickly detect and stop attacks; make it harder for ransomware to spread; and make recovery easier. Each tip cites the CSF subcategories behind it. Table 1 then lists CSF 2.0 categories and subcategories, with a "Ransomware Application" paragraph for each. The document as read cites 43 distinct subcategory identifiers, such as GV.OC-01, PR.DS-11 and RC.RP-03. The control mapping on this site uses only identifiers printed in that document. ## How do you turn the profile into a readiness score? NIST does not weight the subcategories, so a score needs a rule you write down. The [method page](/assessment/method/) shows the rule used here: four answer levels per control, a weight of 1 to 3 per control, and four bands. The [mapping table](/mapping/) shows which controls evidence which NIST identifiers. The abstract notes the profile can be used when developing a ransomware countermeasure playbook. The [NIST-keyed playbook page](/playbook/ransomware-playbook-nist/) does that by function. ## How does NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3 fit in? NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3 was finalized on 3 April 2025. It aims to help organizations incorporate incident response recommendations throughout their CSF 2.0 risk management activities. IR 8374 covers ransomware specifically; SP 800-61 covers incident response in general. ## Related pages - [Ransomware readiness: what it covers and how to test it](/readiness/ransomware-readiness/) - [What is ransomware readiness? A plain definition](/readiness/what-is-ransomware-readiness/) - [CISA Ransomware Readiness Assessment (RRA) explained](/readiness/cisa-ransomware-readiness-assessment-rra/) - [Ransomware readiness assessment tools and what they test](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-assessment-tool/) - [Ransomware readiness checklist for a leadership review](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-checklist/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Community Profile (CSRC record): https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8374/r1/final (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3, Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management (CSRC record): https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/61/r3/final (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/readiness/nist-ransomware-readiness-assessment/ --- # Ransomware readiness assessment tools differ in what they measure, who sees the answers and what you get back Comparison, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Four free ways to assess ransomware readiness are listed here, with what each measures. CISA offers the Ransomware Readiness Assessment in its CSET desktop tool and lists a browser-based Ransomware Risk Assessment in its no-cost services catalog. NIST offers a profile to assess against. This site offers a 36-control form. Read on 16 November 2026. ## Is there a ransomware readiness assessment tool? Yes. CISA, NIST and this site each offer one without charge. They test different things, so the right choice depends on whether you want a yes or no checklist, a framework to profile against, or a weighted score tied to published controls. The table lists what each one measures, what it returns and where it runs. It does not rank them. | Tool | What it measures | What you get back | Where it runs | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | CISA Ransomware Readiness Assessment, in CSET | Practices in ten goals, tiered basic, intermediate, advanced; yes or no answers | An analysis dashboard with summary and detailed graphs and tables | Desktop software; CISA releases it on GitHub | | CISA Ransomware Risk Assessment (no-cost service) | Per CISA, ability to counteract an infection and its spread, and to resume operations; scans defenses against intrusion, lateral movement and exfiltration methods | Not described on the page read | In the browser, per CISA | | NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 profile | CSF 2.0 outcomes relevant to ransomware, 43 subcategories cited | A current and a target profile you write yourself | Document, no software | | This site's assessment | 36 controls in 9 groups, four answer levels, weights 1 to 3 | A percent, a band and a list of priority gaps; CSV and JSON of the control set | On this page, printable, with scripts off | Four free assessment options, read 16 November 2026. Rows are in the order CISA, NIST, this site. ## What is a ransomware preparedness assessment? A ransomware preparedness assessment is the same exercise as a readiness assessment under another name. The published documents use "readiness" (CISA, NIST) and "preparing" (the #StopRansomware Guide, Part 1: Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents). The [technical preparedness checklist](/readiness/ransomware-preparedness-checklist/) lists the controls that IT staff can verify themselves. ## What should an assessment tool tell you? A useful tool shows which controls are missing, in what order to fix them and what evidence supports each answer. CISA's RRA guide invites users to attach comments and artifacts to answers. This site's [method page](/assessment/method/) publishes every point value and weight so a result can be reproduced. Outside help is an option when in-house capacity is short. The [providers page](/providers/) lists firms alphabetically with what their own pages say about ransomware readiness work. ## Related pages - [Ransomware readiness: what it covers and how to test it](/readiness/ransomware-readiness/) - [CISA Ransomware Readiness Assessment (RRA) explained](/readiness/cisa-ransomware-readiness-assessment-rra/) - [NIST ransomware readiness assessment: IR 8374 Rev. 1](/readiness/nist-ransomware-readiness-assessment/) - [Ransomware readiness checklist for a leadership review](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-checklist/) - [Ransomware preparedness checklist for IT teams](/readiness/ransomware-preparedness-checklist/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA alert, 30 June 2021: CSET adds the Ransomware Readiness Assessment: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2021/06/30/cisas-cset-tool-sets-sights-ransomware-threat (read 16 November 2026) - CISA no-cost services: Ransomware Risk Assessment: https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/services/ransomware-risk-assessment (read 16 November 2026) - CISA CSET repository: RRA mini user guide text: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cisagov/cset/main/CSETWebNg/src/app/dialogs/rra-mini-user-guide/rra-mini-user-guide.component.html (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Community Profile (CSRC record): https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8374/r1/final (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cyber Security Evaluation Tool (CSET): https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/services/cyber-security-evaluation-tool-cset (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/readiness/ransomware-readiness-assessment-tool/ --- # A ransomware readiness checklist for leadership has 15 questions that need a yes from someone with authority Checklist, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** The ransomware readiness checklist below has 15 items for an executive or board review, chosen from the 36-control assessment because they need decisions rather than configuration. Each can be answered yes or no in a meeting. A no on any item is a gap worth a named owner and a date. Read on 16 November 2026. ## Is there a ransomware readiness checklist? Yes. The list below is the leadership cut of the assessment: 15 of the 36 controls, picked because their answers sit with executives, counsel, finance or the board. The full control wording, answer levels and sources are on the [assessment page](/assessment/). Tick an item only if you can name the document or test that proves it. - GV1, weight 3: Is one named executive accountable for ransomware decisions, with written authority to order systems isolated? - GV2, weight 3: Does your incident response plan carry ransomware and data-extortion procedures, approved in writing by the CEO or equivalent? - GV3, weight 2: Was the plan exercised against a ransomware scenario in the last 12 months, with executives in the room? - GV4, weight 2: Are your legal reporting duties for a ransomware event written down, with the clock, the recipient and the owner for each? - BR1, weight 3: Are encrypted backups of critical systems kept offline or immutable, out of reach of your domain administrator credentials? - BR2, weight 3: Has a full restore of your critical systems been tested in the last 12 months, with the elapsed time recorded? - BR4, weight 2: Is there a ranked list of systems to restore, with their dependencies, and identity at the front of it? - DT4, weight 2: Does the on-call route reach a person with authority to isolate systems outside business hours? - EE3, weight 2: Does training cover phishing and advanced social engineering such as help desk impersonation, and do staff report without blame? - RR1, weight 3: Is there an out-of-band way to reach responders and staff, and a paper contact list with 24-hour numbers? - RR2, weight 2: Do you have an incident response firm and breach counsel on retainer or pre-agreed terms, and does your insurer know the process? - RR3, weight 2: Is there a written path for a ransom payment decision, including a sanctions screening step and contact with law enforcement first? - TP1, weight 2: Do vendor and service provider contracts require incident notice within a set time? - TP2, weight 3: Is managed service provider access limited by least privilege, MFA and logging, and do you audit remote management tools? - TP4, weight 1: Are key providers on your contact list and in your exercises, and is cyber insurance in place? ## How should the checklist be used in a meeting? Read each item aloud, ask who owns the evidence and write the owner beside it. The #StopRansomware Guide asks that the incident response plan and communications plan be approved by the CEO or equivalent in writing and understood across the chain of command, so that item is a good opener. Items marked with weight 3 in the assessment are the ones to settle first. If three or more are unticked, run the [full assessment](/assessment/) and read the [board briefing page](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-board-briefing/). ## Related pages - [Ransomware readiness: what it covers and how to test it](/readiness/ransomware-readiness/) - [NIST ransomware readiness assessment: IR 8374 Rev. 1](/readiness/nist-ransomware-readiness-assessment/) - [Ransomware readiness assessment tools and what they test](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-assessment-tool/) - [Ransomware preparedness checklist for IT teams](/readiness/ransomware-preparedness-checklist/) - [Ransomware readiness for a small business](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-for-small-business/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) - OFAC: Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments, 21 September 2021: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/912981/download?inline (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/readiness/ransomware-readiness-checklist/ --- # A ransomware preparedness checklist for IT lists the controls an administrator can verify in a day Checklist, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** The ransomware preparedness checklist below lists controls from the assessment that IT staff can verify with logs, configuration screens and a restore test. Each names the published document that asks for it. Start with identity and backups, because attackers go after both. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What is a ransomware preparedness checklist for IT? A technical preparedness checklist turns published guidance into things an administrator can check. The items below come from the assessment and are grouped as in the assessment, so results can be entered there afterwards. The #StopRansomware Guide groups its Part 1 advice by how attackers get in: internet-facing weaknesses, compromised credentials, phishing, precursor malware, advanced social engineering and third parties. - ID1, weight 3: Is phishing-resistant multifactor authentication required for email, remote access, administrator accounts and cloud consoles? - ID2, weight 3: Do administrators use separate accounts from their daily email and web accounts, and are privileges reviewed at least quarterly? - ID3, weight 2: Are domain controllers and the identity platform hardened, restricted to a small admin group and kept off the internet? - ID4, weight 1: Are default passwords changed, passwords unique and long, failed logins alerted on, and leavers cut off promptly? - BR1, weight 3: Are encrypted backups of critical systems kept offline or immutable, out of reach of your domain administrator credentials? - BR2, weight 3: Has a full restore of your critical systems been tested in the last 12 months, with the elapsed time recorded? - BR3, weight 2: Do you hold golden images, infrastructure-as-code templates and installers with license keys, stored offline? - BR4, weight 2: Is there a ranked list of systems to restore, with their dependencies, and identity at the front of it? - DT1, weight 3: Is endpoint detection or centrally managed anti-malware on servers and endpoints, with alerts that reach a person at any hour? - DT2, weight 2: Are logs from critical systems, firewalls, VPN and identity collected centrally and kept for at least a year? - DT3, weight 2: Do you alert on ransomware precursors: new privileged accounts, backup or shadow-copy deletion, unexpected remote management tools, large outbound transfers? - DT4, weight 2: Does the on-call route reach a person with authority to isolate systems outside business hours? - SG1, weight 2: Is the network segmented so that a compromised workstation cannot reach servers, backups and management interfaces directly? - SG2, weight 3: Is every internet-facing service inventoried, with remote desktop closed to the internet and VPN and edge devices patched? - SG3, weight 2: Do you patch known exploited vulnerabilities on internet-facing systems within a time limit you set, and scan for gaps? - SG4, weight 1: Is software execution restricted by allowlisting, and are hypervisors, PowerShell and remote tools hardened and logged? - EE1, weight 2: Does email filtering block risky attachments, flag external senders and disable macros by default? - EE2, weight 1: Are SPF, DKIM and DMARC set on all mail domains, with DMARC at reject? - EE3, weight 2: Does training cover phishing and advanced social engineering such as help desk impersonation, and do staff report without blame? - EE4, weight 1: Is protective DNS or web filtering in place, with remote management tool ports blocked at the perimeter? - RR1, weight 3: Is there an out-of-band way to reach responders and staff, and a paper contact list with 24-hour numbers? - RR4, weight 1: Can responders capture memory and disk images and keep a time-stamped decision log from the first hour? - TP1, weight 2: Do vendor and service provider contracts require incident notice within a set time? - TP2, weight 3: Is managed service provider access limited by least privilege, MFA and logging, and do you audit remote management tools? - TP3, weight 2: If a provider keeps your backups or runs your systems, does the contract require the same backup practices you use? - OT1, weight 3: Are IT and OT networks separated by a demilitarized zone, with industrial protocols barred from the IT network? - OT2, weight 3: Have you tested running the plant manually, and isolating OT from IT, within the last 12 months? - OT3, weight 2: Is there a current inventory of OT assets and a network topology diagram, stored offline? - OT4, weight 2: Are backups and gold images of controllers, HMIs and engineering workstations kept offline and restore-tested? ## Which checks should be done first? Start with backups and identity. The guide says many ransomware variants try to delete or encrypt accessible backups, and that malicious actors often use domain controllers as a staging point. A restore test and a domain controller review show quickly whether the two weakest points are covered. Then confirm that someone sees alerts out of hours. The [first hour page](/decisions/first-hour-of-ransomware/) shows what that person must be able to do. ## Related pages - [Ransomware readiness: what it covers and how to test it](/readiness/ransomware-readiness/) - [Ransomware readiness assessment tools and what they test](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-assessment-tool/) - [Ransomware readiness checklist for a leadership review](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-checklist/) - [Ransomware readiness for a small business](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-for-small-business/) - [Ransomware readiness board briefing: questions to ask](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-board-briefing/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - CISA and FBI advisory AA21-131A: DarkSide ransomware, best practices for preventing business disruption: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-131a (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/readiness/ransomware-preparedness-checklist/ --- # A business without a security team can start with ten ransomware controls from the assessment Guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A small business can start with ten controls from the assessment, chosen for impact over effort. They cover multifactor authentication, admin accounts, passwords, offline backups, endpoint protection, exposed services, email filtering, awareness, outside help and provider access. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What ransomware readiness steps suit a business with no security team? Ten assessment controls are flagged for small organizations. CISA says its performance goals aim to help small and medium-sized organizations kickstart their efforts by prioritizing a limited number of essential actions. The ten below follow that idea. - ID1, weight 3: Is phishing-resistant multifactor authentication required for email, remote access, administrator accounts and cloud consoles? - ID2, weight 3: Do administrators use separate accounts from their daily email and web accounts, and are privileges reviewed at least quarterly? - ID4, weight 1: Are default passwords changed, passwords unique and long, failed logins alerted on, and leavers cut off promptly? - BR1, weight 3: Are encrypted backups of critical systems kept offline or immutable, out of reach of your domain administrator credentials? - DT1, weight 3: Is endpoint detection or centrally managed anti-malware on servers and endpoints, with alerts that reach a person at any hour? - SG2, weight 3: Is every internet-facing service inventoried, with remote desktop closed to the internet and VPN and edge devices patched? - EE1, weight 2: Does email filtering block risky attachments, flag external senders and disable macros by default? - EE3, weight 2: Does training cover phishing and advanced social engineering such as help desk impersonation, and do staff report without blame? - RR2, weight 2: Do you have an incident response firm and breach counsel on retainer or pre-agreed terms, and does your insurer know the process? - TP2, weight 3: Is managed service provider access limited by least privilege, MFA and logging, and do you audit remote management tools? ## Does moving to a managed cloud provider help? It can reduce the work but not remove it. The #StopRansomware Guide acknowledges that small and medium businesses find it hard to keep internet-facing servers updated and urges migrating systems to reputable managed cloud providers, to reduce, not eliminate, system maintenance roles for identity and email systems. It also says to review the shared responsibility model for cloud so you know what remains yours. Backups held by a provider need the same care as backups you hold; the [backup readiness page](/readiness/ransomware-backup-and-identity-recovery-readiness/) covers that. ## What does CISA say it costs? CISA rates every performance goal for cost, impact and ease. Of 34 goals, 16 are rated low cost, 14 moderate and 4 high; 30 are rated high impact. The default password, password strength, unique credentials and separate admin account goals are rated low cost and simple. The [cost page](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-assessment-cost/) shows the full count. ## Related pages - [Ransomware readiness: what it covers and how to test it](/readiness/ransomware-readiness/) - [Ransomware readiness checklist for a leadership review](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-checklist/) - [Ransomware preparedness checklist for IT teams](/readiness/ransomware-preparedness-checklist/) - [Ransomware readiness board briefing: questions to ask](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-board-briefing/) - [Ransomware readiness assessment cost: what drives it](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-assessment-cost/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA: Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals: https://www.cisa.gov/cross-sector-cybersecurity-performance-goals (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/readiness/ransomware-readiness-for-small-business/ --- # A board briefing on ransomware readiness should show six things, each backed by a test or a document Briefing guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A board briefing on ransomware readiness should show who may order isolation, the date of the last restore test, the date of the last exercise, the written reporting duties, third-party access and insurance. Each maps to a published expectation. SEC rules add board-level duties for public companies. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What should a board ask about ransomware readiness? A board should ask six questions and expect a date or a document in reply. Who may order systems isolated, and is that written down? When was a full restore last tested, and how long did it take? When was the response plan last exercised with executives present? Which legal reporting duties apply and who owns each clock? Which third parties hold access or backups? Is there cyber insurance, and who calls the insurer? The questions map to controls GV1, BR2, GV3, GV4, TP2 and TP4 on the [assessment](/assessment/). ## What does NIST say about governance for ransomware? NIST places ransomware risk inside enterprise risk management. Its profile says ransomware risks must be factored into organizational risk management governance, including factors that might transfer risk such as cyber insurance (GV.RM-03), and that a documented risk appetite helps make clear and justifiable decisions during response and recovery (GV.RM-02). ## Do public company boards have extra duties? For companies subject to SEC rules, the final rule adopted in 2023 requires annual reporting on the board's oversight of risks from cybersecurity threats and on management's role in assessing them, plus a Form 8-K Item 1.05 filing for material incidents. The [8-K page](/reporting/sec-form-8-k-item-1-05/) sets out the filing clock. A one-page summary for directors can use the [leadership checklist](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-checklist/). ## Related pages - [Ransomware readiness: what it covers and how to test it](/readiness/ransomware-readiness/) - [Ransomware preparedness checklist for IT teams](/readiness/ransomware-preparedness-checklist/) - [Ransomware readiness for a small business](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-for-small-business/) - [Ransomware readiness assessment cost: what drives it](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-assessment-cost/) - [Backup and Active Directory recovery readiness](/readiness/ransomware-backup-and-identity-recovery-readiness/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Federal Register: SEC final rule on cybersecurity risk management, strategy, governance and incident reporting (4 August 2023): https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/08/04/2023-16194/cybersecurity-risk-management-strategy-governance-and-incident-disclosure (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/readiness/ransomware-readiness-board-briefing/ --- # The cost of a ransomware readiness assessment depends on who does it and what you fix afterwards Cost guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** The assessment itself can be free. CISA rates each of its 34 performance goals low, moderate or high for cost: sixteen low, fourteen moderate, four high. Outside firms set their own prices; one firm lists an hourly incident response rate on its retainer page. Fixing findings costs more than finding them. Read on 16 November 2026. ## How much does a ransomware readiness assessment cost? The assessment itself can cost nothing. CISA's Ransomware Risk Assessment, listed among its no-cost services, and the RRA in CSET are free, and so is this site's assessment. The larger cost is fixing what the assessment finds. Where an outside firm performs the assessment, the firm sets the price. Arctic Wolf's incident response retainer page lists a JumpStart Retainer with a "$325 Hourly IR Rate" and a cyber resilience assessment among its features. That is one firm's list price for one tier on 16 November 2026, not a market rate. The [providers page](/providers/) lists firms alphabetically. ## Which controls are cheapest and which cost most? CISA's CPG 2.0 report rates each goal for cost, impact and ease of implementation. Counting the 34 goals listed on cisa.gov on 16 November 2026 gives this spread. | Rating | Cost: goals | Impact: goals | Ease: goals | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Low or Simple | 16 | 1 | 6 (Simple) | | Moderate | 14 | 3 | 17 | | High or Complex | 4 | 30 | 11 (Complex) | Counts from the CPG 2.0 goal list. Ease uses Simple, Moderate and Complex. The four high-cost goals are mitigating known vulnerabilities (2.B), independent validation of controls (2.C), network segmentation (3.I) and system backups and restoration (3.O). ## What can lower the cost? Three published routes lower the cost of the work without lowering its quality. - Use CISA's no-cost assessments and its vulnerability scanning service, which the #StopRansomware Guide points to. - Start with goals CISA rates low cost and high impact, such as separate administrator accounts (3.G) and least privilege (3.H). - Use CISA tabletop exercise packages, which include templates for objectives, scenarios, discussion questions and an after action report. ## Related pages - [Ransomware readiness: what it covers and how to test it](/readiness/ransomware-readiness/) - [Ransomware readiness for a small business](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-for-small-business/) - [Ransomware readiness board briefing: questions to ask](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-board-briefing/) - [Backup and Active Directory recovery readiness](/readiness/ransomware-backup-and-identity-recovery-readiness/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals: https://www.cisa.gov/cross-sector-cybersecurity-performance-goals (read 16 November 2026) - CISA no-cost services: Ransomware Risk Assessment: https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/services/ransomware-risk-assessment (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Tabletop Exercise Packages: https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/services/cisa-tabletop-exercise-packages (read 16 November 2026) - Arctic Wolf: incident response retainer page: https://arcticwolf.com/solutions/incident-response-retainer/ (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/readiness/ransomware-readiness-assessment-cost/ --- # Backup and Active Directory recovery readiness means you can restore data and rebuild identity from a clean start Guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Backup readiness is a tested ability to restore critical systems from copies the attacker cannot reach. Active Directory recovery readiness adds a way to rebuild identity from a clean state. CISA, NIST and Microsoft each ask for offline or immutable copies and for restores that are actually tested. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What is ransomware backup readiness? Ransomware backup readiness is the ability to restore critical systems from copies that the attacker could not alter or delete. The #StopRansomware Guide asks for offline, encrypted backups of critical data and regular testing of their availability and integrity in a disaster recovery scenario, because many variants try to delete or encrypt accessible backups. NIST adds that backup integrity should be verified before restoration (RC.RP-03). Microsoft advises being able to restore the entire enterprise from immutable storage that neither the cybercriminal nor you can modify. ## What should a backup test prove? - The copy is out of reach of domain administrator and cloud administrator credentials. - A full restore of the highest-ranked systems finishes inside the time the business has agreed. - Installers, license keys and configuration information are stored with the copies, as CPG 3.O asks. - Golden images and infrastructure-as-code templates are current and kept offline, as the guide asks. - Restored systems are scanned before reconnection, so the attack is not restored with the data. ## How do you prepare to rebuild Active Directory? Treat identity as the first system to restore. The guide says malicious actors often target and use domain controllers as a staging point to spread ransomware network wide. It asks for domain controllers on the latest supported server version, patched, limited to a small Administrators group, with no internet access from the controllers and with privileged access management and logging. It also asks that all passwords be reset after the environment is clean, and that persistence mechanisms be removed first. Keep an offline copy of the steps to rebuild the forest, and of the network diagram the guide asks you to store with offline backups and hard copies. ## Where does this connect to the rest of the plan? Restore order is set in the [recovery order page](/decisions/ransomware-recovery-order/). Controls BR1 to BR4 and ID3 on the [assessment](/assessment/) score the same points. ## Related pages - [Ransomware readiness: what it covers and how to test it](/readiness/ransomware-readiness/) - [Ransomware readiness board briefing: questions to ask](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-board-briefing/) - [Ransomware readiness assessment cost: what drives it](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-assessment-cost/) - [What is ransomware readiness? A plain definition](/readiness/what-is-ransomware-readiness/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Microsoft Learn: Prepare for ransomware attacks with a backup and recovery plan: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/ransomware/protect-against-ransomware-phase1 (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/readiness/ransomware-backup-and-identity-recovery-readiness/ --- # A ransomware response plan fixes who decides, what is isolated first and the order of recovery Guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A ransomware response plan is the ransomware-specific part of an incident response plan: who decides, how systems are isolated, who is told, how a payment question is handled and in what order systems come back. The #StopRansomware Guide asks that the CEO or equivalent approve it in writing. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What is a ransomware response plan? A ransomware response plan is a written procedure for a ransomware or data-extortion event, held alongside the general incident response plan. CISA's in-tool guide describes the #StopRansomware Guide's response checklist as something that "can serve as a ransomware-specific addendum to organization cyber incident response plans". The #StopRansomware Guide says to create, maintain and regularly exercise a plan and a communications plan that include response and notification procedures for ransomware and data extortion, and to keep a hard copy and an offline version. ## What is a ransomware incident response plan, and is it the same thing? The two names describe the same document. "Ransomware incident response plan" is the longer form used in searches; the published guidance says "incident response plan" and adds ransomware procedures. The point of difference with a general plan is the content: decision rights over isolation and payment, a recovery order built around backups and identity, and reporting clocks that depend on what was taken. For an attack already in progress, use the [first 24 hours guide](/response/first-24-hours/). For the full-text template, use the [plan template page](/plan/ransomware-response-plan-template/). ## What goes into the plan? The plan has thirteen sections, listed in order below. Each is set out in full on the template page. 1. Document control and approval by the CEO or equivalent. 2. Purpose and scope, with links to the general plan. 3. Authority and decision rights for isolation, outside help, notification and any payment talks. 4. Roles and 24-hour contacts, on paper (see [roles](/plan/ransomware-response-roles/)). 5. Triggers that declare the plan. 6. The first hour, in the sequence the guide gives. 7. Scoping, containment and eradication. 8. The payment decision path (see [should you pay](/decisions/should-you-pay-ransomware/)). 9. Legal and reporting clocks (see [reporting duties](/reporting/ransomware-reporting-duties/)). 10. Communications (see the [communications plan](/plan/ransomware-communications-plan/)). 11. Recovery order and verification. 12. After-incident review. 13. Appendices kept offline, including a [decision log](/plan/ransomware-decision-log/). ## How often should the plan be exercised? CPG 1.C says incident response plans should be reviewed and drilled, at a minimum, on an annual basis, with drills that are realistic and include all relevant stakeholders. CISA's tabletop exercise packages include ransomware scenarios and templates for objectives, discussion questions and an after action report. ## Is there a ransomware incident response plan pdf? The template is published here in full as HTML and as a Word document (.docx). Print it to PDF from the page or open the .docx and save as PDF. No third-party PDF is hosted. ## Related pages - [Ransomware communications plan: staff, customers, press](/plan/ransomware-communications-plan/) - [Ransomware decision log template](/plan/ransomware-decision-log/) - [Ransomware response plan template: full text and .docx](/plan/ransomware-response-plan-template/) - [Ransomware response roles: who does what](/plan/ransomware-response-roles/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - CISA CSET repository: RRA mini user guide text: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cisagov/cset/main/CSETWebNg/src/app/dialogs/rra-mini-user-guide/rra-mini-user-guide.component.html (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Tabletop Exercise Packages: https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/services/cisa-tabletop-exercise-packages (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/plan/ransomware-response-plan/ --- # The ransomware response plan template below is complete and ready to fill in Template, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** The ransomware response plan template below is complete: 13 sections, shown in full and also available as a Word (.docx) file. Bracketed fields are for you to fill in. Each section names the CISA or NIST text it is drawn from. A short illustrative example follows. Read on 16 November 2026. ## Is there a ransomware response plan template? Yes. The full text is below, and the same text is in the Word file. Copy it into your own document system, fill in every bracket, have the CEO or equivalent approve it, and keep a printed copy offline. Download: [Ransomware Response Plan template (.docx)](/downloads/ransomware-response-plan.docx). The file holds the same 13 sections, with tables, and opens in Word, LibreOffice or Google Docs. ## What does the template say? ### 1. Document control Record who owns this plan, who approved it and where the offline copies are kept. The #StopRansomware Guide asks that the plan be reviewed and approved in writing by the CEO or equivalent, and that a hard copy and an offline version are available. | Field | Entry | | --- | --- | | Plan owner (role and name) | [ ] | | Approved by (CEO or equivalent), date | [ ] | | Version and date | [ ] | | Last exercised, and scenario used | [ ] | | Next review due (at least annually) | [ ] | | Offline copies held by (names and places) | [ ] | *Drawn from:* [#StopRansomware Guide](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), [CISA CPG 2.0](https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0) (1.C). ### 2. Purpose and scope State what the plan covers: ransomware and data-extortion incidents affecting [organization], its subsidiaries, its cloud tenants and the systems run on its behalf by third parties. State what it does not cover (for example a safety incident with no cyber cause) and where that is handled. - Scope: [sites, business units, cloud accounts, operational technology] - Linked documents: [general incident response plan, communications plan, business continuity plan, crisis plan] - Definitions: ransomware event, data-extortion event, declared incident *Drawn from:* [#StopRansomware Guide](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide). ### 3. Authority and decision rights NIST says everyone should understand their role, responsibility and authority before an event. Fill in who decides each item, who stands in, and the longest time the decider may take. | Decision | Decider | Deputy | Time limit | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Isolate affected systems or segments | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | Take the network offline at the switch level | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | Disable VPN, remote access and single sign-on | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | Engage the incident response firm and breach counsel | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | Notify the cyber insurer | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | Contact law enforcement and CISA | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | Authorize any payment talks (see section 8) | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | Approve external statements | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | Declare the incident over | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | *Drawn from:* [NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf) (GV.RR-02), [#StopRansomware Guide](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide). ### 4. Roles and 24-hour contacts Keep this table on paper and in a place that does not depend on the network. The guide provides a response contacts table with 24x7 numbers and lists CISA, the FBI field office, the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, the U.S. Secret Service, state and local law enforcement, managed security providers and the cyber insurer. | Role or party | Name | 24-hour phone | Backup | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Incident commander | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | IT lead | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | Security lead | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | Identity and directory lead | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | Backup and recovery lead | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | Breach counsel | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | Incident response firm | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | Cyber insurer and broker | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | Communications lead | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | Human resources | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | Local FBI field office | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | CISA: report at cisa.gov/report, Central@cisa.gov, 1-844-Say-CISA (1-844-729-2472) | [ ] | 1-844-729-2472 | [ ] | | Key vendors and managed service providers | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | *Drawn from:* [#StopRansomware Guide](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), [NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf) (RS.CO-02). ### 5. Triggers: when this plan is declared Name the events that start the plan. Examples drawn from the guide's threat hunting list and the usual victim notice are below. Add your own. - A ransom note, extortion email or leak-site listing naming [organization] - Files encrypted on more than [number] systems, or on any domain controller or backup server - Alerts for new privileged accounts, deleted shadow copies or backups, or unexpected remote management software - Large unexplained outbound data transfer *Drawn from:* [#StopRansomware Guide](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide). ### 6. The first hour The guide says to move through its first three steps in sequence. This section restates them for [organization]. 1. Determine which systems are affected and isolate them. If several systems or subnets appear affected, take the network offline at the switch level. For cloud resources, snapshot volumes for later forensic review. 2. Coordinate isolation using out-of-band communication such as phone calls, so the attacker is not tipped off that they have been discovered. 3. Triage impacted systems for restoration from the predefined critical asset list. 4. Examine detection and prevention systems and logs for earlier-stage malware and signs of data theft. 5. Start the decision log (see the decision log template) and note the time of every action. 6. Power systems down only if they cannot be disconnected. The guide notes this loses volatile memory evidence. *Drawn from:* [#StopRansomware Guide](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide). ### 7. Scoping, containment and eradication Responders follow the guide's containment and eradication steps. Fill in who performs each for [organization]. - Take a system image and memory capture of a sample of affected devices; collect logs and samples of precursor malware - Preserve volatile evidence such as system memory, Windows Security logs and firewall log buffers - Ask federal law enforcement about available decryptors, since researchers sometimes find flaws - Identify the systems and accounts involved in the initial breach, including email accounts - Contain access routes: disable VPN, remote access servers, single sign-on and public-facing assets if needed - Look for persistence, both from outside in and from inside out - Rebuild in priority order from standard images; reset passwords only once the environment is clean - The designated IT or security authority declares the incident over against criteria set here: [criteria] *Drawn from:* [#StopRansomware Guide](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide). ### 8. Ransom payment decision path The FBI does not support paying a ransom, and OFAC says facilitating a payment may violate sanctions regulations. This section does not decide for you. It fixes the order of checks so a decision is not taken in haste. 1. The named decider is [ ]. Only the decider may authorize contact with the actor about payment. 2. Law enforcement has been contacted and the contact is logged. 3. Breach counsel has reviewed sanctions exposure, including OFAC screening of the actor and wallet. 4. The insurer has been told and has given its position in writing. 5. The estimated impact and scope of the event, and the restore options, have been recorded for the cost-benefit decision NIST describes. 6. The reasons for the decision are written in the decision log. *Drawn from:* [OFAC ransomware sanctions advisory](https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/912981/download?inline), [FBI IC3 ransomware page](https://www.ic3.gov/CrimeInfo/Ransomware), [NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf) (DE.AE-04). ### 9. Legal and reporting clocks Counsel completes this table before an event. The rows below show the duties read at source on 16 November 2026. Add contracts, insurer terms and state laws. | Duty | Applies if | Clock | Recipient | Owner | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Form 8-K Item 1.05 | Registrant determines an incident is material | Four business days after the materiality determination | SEC | [ ] | | HIPAA breach notice to individuals | Covered entity discovers a breach of unsecured protected health information | No later than 60 calendar days after discovery | Individuals | [ ] | | HIPAA notice to HHS | Same | 500 or more individuals: contemporaneously with individual notice. Fewer than 500: within 60 days after the end of the calendar year | HHS | [ ] | | HIPAA business associate notice | Business associate discovers a breach | No later than 60 calendar days after discovery | The covered entity | [ ] | | CIRCIA report | Not yet required: the final rule is not in effect | 72 hours for incidents and 24 hours for ransom payments, as the statute directs and CISA proposed | CISA | [ ] | | State breach notice | Personal information of residents involved | Per state law, read by counsel | Individuals and regulators | [ ] | | Insurer notice | Per policy | Per policy | Insurer | [ ] | | Customer and contract notices | Per contract | Per contract | Customers | [ ] | *Drawn from:* [SEC cybersecurity incident reporting rule](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/08/04/2023-16194/cybersecurity-risk-management-strategy-governance-and-incident-disclosure), [45 CFR 164.404](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/section-164.404), [45 CFR 164.408](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/section-164.408), [45 CFR 164.410](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/section-164.410), [CIRCIA](https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories/information-sharing/cyber-incident-reporting-critical-infrastructure-act-2022-circia), [NCSL breach notification laws](https://www.ncsl.org/technology-and-communication/security-breach-notification-laws). ### 10. Communications CPG 5.A asks for a plan naming stakeholders and mechanisms, regular updates to senior leadership and media procedures. Prepare the holding statements now. - Staff message, sent by phone tree if email is down: [text] - Customer holding statement, approved by counsel: [text] - Regulator and insurer contact script: [text] - Media holding statement and spokesperson: [text] - Update rhythm to senior leaders: every [ ] hours *Drawn from:* [CISA CPG 2.0](https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0) (5.A), [#StopRansomware Guide](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide). ### 11. Recovery Recovery follows a predefined critical asset list that includes health and safety, revenue and other critical services and their dependencies. | Order | System or service | Depends on | Restore from | Target time | Owner | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | Identity and directory services | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | 2 | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | 3 | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | 4 | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | - Verify backup integrity and scan restored systems before reconnecting them (NIST RC.RP-03) - Put only clean systems in any new recovery VLAN - Restore from offline, encrypted backups in priority order *Drawn from:* [#StopRansomware Guide](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), [NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf). ### 12. After the incident CPG 6.A asks for post-incident analysis that refines the plan. The guide asks organizations to document lessons learned and consider sharing indicators of compromise with CISA or their sector ISAC. - Hold a lessons-learned review within [ ] days - Update this plan, the playbook and the assessment scores - Share indicators with CISA or the sector ISAC where appropriate - Record dates for each fix and the owner *Drawn from:* [#StopRansomware Guide](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), [CISA CPG 2.0](https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0) (6.A). ### 13. Appendices to attach Attach and keep offline: - Critical asset list and dependencies - Network diagrams, including third-party connections - Backup inventory with installation media and license keys - Decision log (blank) - Holding statements ## What does a ransomware incident response plan example look like? Here is one filled-in extract so the format is clear. The organization and values are fictional and illustrate the layout only; they are not data. Extract from section 3 for "Example Foods Ltd" (fictional): Isolate affected systems: decider is the Chief Operating Officer; deputy is the Head of IT; time limit is 15 minutes from the first confirmed encryption alert; the decision is logged by the incident commander. Take the network offline at the switch level: decider is the Head of IT; deputy is the network manager; time limit is 30 minutes; the Chief Operating Officer is told by phone, not email. The values are illustrative. The principle is that every decision has a named person, a stand-in and a time limit before the event. ## Related pages - [Ransomware response plan: what it holds and who signs](/plan/ransomware-response-plan/) - [Ransomware decision log template](/plan/ransomware-decision-log/) - [Ransomware response roles: who does what](/plan/ransomware-response-roles/) - [Ransomware communications plan: staff, customers, press](/plan/ransomware-communications-plan/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - OFAC: Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments, 21 September 2021: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/912981/download?inline (read 16 November 2026) - Federal Register: SEC final rule on cybersecurity risk management, strategy, governance and incident reporting (4 August 2023): https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/08/04/2023-16194/cybersecurity-risk-management-strategy-governance-and-incident-disclosure (read 16 November 2026) - eCFR: 45 CFR 164.404, notification to individuals: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/section-164.404 (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA): https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories/information-sharing/cyber-incident-reporting-critical-infrastructure-act-2022-circia (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/plan/ransomware-response-plan-template/ --- # Ransomware response roles name one decider, a technical lead, counsel and a person who writes everything down Guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A ransomware response needs one executive decider, technical leads for systems, identity and backups, breach counsel, a communications lead, human resources and outside parties: an incident response firm, the insurer and law enforcement. NIST says roles and authorities must be understood before an event. Read on 16 November 2026. ## Who is on a ransomware response team? A ransomware response team has internal and external members. NIST says ransomware events often cause an immediate loss of business functions, so effective response requires that everyone understands their role, responsibility and authority before an event (GV.RR-02). The guide's contacts table lists the IT and security team, departmental or elected officials, state and local law enforcement, a fusion center, managed or security service providers and the cyber insurer. The table below suggests a split of duties. Names go in the [plan template](/plan/ransomware-response-plan-template/), section 4. | Role | What the role does | Decision rights | | --- | --- | --- | | Executive decider (incident commander) | Chairs the response; takes the isolation, outside-help and payment-path decisions; briefs the board | All decisions in plan section 3 | | Technical lead | Directs isolation, imaging, scoping and rebuild; keeps the system list | Technical containment steps | | Identity lead | Protects and rebuilds directory services; owns credential resets after the environment is clean | Account disablement, resets | | Backup and recovery lead | Protects backups first; verifies integrity before restore; runs the recovery order | Restore sequence within the approved order | | Breach counsel | Advises on legal duties, sanctions exposure and what may be said; reviews reporting clocks | None over technical steps | | Communications lead | Sends staff, customer and media messages from approved holding statements | Message timing within approved text | | Human resources | Informed when insider activity is suspected, as CPG 5.A asks | Personnel actions | | Scribe | Keeps the decision log with times | None | | Incident response firm | Brings scoping, forensics and recovery capacity; named in the contacts table | As contracted | | Cyber insurer | Sets conditions for payment and for appointed vendors | Under the policy | | Law enforcement and CISA | Provide threat response, asset response and, on request, technical help; the guide asks that victims report | None | Roles and rights. Sources: #StopRansomware Guide contacts section, NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 GV.RR-02, CISA CPG 5.A. ## Who can a victim call for outside help? The guide names CISA (cisa.gov/report, Central@cisa.gov, 1-844-Say-CISA), the local FBI field office, the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center and the U.S. Secret Service. For state, local, tribal and territorial organizations it names the MS-ISAC (soc@msisac.org, (866) 787-4722). Federal asset response offers technical assistance on request; federal threat response covers investigation and, on request, evidence collection. Commercial incident response firms are listed alphabetically on the [providers page](/providers/). ## Related pages - [Ransomware response plan: what it holds and who signs](/plan/ransomware-response-plan/) - [Ransomware response plan template: full text and .docx](/plan/ransomware-response-plan-template/) - [Ransomware communications plan: staff, customers, press](/plan/ransomware-communications-plan/) - [Ransomware decision log template](/plan/ransomware-decision-log/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/plan/ransomware-response-roles/ --- # A ransomware communications plan has holding statements approved before the attack and a channel that works without email Template, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A ransomware communications plan names who is told what, by which channel and when, and holds approved statements ready. The guide asks for holding statement templates and agreement on what level of detail to share. NIST warns that ransomware can disable email, so planning needs another way to reach staff and partners. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What goes in a ransomware communications plan? The #StopRansomware Guide asks that the communications plan include organizational communications procedures and templates for cyber incident holding statements, and that the organization reach consensus on the level of detail to share inside and outside and on how information will flow. CPG 5.A adds: identify stakeholders and mechanisms, update senior leadership regularly on major incidents, and follow media communications procedures. NIST notes that ransomware attacks can disable common communication channels such as email, so planning must include a way to communicate with staff and partners. | Audience | Channel if email is down | Owner | Approved by | When | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Executives and board | Phone tree, then secure messaging set up in advance | Incident commander | Incident commander | Within the first hours, then at set intervals | | All staff | Text message and phone tree; notice at entrances | Communications lead | Executive decider | After isolation is complete | | Customers | Account managers by phone; holding statement on the website | Communications lead | Breach counsel | When counsel confirms what can be said | | Regulators | As each clock requires | Breach counsel | Executive decider | Per reporting clocks | | Insurer and incident response firm | Phone numbers on paper | Incident commander | Not applicable | At once | | Media | Holding statement only | Communications lead | Breach counsel | If asked or if public | Starting channel table. Fill in names in the plan template. ## What should a holding statement say? A holding statement confirms facts that are known and promises updates without guessing. A neutral frame: "[Organization] has identified a cybersecurity incident affecting some of its systems. We took steps to contain it and have notified law enforcement. Some services may be unavailable. We will update [channel] by [time]." Have counsel approve it before the event. If personal data may be involved, notification content follows the legal duties on the [reporting duties page](/reporting/ransomware-reporting-duties/). ## Why plan for pre-emptive messaging? NIST lists pre-emptive messaging among the aims of immediate plan execution and information sharing, alongside stopping continuing exfiltration and the spread of infection. Agreeing wording beforehand removes drafting time from the first day. ## Related pages - [Ransomware response plan: what it holds and who signs](/plan/ransomware-response-plan/) - [Ransomware response plan template: full text and .docx](/plan/ransomware-response-plan-template/) - [Ransomware response roles: who does what](/plan/ransomware-response-roles/) - [Ransomware decision log template](/plan/ransomware-decision-log/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/plan/ransomware-communications-plan/ --- # A ransomware decision log records each decision, who took it, on what advice and with which alternatives Template, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A ransomware decision log is a time-stamped record of each decision taken during an incident: what was decided, by whom, on whose advice, with what options considered. It supports later reporting, insurance and review. The SEC final rule treats delay in a materiality determination as a compliance risk, which makes timing records useful. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What is a ransomware decision log? A ransomware decision log is a running table kept by a scribe from the first hour. It records the time of each decision, the decision, the decider, the advice received, the options not taken and the next review time. The first reason to keep one is clarity. NIST says estimating the impact and scope of an event informs response and recovery priorities and supports a cost-benefit analysis when deciding whether a ransom should be paid. The log shows what was known when the choice was made. ## Why does timing matter in the log? For companies filing under SEC rules, the final rule requires a materiality determination "without unreasonable delay" and says that deferring a board committee meeting past the normal time to convene would be unreasonable delay. The release adds that revising incident response policies to delay a determination would also be unreasonable. A log with times shows the determination followed normal practice. OFAC also considers the timing and completeness of reporting and cooperation with law enforcement as significant mitigating factors, so log the time of each report. ## What columns should the log have? | Time (UTC) | Decision | Decider | Advice received | Options not taken | Evidence or log reference | Next review | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Blank log. Print several copies and keep them with the plan. Always log these decisions: isolation, any power-down, outside help engaged, insurer and law enforcement contact, every reporting clock started, any contact with the actor, any payment decision and its screening, and the declaration that the incident is over. See the [plan template](/plan/ransomware-response-plan-template/), sections 3 and 8. ## Related pages - [Ransomware response plan: what it holds and who signs](/plan/ransomware-response-plan/) - [Ransomware response roles: who does what](/plan/ransomware-response-roles/) - [Ransomware communications plan: staff, customers, press](/plan/ransomware-communications-plan/) - [Ransomware response plan template: full text and .docx](/plan/ransomware-response-plan-template/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - Federal Register: SEC final rule on cybersecurity risk management, strategy, governance and incident reporting (4 August 2023): https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/08/04/2023-16194/cybersecurity-risk-management-strategy-governance-and-incident-disclosure (read 16 November 2026) - OFAC: Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments, 21 September 2021: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/912981/download?inline (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/plan/ransomware-decision-log/ --- # A ransomware playbook is a decision sequence you follow in order, with a named owner for each step Playbook, steps, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A ransomware playbook is a short ordered set of steps with owners and decision points, used under pressure. This one has 11 steps for the first 72 hours, drawn from the #StopRansomware Guide checklist and NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1. The CISA guide says to move through its first three steps in sequence. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What are the steps in a ransomware playbook? The 11 steps below follow the guide's order. Times are targets to set, not published standards. The owner column uses the roles on the [roles page](/plan/ransomware-response-roles/). 1. **Declare the incident and open the decision log.** The incident commander declares the incident under the plan triggers and starts the time-stamped log. Target: first 15 minutes. Owner: Incident commander. Source: Plan template sections 5 and 6. 2. **Determine impacted systems and isolate them.** If several systems or subnets look affected, take the network offline at the switch level; unplug or remove from Wi-Fi if that is not possible; snapshot cloud volumes. Prioritize critical systems. Owner: Technical lead. Source: #StopRansomware Guide, Detection and Analysis. 3. **Coordinate by phone, not network channels.** Use out-of-band communication such as phone calls so the actor does not learn that mitigation is under way and move laterally faster. Owner: Incident commander. Source: #StopRansomware Guide, Detection and Analysis. 4. **Triage systems for restoration.** Mark systems for restoration from the predefined critical asset list covering health and safety, revenue and other critical services, and note systems not affected so they can wait. Owner: Technical lead and business owners. Source: #StopRansomware Guide, Detection and Analysis. 5. **Examine logs and detection tools; start hunting.** Check for new privileged accounts, anomalous VPN logins, backup and shadow copy tampering, remote management tools, credential dumping and signs of data leaving the network. Owner: Security lead. Source: #StopRansomware Guide, threat hunting list. 6. **Notify counsel, insurer, incident response firm and law enforcement.** Report to CISA, the local FBI field office, the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center or the Secret Service. Share information so help can start. Owner: Incident commander and counsel. Source: #StopRansomware Guide, Reporting and Notification. 7. **Preserve evidence.** Image and capture memory of a sample of devices; keep logs, ransom notes and malware samples. Preserve volatile data first. Owner: Technical lead. Source: #StopRansomware Guide, Containment and Eradication. 8. **Decide whether data was taken, and start the reporting clocks.** Counsel works through the clock table: Form 8-K Item 1.05, HIPAA, state law, contracts. Ask law enforcement about possible decryptors. Owner: Breach counsel. Source: Plan template section 9. 9. **If an extortion demand exists, follow the payment decision path.** No contact with the actor except by the named decider. Screen for sanctions, consult counsel, insurer and law enforcement, and log reasons. Owner: Executive decider. Source: OFAC advisory of 21 September 2021. 10. **Eradicate, rebuild identity first and reset credentials.** Identify involved accounts and systems, remove persistence, rebuild by priority from standard images, then reset passwords once the environment is clean. Owner: Identity lead and technical lead. Source: #StopRansomware Guide, Containment and Eradication. 11. **Restore, verify and close.** Restore from offline, encrypted backups in priority order; verify integrity; add only clean systems to any recovery network; the designated authority declares the incident over; hold lessons learned. Owner: Backup and recovery lead. Source: #StopRansomware Guide, Recovery and Post Incident Activity. ## Is there a ransomware playbook template? Yes. Copy the table below. It is the blank form of the steps above, with a column for the time each step finished and for the evidence. | Step | Trigger or input | Action taken | Owner | Time done | Evidence reference | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 Declare | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | 2 Isolate | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | 3 Out-of-band coordination | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | 4 Triage | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | 5 Examine and hunt | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | 6 Notify | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | 7 Preserve | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | 8 Data theft and clocks | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | 9 Payment path | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | 10 Eradicate and rebuild | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | 11 Restore and close | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | ## Is there a ransomware playbook example? The numbered steps above are a worked example. For the decision paths drawn as a flowchart, see the [flowchart page](/playbook/ransomware-playbook-flowchart/). For the function-by-function version keyed to NIST, see the [NIST playbook page](/playbook/ransomware-playbook-nist/). ## Related pages - [Ransomware playbook keyed to NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1](/playbook/ransomware-playbook-nist/) - [Ransomware incident report template, ten sections](/playbook/ransomware-incident-report-template/) - [What is a ransomware playbook, and who holds it?](/playbook/what-is-a-ransomware-playbook/) - [Ransomware playbook flowchart: the decision paths](/playbook/ransomware-playbook-flowchart/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - OFAC: Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments, 21 September 2021: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/912981/download?inline (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/playbook/ransomware-playbook/ --- # A ransomware playbook is a short, rehearsed set of steps for one scenario, kept where responders can find it Definition, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A ransomware playbook is a set of steps and decision points for a ransomware event, held by the people who will run the response. It is narrower than a response plan. NIST says its ransomware profile can be used when developing a countermeasure playbook. Microsoft Learn also lists ransomware incident response playbooks. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What is a ransomware playbook? A ransomware playbook is an ordered procedure for a ransomware event, with decision points and owners. NIST says its ransomware profile can be used when developing a ransomware countermeasure playbook, which marks the playbook as something built from the profile's outcomes rather than a separate framework. The plan says who has authority and what must be true. The playbook says what to do next and in what order. Both belong in the offline binder. ## How is a playbook different from a response plan? | Feature | Response plan | Playbook | | --- | --- | --- | | Purpose | Authority, roles, duties, scope | Sequence of actions for one scenario | | Length | Many sections, reviewed annually | A few pages; used live | | Reader | Executives, counsel, IT | Responders on shift | | Example here | [Plan template](/plan/ransomware-response-plan-template/) | [11-step playbook](/playbook/ransomware-playbook/) | ## What is the Microsoft ransomware playbook? Microsoft Learn publishes a ransomware hub that lists "Microsoft ransomware incident response playbooks" and a page titled "Responding to ransomware attacks", alongside a question on how to download a ransomware incident response playbook. The hub is aimed at Microsoft environments. Microsoft's separate incident response playbooks overview states the format of its playbooks: prerequisites, a workflow, a checklist and investigation steps. That four-part format is a useful template for any estate. Its listed playbooks cover phishing, password spray, app consent grant, compromised and malicious applications, and token theft. For non-Microsoft estates, use the steps in this site's playbook and map each to your own tools. ## Who should hold the playbook? Give a printed copy to each role on the [roles page](/plan/ransomware-response-roles/), store one offline and keep one with the incident response firm. The #StopRansomware Guide asks that the plan be available as a hard copy and offline version; the same logic applies to the playbook. ## Related pages - [Ransomware playbook: steps for the first 72 hours](/playbook/ransomware-playbook/) - [Ransomware incident report template, ten sections](/playbook/ransomware-incident-report-template/) - [Ransomware playbook flowchart: the decision paths](/playbook/ransomware-playbook-flowchart/) - [Ransomware playbook keyed to NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1](/playbook/ransomware-playbook-nist/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Community Profile (CSRC record): https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8374/r1/final (read 16 November 2026) - Microsoft Learn: Microsoft defense against ransomware, extortion, and intrusion: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/ransomware/ (read 16 November 2026) - Microsoft Learn: Incident response playbooks overview: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/zero-trust/security-operations-incident-response-playbooks (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/playbook/what-is-a-ransomware-playbook/ --- # A ransomware playbook flowchart shows eight decisions, each with a yes path and a no path Flowchart, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A ransomware playbook flowchart is a set of yes or no questions that route responders. This one has eight decision nodes, written as a table so it prints on one page and works with a screen reader: systems affected, disconnection, demand, data theft, legal duties, sanctions checks, backups and identity. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What does a ransomware playbook flowchart look like? Read the table row by row. Each row is a decision node, and the yes and no columns name the next node or action. Node numbers match the [playbook steps](/playbook/ransomware-playbook/). | Node | Question | If yes | If no | Source | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | A | Are systems showing encryption, a ransom note or backup tampering? | Go to B | Keep monitoring; go to E if data theft is suspected | Guide: threat hunting list | | B | Can affected systems be disconnected individually? | Disconnect them; go to C | Take the network offline at the switch level; if even that is not possible, power down and accept that volatile memory is lost | Guide: Detection and Analysis | | C | Has the actor tried to deliver or demand anything? | Go to F | Go to D | Guide; IC3 | | D | Is there evidence that data left the network? | Go to E | Continue to G | Guide: threat hunting list | | E | Do personal, health or regulated data or a material event apply? | Start the reporting clocks with counsel; go to F or G | Record why not and keep reviewing | SEC final rule; 45 CFR 164 | | F | Has law enforcement been contacted, counsel and insurer consulted, and sanctions screening done? | Decider records a decision; go to G | Stop contact with the actor until done | OFAC advisory of 21 September 2021 | | G | Are backups verified as clean and out of the attacker's reach? | Restore in priority order; scan before reconnecting | Rebuild from golden images; check for dropper malware before restoring | Guide: Recovery; NIST RC.RP-03 | | H | Is the identity layer trusted? | Reset credentials once clean; reconnect in stages | Rebuild directory services first and reset all passwords after the environment is clean | Guide: Containment and Eradication | Decision nodes A to H. Eight nodes; C and D separate a demand from data theft. ## Why write the flowchart as a table? A table prints on one page, reads with a screen reader and survives a failed projector. The first three steps of the guide must run in sequence, and the table enforces order by node letter. ## Related pages - [Ransomware playbook: steps for the first 72 hours](/playbook/ransomware-playbook/) - [What is a ransomware playbook, and who holds it?](/playbook/what-is-a-ransomware-playbook/) - [Ransomware playbook keyed to NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1](/playbook/ransomware-playbook-nist/) - [Ransomware incident report template, ten sections](/playbook/ransomware-incident-report-template/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - OFAC: Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments, 21 September 2021: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/912981/download?inline (read 16 November 2026) - FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center: Ransomware: https://www.ic3.gov/CrimeInfo/Ransomware (read 16 November 2026) - Federal Register: SEC final rule on cybersecurity risk management, strategy, governance and incident reporting (4 August 2023): https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/08/04/2023-16194/cybersecurity-risk-management-strategy-governance-and-incident-disclosure (read 16 November 2026) - eCFR: 45 CFR 164.404, notification to individuals: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/section-164.404 (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/playbook/ransomware-playbook-flowchart/ --- # A ransomware playbook keyed to NIST assigns each action to a CSF function and a cited subcategory Framework mapping, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** NIST does not publish a ransomware playbook, but IR 8374 Rev. 1 says its profile can be used to develop one. This page keys playbook actions to the six CSF functions and to subcategory identifiers printed in the profile. Respond and Recover actions come from RS.MA-01, RS.MI-01, RS.MI-02 and RC.RP-01 to RC.RP-03. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What does the NIST ransomware playbook say? NIST has not published a playbook titled that way. NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 is a Community Profile, and its abstract says the profile can be used when developing a ransomware countermeasure playbook. The table keys each playbook phase to the subcategories the profile cites for it, in NIST's own identifiers. | CSF function | Playbook action | Cited subcategories | What NIST says it is for | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Govern | Know who decides; know legal duties; place ransomware in risk management | GV.RR-02, GV.OC-03, GV.RM-02, GV.RM-03 | Clear decision making and justifiable choices during response and recovery | | Identify | Keep inventories and priorities; know data flows and external connections | ID.AM-02, ID.AM-03, ID.AM-05, ID.RA-04 | Scope an event and order recovery | | Protect | Phishing-resistant MFA, least privilege, offline backups, allowlisting, segmentation | PR.AA-03, PR.AA-05, PR.DS-11, PR.PS-05, PR.IR-01 | Make initial access and spread harder | | Detect | Monitor networks, personnel activity and external providers; analyze events and estimate impact | DE.CM-01, DE.CM-03, DE.CM-06, DE.AE-02, DE.AE-04 | Find the event early; inform the pay or not-pay cost-benefit analysis | | Respond | Execute the plan; notify; share; contain; eradicate | RS.MA-01, RS.CO-02, RS.CO-03, RS.MI-01, RS.MI-02 | Stop exfiltration and spread; restore stakeholder confidence | | Recover | Execute the recovery plan; choose actions; verify backups; communicate progress | RC.RP-01, RC.RP-02, RC.RP-03, RC.CO-03, RC.CO-04 | Restore business function and cut losses | IDs are those printed in NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 (June 2026). The right-hand column paraphrases the profile. ## How do you use the table to build the playbook? Pick the playbook step from the [playbook page](/playbook/ransomware-playbook/), find its function in the table, and record which owner and which evidence satisfies the cited subcategories. The [control mapping](/mapping/) does the same for the 36 assessment controls. ## What do the basic tips add? Section 1.2 of the profile lists six basic tips: plan, educate, avoid vulnerabilities, detect and stop, make spread harder and make recovery easier. Under recovery it says to make an incident response and recovery plan with defined roles, including a strategy for out-of-band communications, and to keep contacts including law enforcement, legal counsel and incident response resources. ## Related pages - [Ransomware playbook: steps for the first 72 hours](/playbook/ransomware-playbook/) - [What is a ransomware playbook, and who holds it?](/playbook/what-is-a-ransomware-playbook/) - [Ransomware playbook flowchart: the decision paths](/playbook/ransomware-playbook-flowchart/) - [Ransomware incident report template, ten sections](/playbook/ransomware-incident-report-template/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Community Profile (CSRC record): https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8374/r1/final (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/playbook/ransomware-playbook-nist/ --- # A ransomware incident report template has ten sections and one block for the fields law enforcement asks for Template, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A ransomware incident report states what happened, what was affected, what was done, what has been reported and what comes next. This template has ten sections and includes the fields the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center asks for: variant, file extension, wallet details, attacker email, ransom demand and whether anything was paid. Read on 16 November 2026. ## Is there a ransomware incident report template? Yes. The ten sections below can be pasted into a document. Write facts and mark unknowns as unknown, because the first report is usually revised. 1. Summary: date and time of discovery, current status, business impact in one paragraph. 2. Timeline: time-stamped events from the decision log. 3. Systems and services affected, and those confirmed unaffected. 4. Data affected: types, volumes, and whether theft is confirmed, suspected or ruled out. 5. Actions taken: isolation, evidence preserved, outside help engaged. 6. Entry route and attacker activity, as far as known. 7. Demand and contact: whether a demand was made, what, and who has been in contact. 8. Notifications made and due: regulators, individuals, customers, insurer, law enforcement, with the clock for each. 9. Recovery status: restore order, progress and next milestones. 10. Open decisions and who owns them. ## What does law enforcement ask a victim to provide? The FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center says a complaint should contain all required data in its fields, including the ransomware variant name if known; the file extension of encrypted files; cryptocurrency type and address; the email address used by the attackers; websites or URLs provided by the attackers; the ransom demand amount; and whether the ransom was paid and, if so, the amount. Collect these in one block of the report so one person can file once. The FBI also states that it does not support paying a ransom. The [reporting page](/reporting/ransomware-reporting-duties/) covers other recipients. ## Who should receive the report? Send the executive version to the executive decider and board, the insurer version to the insurer under the policy terms, and the regulator version only after counsel has reviewed it. Keep a single source of facts, the decision log, and derive each version from it. ## Related pages - [Ransomware playbook: steps for the first 72 hours](/playbook/ransomware-playbook/) - [Ransomware playbook flowchart: the decision paths](/playbook/ransomware-playbook-flowchart/) - [Ransomware playbook keyed to NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1](/playbook/ransomware-playbook-nist/) - [What is a ransomware playbook, and who holds it?](/playbook/what-is-a-ransomware-playbook/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center: Ransomware: https://www.ic3.gov/CrimeInfo/Ransomware (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - OFAC: Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments, 21 September 2021: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/912981/download?inline (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/playbook/ransomware-incident-report-template/ --- # Ransomware incident response runs from first sign to recovery in four phases, and each has an owner Pillar guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Ransomware incident response is the process of detecting, containing and recovering from a ransomware event. The #StopRansomware Guide organizes it as Detection and Analysis, Reporting and Notification, Containment and Eradication, and Recovery and Post Incident Activity, and says to move through the first three steps in sequence. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What is ransomware incident response? Ransomware incident response is the coordinated work of finding out which systems are affected, stopping the spread, preserving evidence, telling the right parties, removing the attacker and restoring operations. The guide, written by CISA, the FBI, the NSA and the MS-ISAC, sets this out as Part 2, a "Ransomware and Data Extortion Response Checklist", and tells victims to follow their approved incident response plan. The guide covers data extortion as well as encryption, because it notes that attackers may steal data and threaten to release it. The [double extortion page](/decisions/double-extortion/) explains the consequences. ## How is incident response for ransomware different from general incident response? General incident response is about any security event; ransomware adds a deadline, an extortion demand and often data theft. NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3, finalized in April 2025, covers incident response across risk management, while NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 applies the CSF to ransomware specifically. Three things change. Isolation must happen at speed, ideally through out-of-band coordination so the attacker does not accelerate. A payment question appears, with sanctions and law enforcement checks. And recovery depends on whether backups and identity survived. See [incident response procedure](/response/ransomware-incident-response-procedure/) for the techniques and the [plan](/plan/ransomware-response-plan/) for authority. ## What are the four phases? The guide's Part 2 checklist runs in four phases. The table names each phase, what happens in it and the page that covers it. | Phase (guide wording) | What happens | Page | | --- | --- | --- | | Detection and Analysis | Isolate affected systems, triage for recovery, examine logs, hunt for precursors and data theft | [First 24 hours](/response/first-24-hours/) | | Reporting and Notification | Inform management, insurer and providers; report to CISA, FBI or Secret Service; follow breach notification duties | [Reporting duties](/reporting/ransomware-reporting-duties/) | | Containment and Eradication | Image and capture memory, contain access routes, find persistence, rebuild, reset credentials, declare over | [Procedure](/response/ransomware-incident-response-procedure/) | | Recovery and Post Incident Activity | Restore from offline backups by priority, avoid reinfection, record lessons learned | [Recovery order](/decisions/ransomware-recovery-order/) | ## How do attackers get in, according to one response firm's cases? Coveware, an extortion response firm, reported for incidents it supported in the third quarter of 2026 that phishing and social engineering led initial access at about 29%, remote access compromise ran at 22 to 23%, and compromised credentials at 14 to 15%. It also reported that lateral movement and data exfiltration were each observed in 71% of cases. These figures describe one firm's caseload, not all incidents. ## Where do the details live? - [The steps of ransomware incident response](/response/ransomware-incident-response-steps/) - [The first 24 hours, hour by hour](/response/first-24-hours/) - [Procedure and techniques for responders](/response/ransomware-incident-response-procedure/) - [The 72-hour playbook](/playbook/ransomware-playbook/) - [Should you pay a ransom?](/decisions/should-you-pay-ransomware/) ## Related pages - [Ransomware first 24 hours: an hour-by-hour guide](/response/first-24-hours/) - [Ransomware incident response procedure and techniques](/response/ransomware-incident-response-procedure/) - [Ransomware incident response steps, in order, with owners](/response/ransomware-incident-response-steps/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3, Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management (CSRC record): https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/61/r3/final (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Community Profile (CSRC record): https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8374/r1/final (read 16 November 2026) - Coveware: The Silent Ransom Group leak shows why paying for silence fails (Q3 2026 report article): https://coveware.com/2026/10/the-silent-ransom-group-leak-shows-why-paying-for-silence-fails/ (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/response/ransomware-incident-response/ --- # The steps of ransomware incident response are six, and the first three must run in sequence Steps, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** The steps of ransomware incident response are: detect and analyze, report and notify, contain, eradicate, recover and review. The #StopRansomware Guide says to move through its first three checklist steps in sequence. Each step below has an owner and a done-when test so progress can be reported without guessing. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What are the steps of ransomware incident response? Six steps cover the guide's four phases. The table shows what each aims at, who owns it and how you know it is done. The [11-step playbook](/playbook/ransomware-playbook/) gives the finer sequence. | Step | Goal | Owner | Done when | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 Detect and analyze | Know which systems are affected; isolate; triage for restoration; examine logs | Technical lead | Affected systems isolated and listed; initial understanding documented | | 2 Report and notify | Get help and meet duties | Incident commander and counsel | Management, insurer, providers and law enforcement told; clocks started | | 3 Contain | Stop the spread and cut access routes | Technical lead and identity lead | Access routes disabled; evidence imaged and preserved | | 4 Eradicate | Remove the attacker and persistence | Security lead | Persistence reviewed; systems rebuilt from clean images; passwords reset | | 5 Recover | Restore business services | Backup and recovery lead | Critical services restored from verified backups, without reinfection | | 6 Review | Fix the causes | Executive decider | Lessons-learned review held; plan and controls updated | Steps follow the guide's four phases. Owners are suggestions; set yours in the plan template. ## What are incident response steps for a ransomware attack when you are the person on call? Do these three first and in this order, as the guide says: determine which systems are affected and isolate them; triage the affected systems for restoration; examine the detection systems and logs. If you cannot disconnect a system, power it down to stop spread, accepting that this loses volatile memory evidence. Then call the executive decider, using a phone. The [first hour page](/decisions/first-hour-of-ransomware/) lists the questions to ask in that call. ## What is the ransomware incident response process, and who hands off to whom? The process hands off at three points: from the on-call responder to the executive decider (authority), from the decider to counsel and the insurer (obligations), and from the technical lead to the backup lead (recovery). Each handoff needs a named person on both sides. See [roles](/plan/ransomware-response-roles/). ## Related pages - [Ransomware incident response: the whole process explained](/response/ransomware-incident-response/) - [Ransomware incident response procedure and techniques](/response/ransomware-incident-response-procedure/) - [Ransomware first 24 hours: an hour-by-hour guide](/response/first-24-hours/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/response/ransomware-incident-response-steps/ --- # The first 24 hours of a ransomware attack go in four blocks: the first hour, hours one to four, four to eight and eight to twenty-four Guide, steps, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** The first 24 hours of a ransomware attack are easiest to manage in four blocks: the first hour, hours one to four, hours four to eight and hours eight to twenty-four. Isolate, preserve and call for help first; scope and decide next; start recovery planning last. Times are targets, not published standards. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What should you do in the first 24 hours of a ransomware attack? Follow the order, not the clock. The #StopRansomware Guide asks responders to move through its first three steps in sequence, and the time blocks below hang the rest of the checklist around them. 1. **Hour 0 to 1: isolate and call.** Isolate affected systems; if several subnets are affected take the network offline at the switch level. Use out-of-band communication. Call the executive decider. Open the decision log. Owner: On-call responder. Source: Guide, Detection and Analysis. 2. **Hours 1 to 4: preserve and bring in help.** Image a sample of devices and capture memory; keep logs and ransom notes. Notify the insurer, breach counsel, and the incident response firm. Report to CISA, the local FBI field office, IC3 or the Secret Service. Owner: Technical lead and incident commander. Source: Guide, Reporting and Notification; Containment and Eradication. 3. **Hours 4 to 8: scope and decide.** Hunt for the entry route, dropper malware, new accounts, backup tampering and data leaving the network. Counsel starts the reporting clocks. No contact with the actor except by the decider. Owner: Security lead and counsel. Source: Guide, threat hunting list; OFAC advisory. 4. **Hours 8 to 24: protect backups and plan recovery.** Confirm backups are intact and offline. Rank systems for restoration from the critical asset list. Rebuild identity first when it is affected. Agree an update rhythm with leadership. Owner: Backup and recovery lead. Source: Guide, Recovery and Post Incident Activity. ## What goes in a ransomware incident response checklist? Print the list below. Each line comes from the guide's Part 2 checklist. - Affected systems identified and isolated, in a coordinated way. - Out-of-band channel in use; attacker not tipped off. - Critical systems prioritized for restoration; unaffected systems noted. - Logs and detection tools examined for precursor malware and data theft. - Management, insurer and providers informed. - CISA, FBI field office, IC3 or Secret Service contacted. - System images and memory captured from a sample of devices. - Possible decryptors asked about through federal law enforcement. - Access routes cut: VPN, remote access, single sign-on if needed. - Persistence searched for, outside in and inside out. - Rebuild plan agreed, in priority order, from standard images. - Backups protected and verified; recovery network kept clean. ## What if you only have an hour? Do the first block and the call. The [first hour page](/decisions/first-hour-of-ransomware/) explains the isolate-or-shut-down choice, and the [playbook](/playbook/ransomware-playbook/) takes the sequence to 72 hours. ## Related pages - [Ransomware incident response: the whole process explained](/response/ransomware-incident-response/) - [Ransomware incident response steps, in order, with owners](/response/ransomware-incident-response-steps/) - [Ransomware incident response procedure and techniques](/response/ransomware-incident-response-procedure/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - OFAC: Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments, 21 September 2021: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/912981/download?inline (read 16 November 2026) - FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center: Ransomware: https://www.ic3.gov/CrimeInfo/Ransomware (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/response/first-24-hours/ --- # A ransomware incident response procedure lists the technical checks a responder runs, such as sessions, logs and persistence Procedure, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A ransomware incident response procedure is the technical checklist responders follow once the plan is invoked. The #StopRansomware Guide lists checks for server-side encryption, a threat hunting list, persistence analysis and cloud steps. This page condenses them and notes where each comes from. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What is a ransomware incident response procedure? It is the step-level instruction that sits under the plan: what to open, what to look for and what to record. The plan assigns authority; the procedure tells a responder which logs to read. The guide's Containment and Eradication section is its core. ## What techniques does incident response use against ransomware attacks? Responders use triage, imaging, log review, threat hunting, session and file analysis, network capture and persistence analysis. The guide describes each in terms an administrator can run. | Technique | What to do | Why | | --- | --- | --- | | Triage | Rank affected systems against the critical asset list; note unaffected systems | Orders recovery | | Imaging | Take a system image and memory capture from a sample of workstations, servers, virtual and cloud servers; collect logs and precursor malware samples | Preserves evidence; volatile data is lost on power-off | | Threat hunting | Look for new or escalated AD accounts, odd VPN logins, tools that impair backups and shadow copies (bcdedit, fsutil, vssadmin, wbadmin, wmic), Cobalt Strike, unexpected remote management software, PowerShell and PsTools use, credential dumping, odd endpoint-to-endpoint traffic | Finds the route and the scope | | Data theft checks | Look for abnormal outbound data on any port and for tunneling and sync tools such as Chisel, Cloudflared and Rclone | Tells you whether extortion is double | | Server-side encryption identification | Review sessions and open files; file properties of encrypted files and ransom notes; the TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager log for RDP connections; Windows Security and SMB logs; packet capture filtered for files being written or renamed | Finds the infected workstation encrypting a server | | Persistence analysis | Outside-in: rogue accounts, backdoors on perimeter systems, exploited external vulnerabilities. Inside-out: implants and living-off-the-land use of commercial tools, PsExec and PowerShell | Prevents a repeat the next week | | Cloud checks | Snapshot volumes; alert on changes to IAM, network security and data protection resources; automate response to open firewall rules | Preserves evidence and blocks tampering | Techniques from the #StopRansomware Guide, Part 2, page read 16 November 2026. ## What is a ransomware response procedure for the technical team, in order? In order, the procedure for the technical team is seven steps, each drawn from the guide's checklist. 1. Run the first three guide steps: isolate, triage, examine. 2. Capture images and memory from a sample before any rebuild. 3. Hunt using the list above, and record every finding in the decision log. 4. Identify the accounts and systems involved in the initial breach, including email accounts. 5. Cut access: disable VPN, remote access servers, single sign-on and public-facing assets where needed. 6. Search for persistence, then rebuild in priority order from standard images. 7. Reset passwords only after the environment is clean, then bring systems back in stages. ## Related pages - [Ransomware incident response: the whole process explained](/response/ransomware-incident-response/) - [Ransomware incident response steps, in order, with owners](/response/ransomware-incident-response-steps/) - [Ransomware first 24 hours: an hour-by-hour guide](/response/first-24-hours/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/response/ransomware-incident-response-procedure/ --- # In the first hour of a ransomware attack, isolate first and power off only when you cannot disconnect Decision guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** In the first hour of a ransomware attack, isolate affected systems, coordinate by phone, and call the person with authority. On isolate or shut down: the 2023 #StopRansomware Guide says to disconnect first and power down only if disconnection is impossible, because power-off loses volatile memory. A 2021 advisory said to power off other devices. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What should you do in the first hour of a ransomware attack? Do four things in the first hour: isolate, coordinate out of band, call the decider and start the log. The guide says to determine which systems are impacted and isolate them immediately, to prioritize critical systems, and to take the network offline at the switch level if several systems or subnets appear impacted. If taking the network offline is not possible, locate the network cable and unplug affected devices or remove them from Wi-Fi. For cloud resources, take a snapshot of volumes for later forensic review. 1. Isolate in a coordinated way, so the attacker is not alerted by piecemeal changes. 2. Use phone calls or another channel outside the affected network. 3. Call the executive decider and the incident response lead. 4. Start the decision log with the time of discovery and each action. ## Should you isolate or shut down infected systems? Isolate first. Shut down only if you cannot disconnect. The guide says to power down devices if you are unable to disconnect them from the network, to avoid further spread, and notes that doing so prevents the organization from keeping ransomware artifacts and evidence stored in volatile memory. An earlier CISA and FBI advisory about DarkSide ransomware (AA21-131A, May 2021) said to isolate the infected system and to power off and segregate other computers that shared a network with it and had not yet been fully encrypted. The two documents were written two years apart for different purposes; treat the later and more detailed guide as the default, and record in the log why you chose power-off if you did. | Option | Preserves memory evidence | Stops spread | When the sources say to use it | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Disconnect (switch-level offline, unplug, Wi-Fi off) | Yes | Yes | First choice, per the 2023 guide | | Power down | No | Yes | Only if you cannot disconnect, per the 2023 guide | | Power off uninfected devices that shared the network | Not applicable | Prevents encryption | Per the 2021 advisory, before full encryption | ## What should wait until after the first hour? Password resets, rebuilds and any reconnection of systems wait until the environment is clean. The guide asks for password resets after the environment has been fully cleaned and rebuilt. The [first 24 hours guide](/response/first-24-hours/) continues from here. ## Related pages - [Should you pay a ransom? Legal and practical checks](/decisions/should-you-pay-ransomware/) - [Ransomware recovery order: what to restore first](/decisions/ransomware-recovery-order/) - [Ransomware in OT environments: a guide](/decisions/ransomware-in-ot-environments/) - [Ransom payment and OFAC sanctions screening](/decisions/ransom-payment-and-sanctions/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - CISA and FBI advisory AA21-131A: DarkSide ransomware, best practices for preventing business disruption: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-131a (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/decisions/first-hour-of-ransomware/ --- # Whether to pay a ransom is a legal and business decision, and government sources advise against paying Decision guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Whether to pay a ransom is a legal and business decision, not a technical one. The FBI does not support paying; OFAC strongly discourages it and warns that facilitating payment may violate sanctions regulations; the UK NCSC does not encourage it. Payment guarantees nothing. Check sanctions, law enforcement and the insurer first. Read on 16 November 2026. ## Should you pay a ransom? Government sources advise against paying. The FBI says it does not support paying a ransom, that paying does not guarantee getting data back, and that it encourages perpetrators to target more victims. OFAC says the U.S. government strongly discourages paying ransom or extortion demands. The UK NCSC says it does not encourage, endorse or condone payment, and that there is no guarantee you will get access to your data. The decision is still yours, and some organizations face it. This page sets out the checks, not a verdict. If you are in the first hours of an incident, do not start talks until the checks below are complete. ## What must be checked before any payment? | Question | Why it matters | Source | | --- | --- | --- | | Is the actor or wallet on a sanctions list, or in a sanctioned jurisdiction? | Facilitating a payment may violate OFAC regulations; liability can be strict | OFAC advisory, 21 September 2021 | | Has law enforcement been told, and has cooperation been logged? | OFAC treats a prompt, complete report and ongoing cooperation as significant mitigating factors | OFAC advisory | | Does the insurer consent, and on what terms? | Insurers are among the companies OFAC names as at risk when facilitating payments | OFAC advisory; NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 | | What is the cost-benefit once impact and scope are known? | NIST says impact and scope inform a cost-benefit analysis on whether to pay | NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, DE.AE-04 | | Is there a decryptor, or a clean restore path? | The guide asks that federal law enforcement be asked about decryptors; restoring from backups removes one reason to pay | #StopRansomware Guide | | Was data stolen? | Payment does not remove reporting duties; deletion promises cannot be checked | Coveware Q3 2026 article (vendor view) | | Who decides, and where are the reasons written? | NIST says a documented risk appetite supports justifiable choices | NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, GV.RM-02 | Seven checks. This site does not tell you to pay or not to pay. ## What do response firms report about payment? Coveware, a firm that handles extortion cases, wrote in its Q3 2026 article that the median ransom payment among incidents it supported was $400,000, up 167% on the second quarter, and that the average fell 45% to $1,025,278. It also said nearly 80% of pure data-exfiltration incidents were resolved without a ransom payment, and that paying rarely removes regulatory or legal notification obligations. These are one firm's figures from its own cases. See [negotiation](/decisions/ransomware-negotiation/), [sanctions](/decisions/ransom-payment-and-sanctions/) and [insurance](/decisions/ransomware-and-cyber-insurance/) for the supporting steps. ## Related pages - [Ransomware in OT environments: a guide](/decisions/ransomware-in-ot-environments/) - [First hour of a ransomware attack: isolate or shut down?](/decisions/first-hour-of-ransomware/) - [Ransom payment and OFAC sanctions screening](/decisions/ransom-payment-and-sanctions/) - [Ransomware negotiation: what negotiators do](/decisions/ransomware-negotiation/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center: Ransomware: https://www.ic3.gov/CrimeInfo/Ransomware (read 16 November 2026) - OFAC: Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments, 21 September 2021: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/912981/download?inline (read 16 November 2026) - UK NCSC: What you need to know about ransomware: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/ransomware/home (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - Coveware: The Silent Ransom Group leak shows why paying for silence fails (Q3 2026 report article): https://coveware.com/2026/10/the-silent-ransom-group-leak-shows-why-paying-for-silence-fails/ (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/decisions/should-you-pay-ransomware/ --- # Paying a ransom can break U.S. sanctions rules even when the victim did not know who the attacker was Legal guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** OFAC's updated advisory of 21 September 2021 warns that facilitating a ransomware payment may violate U.S. sanctions regulations. Liability can be strict, so lack of knowledge is not a defense. Prompt reporting to law enforcement and a strong security program count as mitigating factors. License applications get a presumption of denial. Read on 16 November 2026. ## Does OFAC prohibit paying a ransom? OFAC does not ban every payment. It says U.S. persons are generally prohibited from transactions with persons on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List, other blocked persons and those covered by comprehensive embargoes, and that a payment demanded by or routed to such a party may violate its regulations. The advisory lists Cuba, the Crimea region of Ukraine, Iran, North Korea and Syria as examples of embargoed jurisdictions. The advisory states that it is explanatory only and has no force of law; the binding provisions are the regulations it cites. It updates and supersedes OFAC's advisory of 1 October 2020. ## Who is at risk besides the victim? OFAC names companies that facilitate ransomware payments on behalf of victims, including financial institutions, cyber insurance firms and companies involved in digital forensics and incident response. It adds that their sanctions compliance programs should account for the risk that a payment involves an SDN or blocked person, and that they should consider FinCEN obligations. OFAC may impose civil penalties on a strict liability basis, meaning a person can be liable even if they did not know a transaction was prohibited. ## What counts as a mitigating factor? OFAC names three kinds of conduct that it treats as mitigating in an enforcement response. - Meaningful steps to reduce the risk of extortion, such as those in CISA's ransomware guide: offline backups, incident response plans, training, up-to-date anti-malware and authentication. OFAC calls these a significant mitigating factor. - A self-initiated, complete report of the attack to law enforcement or CISA, or Treasury's Office of Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection, as soon as possible after discovery. OFAC treats this as a "voluntary self-disclosure" and a significant mitigating factor. - Full and ongoing cooperation with law enforcement, including technical details, the demand and the payment instructions. ## What does OFAC do with license applications? It reviews license applications involving ransomware payments case by case, with a presumption of denial. It encourages victims to report to CISA, the local FBI field office, the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center or the U.S. Secret Service, to report attacks and payments to Treasury's OCCIP, and to contact OFAC if a sanctions nexus is suspected. The [plan template](/plan/ransomware-response-plan-template/), section 8, builds these checks into the payment path. ## Which actors has OFAC designated? The advisory gives examples: the developer of Cryptolocker (designated December 2016), two Iranians tied to SamSam (November 2018), the Lazarus Group and two subgroups (September 2019), Evil Corp and its head (December 2019), and the virtual currency exchange SUEX (September 2021). A payment to a designated actor is the clearest case of risk. ## Related pages - [Should you pay a ransom? Legal and practical checks](/decisions/should-you-pay-ransomware/) - [First hour of a ransomware attack: isolate or shut down?](/decisions/first-hour-of-ransomware/) - [Ransomware negotiation: what negotiators do](/decisions/ransomware-negotiation/) - [Double extortion ransomware: stolen data and encryption](/decisions/double-extortion/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - OFAC: Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments, 21 September 2021: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/912981/download?inline (read 16 November 2026) - OFAC recent action, 21 September 2021: https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20210921 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/decisions/ransom-payment-and-sanctions/ --- # A ransomware negotiator talks to the attacker for the victim; hiring one does not commit you to pay Decision guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A ransomware negotiator communicates with the attacker on the victim's behalf. Firms describe the work as verifying claims, testing whether stolen data is real and buying time. Hiring one does not oblige payment. OFAC lists incident response firms among parties that can face sanctions risk if a payment is facilitated. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What does a ransomware negotiator do? Firms that offer the service describe it in their own words. Coveware says its extortion case managers negotiate around the clock on the client's behalf until the client directs otherwise or the incident is resolved. CRA says its negotiation team manages over 750 successful negotiations annually. Arctic Wolf says threat actor negotiation is in-house so a third party need not be onboarded mid-incident. Mandiant says it works with a network of law firms, insurance providers and ransomware negotiators. These are the firms' claims, read 10 November 2026. No source read here says a negotiator is needed in every case. The UK NCSC and the FBI advise against paying, and negotiation can occur without payment. ## What should you ask a negotiator before hiring one? 1. Do you screen the actor and wallet against sanctions lists before any talk of payment, and in writing? 2. Who instructs you: the victim, counsel or the insurer? 3. Do you report to law enforcement, and when? 4. What do you charge, and is it separate from any payment? 5. How do you verify that stolen data is real, and what do you do with the proof? 6. Which decryptor testing do you do before payment? 7. What do you log, and can we have the log? 8. Which conflicts do you hold, for example with the insurer or the incident response firm? ## Does the law limit negotiation? OFAC says facilitating a payment may violate sanctions regulations, and it names digital forensics and incident response firms and cyber insurers among the companies exposed. The [sanctions page](/decisions/ransom-payment-and-sanctions/) sets out the rules. The [providers page](/providers/) lists, alphabetically, which firms name negotiation on their own pages. ## Related pages - [Should you pay a ransom? Legal and practical checks](/decisions/should-you-pay-ransomware/) - [Ransom payment and OFAC sanctions screening](/decisions/ransom-payment-and-sanctions/) - [Double extortion ransomware: stolen data and encryption](/decisions/double-extortion/) - [Ransomware and cyber insurance: what to arrange first](/decisions/ransomware-and-cyber-insurance/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - OFAC: Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments, 21 September 2021: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/912981/download?inline (read 16 November 2026) - UK NCSC: What you need to know about ransomware: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/ransomware/home (read 16 November 2026) - FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center: Ransomware: https://www.ic3.gov/CrimeInfo/Ransomware (read 16 November 2026) - Coveware: ransomware incident response: https://www.coveware.com/ransomware-incident-response (read 10 November 2026) - CRA: incident response: https://www.crai.com/services/information-security-and-privacy/cybersecurity/incident-response/ (read 10 November 2026) - Arctic Wolf: incident response: https://arcticwolf.com/solutions/incident-response/ (read 10 November 2026) - Mandiant: https://cloud.google.com/security/mandiant (read 10 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/decisions/ransomware-negotiation/ --- # Double extortion ransomware pairs encryption with data theft, so restoring from backups does not end the pressure Explainer, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Double extortion ransomware means attackers both encrypt systems and steal data, then demand payment for a key and again for silence. NIST describes the second demand. CISA says access brokers sometimes exfiltrate data and threaten release before ransoming a network. Restoring from backup fixes availability, not the stolen copy. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What is double extortion in ransomware? Double extortion is a ransomware attack with two pressures: encrypted systems and stolen data. NIST puts it this way: attackers encrypt data and demand payment to restore access, and may also steal an organization's information and demand an additional payment in return for not disclosing it to authorities, competitors or the public. CISA's guide says operators of precursor malware often sell access to a network and that actors sometimes use that access to exfiltrate data and threaten to release it publicly before ransoming the network, to extort the victim further. ## What does double extortion change in the response? - Scoping must include data theft, not only encryption. The guide lists abnormal outbound data and tunneling and sync tools to check for. - Reporting clocks may start even if every system is restored, because personal or regulated data may have left. - Backups solve availability. They do not retrieve stolen copies. - The payment question gets harder: a payment for deletion buys a promise that cannot be checked, according to Coveware. ## Are pure data theft attacks growing? One response firm says so. Coveware wrote in its Q3 2026 article that ransomware is "increasingly shedding the ware" in favor of data extortion with little or no encryption, and that nearly 80% of pure data-exfiltration incidents it supported were resolved without payment. The sample is its own caseload. CISA's RRA and NIST's profile both describe extortion by data theft, so a readiness view should not rely on backups alone. ## Where does this leave readiness? Controls that limit exfiltration and watch for it matter as much as backups. See the detection controls on the [assessment](/assessment/) and the [data theft hunting list](/response/ransomware-incident-response-procedure/). ## Related pages - [Should you pay a ransom? Legal and practical checks](/decisions/should-you-pay-ransomware/) - [Ransom payment and OFAC sanctions screening](/decisions/ransom-payment-and-sanctions/) - [Ransomware negotiation: what negotiators do](/decisions/ransomware-negotiation/) - [Ransomware and cyber insurance: what to arrange first](/decisions/ransomware-and-cyber-insurance/) - [Ransomware recovery order: what to restore first](/decisions/ransomware-recovery-order/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Community Profile (CSRC record): https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8374/r1/final (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - Coveware: The Silent Ransom Group leak shows why paying for silence fails (Q3 2026 report article): https://coveware.com/2026/10/the-silent-ransom-group-leak-shows-why-paying-for-silence-fails/ (read 16 November 2026) - CISA and FBI advisory AA21-131A: DarkSide ransomware, best practices for preventing business disruption: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-131a (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/decisions/double-extortion/ --- # Cyber insurance can ease the cost of a ransomware event, but the policy sets conditions you must know before the attack Guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Cyber insurance can ease the financial pressure of a ransomware event, according to NIST, and the guide lists the insurer among contacts to fill in beforehand. OFAC names cyber insurers among companies exposed to sanctions risk. Know the notice step, the approved vendors and the payment conditions before an attack. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What does the insurer need after a ransomware attack? What the insurer needs is set by the policy, which this site has not read for any carrier. Take the notice clause and the list of approved vendors from your own policy and put them in the plan. The #StopRansomware Guide lists the cyber insurer in its response contacts table with a 24x7 number and a role, and its reporting step says relevant stakeholders may include the cyber insurance company. NIST says cyber insurance, especially for small and medium-sized businesses, can help alleviate the financial pressure of a ransomware event, helping keep organizations operational during response and recovery (GV.RM-03). ## What policy questions should be settled before an attack? 1. How and how fast must the insurer be told, and to which number? 2. Must incident response firms and counsel come from a panel? 3. Does the policy cover extortion payments, and what consent does it require? 4. How does the insurer treat sanctions screening of payments? 5. What security controls are conditions of cover or of the premium? 6. What evidence will the insurer ask for, and in what form? 7. Does cover include data restoration, business interruption and notification costs? ## Why does sanctions exposure reach insurers? OFAC says companies that facilitate ransomware payments, including cyber insurance firms, not only encourage future demands but may risk violating OFAC regulations. It asks them to run risk-based sanctions compliance programs that account for payments involving SDN or blocked persons. For the insured, this can mean extra steps before a payment is approved. See the [payment decision path](/decisions/should-you-pay-ransomware/). ## Related pages - [Should you pay a ransom? Legal and practical checks](/decisions/should-you-pay-ransomware/) - [Ransomware negotiation: what negotiators do](/decisions/ransomware-negotiation/) - [Double extortion ransomware: stolen data and encryption](/decisions/double-extortion/) - [Ransomware recovery order: what to restore first](/decisions/ransomware-recovery-order/) - [Ransomware in OT environments: a guide](/decisions/ransomware-in-ot-environments/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - OFAC: Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments, 21 September 2021: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/912981/download?inline (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/decisions/ransomware-and-cyber-insurance/ --- # The ransomware recovery order should be written before the attack, with identity at the front Decision guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** The ransomware recovery order is the ranked list of systems to restore, set before an attack from a critical asset list. The #StopRansomware Guide asks that restoration follow a predefined list covering health and safety, revenue and other critical services and their dependencies. This page proposes identity first, then core network services, then business systems. Read on 16 November 2026. ## Which systems should be restored first after ransomware? Restore in the order of a list written beforehand, not in the order users complain. The guide asks for prioritization based on a predefined critical asset list that includes information systems critical for health and safety, revenue generation or other critical services, and the systems they depend on. NIST says asset prioritization by classification, criticality and mission impact is essential to understanding the scope of an event and to prioritizing recovery (ID.AM-05). The default order below is this site's proposal, built on that principle. The guide does not publish a fixed order. | Order | Tier | Reason | Check before moving on | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | Identity and directory services | The guide says attackers often use domain controllers to spread ransomware; nothing else can be trusted until identity is clean | Controllers rebuilt or verified; passwords reset after environment is clean | | 2 | Network core: DNS, DHCP, remote access, management network | Systems cannot reconnect without them | Clean VLAN set up; only verified systems added | | 3 | Backup and security tooling | You need detection and backup to avoid repeat harm | Tooling reports on restored systems | | 4 | Systems tied to safety, health or legal duties | The guide names health and safety first among criteria | Safety owner signs off | | 5 | Revenue systems and their data | Business survival | Integrity of data checked | | 6 | Everything else, in the business-agreed order | Finish the list | Business owners confirm | Proposed default order, to be replaced by your own critical asset list. ## How do you avoid reinfecting restored systems? The guide warns to take care not to reinfect clean systems during recovery, for example by making sure only clean systems join any new VLAN created for recovery. NIST adds that backup integrity should be verified before restoring (RC.RP-03). Scan restored systems before they rejoin the network and look for dropper malware before rebuilding from backups. The [backup readiness page](/readiness/ransomware-backup-and-identity-recovery-readiness/) covers the tests to run in advance. ## Related pages - [Should you pay a ransom? Legal and practical checks](/decisions/should-you-pay-ransomware/) - [Double extortion ransomware: stolen data and encryption](/decisions/double-extortion/) - [Ransomware and cyber insurance: what to arrange first](/decisions/ransomware-and-cyber-insurance/) - [Ransomware in OT environments: a guide](/decisions/ransomware-in-ot-environments/) - [First hour of a ransomware attack: isolate or shut down?](/decisions/first-hour-of-ransomware/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/decisions/ransomware-recovery-order/ --- # Ransomware reaches plants through the IT network, and the first move is to protect operations and safety Guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Ransomware in OT environments usually starts on the IT network, then threatens operations through shared connections or precautionary shutdowns. A CISA and FBI advisory on DarkSide says the pipeline company disconnected certain OT systems proactively. Segmentation, manual operation tests and offline OT backups come first. Read on 16 November 2026. ## How does ransomware reach OT environments? Mostly by way of the IT network. In the May 2021 advisory on a pipeline company, CISA and the FBI said DarkSide actors deployed ransomware against the IT network, there was no indication of direct effects on OT networks, and the company proactively disconnected certain OT systems for their safety. Disconnecting to protect safety can itself halt operations. Some malware is built to affect industrial software. MITRE ATT&CK records that EKANS, a ransomware variant first seen in mid-December 2019 and used against energy, healthcare and automotive manufacturing, had a hard-coded kill-list of processes that included some tied to common ICS software platforms, and that it stopped database, backup, antivirus and ICS-related processes. ## What should you do first when ransomware threatens a plant? 1. Protect safety and decide who owns the plant-side decisions. CPG 1.C says OT incident response plans account for safety and containment considerations that differ from IT plans. 2. Isolate OT from IT at the boundary if the connection creates risk to safe and reliable operation, using the workarounds and manual controls prepared in advance (AA21-131A). 3. Confirm the OT network can operate at the capacity needed even if IT is compromised. 4. Secure OT backups: the advisory asks that backups on both IT and OT networks be isolated and tested. 5. Apply the [first hour](/decisions/first-hour-of-ransomware/) steps on the IT side, with plant engineers in the call. ## What readiness controls matter most for OT? Six controls matter most, with their sources and the matching assessment IDs. | Control | Source | Assessment ID | | --- | --- | --- | | A demilitarized zone between IT and OT, zones by criticality, no industrial protocols on the IT network | AA21-131A; CPG 3.I | OT1 | | Manual controls tested so critical functions run if ICS or OT must go offline | AA21-131A; CPG 6.A (degraded operation) | OT2 | | Inventory of OT assets; network topology across IT and OT, reviewed annually | CPG 2.A and 2.E | OT3 | | Backups and gold images of OT systems, offline and tested | AA21-131A | OT4 | | Compensating controls where patching is not possible | CPG 2.B (OT note) | SG3 | | Default passwords changed on IT assets used in OT, including OT admin web pages | CPG 3.A | ID4 | OT controls from the assessment, with sources. Score the four OT controls in the [assessment](/assessment/). If you run no operational technology, mark that group not applicable; it is then left out of your total. The [control mapping](/mapping/) shows how each maps to CPG 2.0 and NIST. ## Related pages - [Should you pay a ransom? Legal and practical checks](/decisions/should-you-pay-ransomware/) - [Ransomware and cyber insurance: what to arrange first](/decisions/ransomware-and-cyber-insurance/) - [Ransomware recovery order: what to restore first](/decisions/ransomware-recovery-order/) - [First hour of a ransomware attack: isolate or shut down?](/decisions/first-hour-of-ransomware/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA and FBI advisory AA21-131A: DarkSide ransomware, best practices for preventing business disruption: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-131a (read 16 November 2026) - MITRE ATT&CK: EKANS, software S0605: https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605/ (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/decisions/ransomware-in-ot-environments/ --- # Ransomware reporting duties depend on what was affected, and five clocks can apply at once Legal guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Ransomware reporting duties depend on the facts: a public company, health information, personal data or critical infrastructure status. As read on 16 November 2026: Form 8-K Item 1.05 is due within four business days of a materiality determination; HIPAA allows up to 60 calendar days; CIRCIA reporting is not yet required; state laws vary. This is not legal advice. ## Who must you tell after a ransomware attack? Which duties apply depends on what you are and what was taken. The table lists the duties read at source for this site. Counsel decides which apply. Each row links to the page that reads the source. | Duty | Applies to | Clock | Status on 16 November 2026 | Page | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05 | Registrants that determine a cybersecurity incident is material | Four business days after the materiality determination | In force since the rule took effect on 5 September 2023 | [8-K page](/reporting/sec-form-8-k-item-1-05/) | | HIPAA breach notification | Covered entities and business associates | Individuals: without unreasonable delay and within 60 calendar days of discovery; HHS: with individual notice for 500 or more, otherwise within 60 days of year end; media: within 60 days when more than 500 residents of a State are affected | In force (45 CFR 164.404, 164.406, 164.408, 164.410) | [HIPAA page](/reporting/hipaa-breach-notification-ransomware/) | | CIRCIA covered incident and ransom payment reports | Covered entities in critical infrastructure | 72 hours for covered incidents and 24 hours for ransom payments, as the statute directs | Not required until the final rule takes effect | [CIRCIA page](/reporting/circia-ransomware-reporting-status/) | | State breach notification | Entities holding residents' personal information | Set by each state | Laws in all 50 states, DC, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, per NCSL | [State laws page](/reporting/state-breach-notification-laws/) | | Voluntary reports to CISA, FBI IC3, Secret Service | Any victim | As soon as possible, per OFAC and CISA | Encouraged | This page | Duties read at source. Contracts and insurance policies may add others. ## Whom should you report ransomware to, and what do they give back? The guide tells victims to report to CISA, their local FBI field office, the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center or their local U.S. Secret Service field office. CISA's Stop Ransomware page says victims should report to federal law enforcement through IC3 or a Secret Service field office, and can request technical assistance or share information with CISA. The guide says what to expect from federal partners: guidance to evaluate and remediate ransomware, remote assistance to identify the extent of the compromise and recommend containment, analysis of submitted phishing emails, storage media, logs and malware, and help with a criminal investigation. Asset response is on request. Reports also help the sanctions position: OFAC treats a prompt, complete report as a significant mitigating factor. ## What should you do first? 1. Ask counsel to complete the clock table in section 9 of the [plan template](/plan/ransomware-response-plan-template/). 2. Report to law enforcement and CISA as soon as help is needed. 3. Log the time of each report in the [decision log](/plan/ransomware-decision-log/). ## Related pages - [HIPAA breach notification and healthcare ransomware](/reporting/hipaa-breach-notification-ransomware/) - [State breach notification laws: citations by state](/reporting/state-breach-notification-laws/) - [CIRCIA ransomware reporting: status on 16 November 2026](/reporting/circia-ransomware-reporting-status/) - [SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05 and ransomware: the four-day clock](/reporting/sec-form-8-k-item-1-05/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Stop Ransomware: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware (read 16 November 2026) - OFAC: Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments, 21 September 2021: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/912981/download?inline (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA): https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories/information-sharing/cyber-incident-reporting-critical-infrastructure-act-2022-circia (read 16 November 2026) - Federal Register: SEC final rule on cybersecurity risk management, strategy, governance and incident reporting (4 August 2023): https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/08/04/2023-16194/cybersecurity-risk-management-strategy-governance-and-incident-disclosure (read 16 November 2026) - eCFR: 45 CFR 164.404, notification to individuals: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/section-164.404 (read 16 November 2026) - National Conference of State Legislatures: Security Breach Notification Laws: https://www.ncsl.org/technology-and-communication/security-breach-notification-laws (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/reporting/ransomware-reporting-duties/ --- # CIRCIA ransomware payment and incident reporting is not yet required, because the final rule is not in effect Status, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** On 16 November 2026, CIRCIA incident and ransom payment reporting is not required, because CISA has not finished the rule. The statute directs 72-hour reporting of covered cyber incidents and 24-hour reporting of ransom payments. CISA proposed the rule in April 2024 and held town halls on 15 to 18 June 2026. Voluntary reports are encouraged. ## Is CIRCIA ransomware reporting required yet? No. CISA's CIRCIA page says that until the effective date of the final rule, organizations are not required to submit covered cyber incident or ransom payment reports under CIRCIA. It adds that CISA continues to work on the final rule and notes that multiple funding lapses affected its ability to do rulemaking. The page read on 16 November 2026 gives no date for the final rule. CISA says it will communicate updates through cisa.gov/CIRCIA. ## What does the law require once the rule is final? CIRCIA, enacted in March 2022, requires CISA to issue regulations requiring covered entities to report covered cyber incidents to CISA no later than 72 hours from the time the entity reasonably believes the incident occurred, and to report ransom payments made as a result of a ransomware attack within 24 hours of making them. A federal agency receiving an incident report after the effective date must share it with CISA within 24 hours. These are the statute's directions. The rule defines who is a covered entity and what is a covered incident, and those definitions are in CISA's proposal, not in this page. ## What is the rulemaking timeline so far? CISA's CIRCIA page gives these dates for the rulemaking. | Date | Event | | --- | --- | | March 2022 | CIRCIA enacted | | 4 April 2024 | Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published (89 FR 23644) | | 3 June 2024 | Correction published (89 FR 47471) | | 3 July 2024 | Public comment period on the proposal closes | | 15 to 18 June 2026 | Four town hall meetings held; announced in the Federal Register on 13 February and 26 May 2026 | Dates as stated on CISA's CIRCIA page, read 16 November 2026. ## What should you do in the meantime? CISA encourages all organizations to share information about unusual cyber activity and incidents, by the CISA reporting page, report@cisa.gov or 1-844-Say-CISA (1-844-729-2472). Build the 72-hour and 24-hour steps into your [reporting clock table](/reporting/ransomware-reporting-duties/) now so the plan is ready when the rule takes effect. ## Related pages - [Ransomware reporting duties: who to tell and when](/reporting/ransomware-reporting-duties/) - [State breach notification laws: citations by state](/reporting/state-breach-notification-laws/) - [SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05 and ransomware: the four-day clock](/reporting/sec-form-8-k-item-1-05/) - [HIPAA breach notification and healthcare ransomware](/reporting/hipaa-breach-notification-ransomware/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - CISA: Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA): https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories/information-sharing/cyber-incident-reporting-critical-infrastructure-act-2022-circia (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/reporting/circia-ransomware-reporting-status/ --- # Form 8-K Item 1.05 requires a filing within four business days of deciding a cyber incident is material Legal guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Item 1.05 of Form 8-K requires a public company to report a cybersecurity incident it determines to be material within four business days of that determination. Two delays exist: the Attorney General's national security or public safety delay, and a seven-business-day delay for FCC CPNI registrants. Read on 16 November 2026. ## When does Form 8-K Item 1.05 apply to a ransomware attack? It applies when a registrant determines that a cybersecurity incident it experienced is material. The item covers any incident determined to be material and is not limited to ransomware. The SEC's final rule, published in the Federal Register on 4 August 2023 and effective 5 September 2023, says the filing is due within four business days of determining the incident was material. This page reads the rule as published in 2023. Later amendments, if any, were not checked. ## What must the filing say? The registrant describes the material aspects of the nature, scope and timing of the incident, and its material impact or reasonably likely material impact. The SEC clarified that the item does not require specific technical information about the planned response or systems in such detail as would impede response or remediation. A registrant must amend a prior Item 1.05 Form 8-K to include information not determined or unavailable at the first filing. ## Can the filing be delayed? Two delays exist. If the Attorney General determines that immediate reporting would pose a substantial risk to national security or public safety, the registrant may postpone the filing. A registrant subject to the FCC's CPNI breach rule (47 CFR 64.2011) may also delay up to seven business days after the notification required under that rule, and must notify the SEC through EDGAR. Outside those two cases, the release creates no general pause while an investigation is still running. ## What counts as unreasonable delay in deciding materiality? The final rule requires the materiality determination "without unreasonable delay" after discovery. The SEC says a company that cannot yet determine the full extent of an incident may still know enough to decide whether it is material, and that deferring a board committee meeting past the normal time to convene would be unreasonable delay. Revising incident response policies to extend deadlines in order to delay a determination would also be unreasonable. The SEC found a safe harbor unnecessary, because normal internal practices and controls will suffice to show good faith. Keep the time of each step in the [decision log](/plan/ransomware-decision-log/). Companies also report annually on the board's oversight of cybersecurity risk and management's role, as the [board briefing page](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-board-briefing/) notes. ## Related pages - [Ransomware reporting duties: who to tell and when](/reporting/ransomware-reporting-duties/) - [CIRCIA ransomware reporting: status on 16 November 2026](/reporting/circia-ransomware-reporting-status/) - [HIPAA breach notification and healthcare ransomware](/reporting/hipaa-breach-notification-ransomware/) - [State breach notification laws: citations by state](/reporting/state-breach-notification-laws/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - Federal Register: SEC final rule on cybersecurity risk management, strategy, governance and incident reporting (4 August 2023): https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/08/04/2023-16194/cybersecurity-risk-management-strategy-governance-and-incident-disclosure (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/reporting/sec-form-8-k-item-1-05/ --- # HIPAA sets four notification duties, each with a clock of up to 60 days, and healthcare faces ransomware with patient safety at stake Legal guide, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** HIPAA's Breach Notification Rule sets up to 60 calendar days after discovery for notice to individuals, to the media (over 500 residents of a State) and from a business associate to the covered entity. HHS hears with individual notice for 500 or more, otherwise within 60 days of year end. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What does HIPAA require after a ransomware breach? HIPAA requires notice when there is a breach of unsecured protected health information. The rule defines a breach as "the acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of protected health information in a manner not permitted under subpart E of this part which compromises the security or privacy of the protected health information", with listed exclusions. Whether a ransomware event meets that definition is a legal question for counsel; HHS's ransomware fact sheet could not be loaded and is not read here. If the definition is met, four notices can apply. | Who | To whom | Clock | Rule | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Covered entity | Each affected individual | Without unreasonable delay and in no case later than 60 calendar days after discovery | 45 CFR 164.404 | | Covered entity | HHS Secretary | 500 or more individuals: with the individual notice. Fewer than 500: keep a log and notify no later than 60 days after the end of the calendar year | 45 CFR 164.408 | | Covered entity | Prominent media outlets serving a State or jurisdiction, when the breach involves more than 500 residents of that State or jurisdiction | Without unreasonable delay and in no case later than 60 calendar days after discovery | 45 CFR 164.406 | | Business associate | The covered entity | Without unreasonable delay and in no case later than 60 calendar days after discovery | 45 CFR 164.410 | Clocks as published in the eCFR, read 16 November 2026. Law enforcement delay rules (164.412) were not read. ## How ready is healthcare for ransomware? No sector-wide readiness measure was found in the sources read. What can be said: the OFAC advisory lists hospitals among critical infrastructure targets of ransomware. Coveware's Q3 2026 article names healthcare among sectors with a significant share of the victim volume it supported. CISA's Cross-Sector CPG page lists Healthcare Sector-Specific Goals and links to the HHS voluntary health and public health performance goals. Patient safety changes the plan. CPG 6.A asks organizations to be able to run essential functions in a degraded manner without critical assets, for example by shifting to paper-based operations. Run that test before you need it. The [assessment](/assessment/) scores restore capability, and the [reporting duties page](/reporting/ransomware-reporting-duties/) shows how HIPAA sits beside other clocks. ## Related pages - [Ransomware reporting duties: who to tell and when](/reporting/ransomware-reporting-duties/) - [CIRCIA ransomware reporting: status on 16 November 2026](/reporting/circia-ransomware-reporting-status/) - [SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05 and ransomware: the four-day clock](/reporting/sec-form-8-k-item-1-05/) - [State breach notification laws: citations by state](/reporting/state-breach-notification-laws/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - eCFR: 45 CFR 164.402, definitions: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/section-164.402 (read 16 November 2026) - eCFR: 45 CFR 164.404, notification to individuals: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/section-164.404 (read 16 November 2026) - eCFR: 45 CFR 164.408, notification to the Secretary: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/section-164.408 (read 16 November 2026) - eCFR: 45 CFR 164.406, notification to the media: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/section-164.406 (read 16 November 2026) - eCFR: 45 CFR 164.410, notification by a business associate: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/section-164.410 (read 16 November 2026) - OFAC: Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments, 21 September 2021: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/912981/download?inline (read 16 November 2026) - Coveware: The Silent Ransom Group leak shows why paying for silence fails (Q3 2026 report article): https://coveware.com/2026/10/the-silent-ransom-group-leak-shows-why-paying-for-silence-fails/ (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals: https://www.cisa.gov/cross-sector-cybersecurity-performance-goals (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/reporting/hipaa-breach-notification-ransomware/ --- # State breach notification laws exist in every state, and counsel must read the one that applies Reference, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** All 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have laws requiring businesses to notify individuals of breaches involving personal information, according to NCSL. This page lists each private-sector citation as NCSL prints it. It gives no state deadlines, because none were read. Counsel confirms the current text. Read on 16 November 2026. ## Do state laws require notice after a ransomware attack? State laws require notice when personal information is involved in a breach, and whether a ransomware event triggers them depends on the facts and on each statute's definition of breach. NCSL says these laws typically cover who must comply, what counts as personal information, what constitutes a breach, notice requirements such as timing and method, and exemptions such as encrypted information. The CISA guide tells organizations to make sure data breach notification procedures adhere to applicable state laws, to consult legal counsel when necessary, and points to NCSL's list. If personally identifiable information stored on behalf of other businesses is stolen, the guide says to notify those businesses. ## Which statute applies in which state? | Jurisdiction | Private-sector statute as printed by NCSL | | --- | --- | | Alabama | Ala. Code § 8-38-1 et seq. | | Alaska | Alaska Stat. § 45.48.010 et seq. | | Arizona | Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 18-551 to -552 | | Arkansas | Ark. Code §§ 4-110-101 et seq. | | California | Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82 | | Colorado | Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-716 | | Connecticut | Conn. Gen Stat. §§ 36a-701b , 4e-70 | | Delaware | Del. Code tit. 6, § 12B-101 et seq. | | Florida | Fla. Stat. § 501.171 | | Georgia | Ga. Code §§ 10-1-910 to -912 ; 46-5-214 | | Hawaii | Haw. Rev. Stat. § 487N-1 et seq. | | Idaho | Idaho Stat. §§ 28-51-104 to -107 | | Illinois | 815 ILCS §§ 530/1 to 530/25 , 815 ILCS 530/ | | Indiana | Ind. Code § 24-4.9 et seq. | | Iowa | Iowa Code §§ 715C.1, 715C.2 | | Kansas | Kan. Stat. § 50-7a01 et seq. | | Kentucky | KRS § 365.732 | | Louisiana | La. Rev. Stat. §§ 51:3071 et seq . | | Maine | Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 10 § 1346 et seq. | | Maryland | Md. Code Com. Law § 14-3504 | | Massachusetts | Mass. Gen. Laws § 93H-1 et seq. | | Michigan | Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 445.63 , 445.72 | | Minnesota | Minn. Stat. §§ 325E.61 , 325E.64 | | Mississippi | Miss. Code § 75-24-29 | | Missouri | Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.1500 | | Montana | Mont. Code §§ 30-14-1704 , 33-19-321 | | Nebraska | Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 87-801 et seq . | | Nevada | Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 603A.010 et seq. | | New Hampshire | N.H. Rev. Stat. §§ 359-C:19, 359-C:20 , 359-C:21 | | New Jersey | N.J. Stat . § 56:8-161, 163 | | New Mexico | N.M. Stat. §§ 57-12C-1 | | New York | N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 899-AA | | North Carolina | N.C. Gen. Stat § 75-61 , § 75-65 | | North Dakota | N.D. Cent. Code §§ 51-30-01 et seq . | | Ohio | Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1349.19 , 1349.191 , 1345.01 et seq. | | Oklahoma | Okla. Stat. §§ 24-161 to -166 | | Oregon | Oregon Rev. Stat. §§ 646A.600 to .628 | | Pennsylvania | 73 Pa. Stat. § § 2301 et seq. | | Rhode Island | R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-49.3-1 et seq . | | South Carolina | S.C. Code § 39-1-90 | | South Dakota | S.D. Cod. Laws §§ 20-40-19 to -26 | | Tennessee | Tenn. Code §§ 47-18-2107 | | Texas | Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§ 521.002 , 521.053 | | Utah | Utah Code §§ 13-44-101 et seq. , 80 78B-4-701 et seq. | | Vermont | Vt. Stat. tit. 9 §§ 2430, 2435 | | Virginia | Va. Code §§ 18.2-186.6 , 32.1-127.1:05 | | Washington | Wash. Rev. Code §§ 19.255.010 | | West Virginia | W.V. Code §§ 46A-2A-101 et seq. | | Wisconsin | Wis. Stat. § 134/98 | | Wyoming | Wyo. Stat. §§ 40-12-501 to -502 | | District of Columbia | D.C. Code §§ 28-3851 et seq. | | Guam | 9 GCA §§ 48-10 et seq. | | Puerto Rico | 10 LRPA §§ 4051 et seq. | | Virgin Islands | V.I. Code tit. 14 § 2209 | Citations copied from the NCSL chart, read 16 November 2026. Government-entity citations are on the NCSL page. ## Why does this page give no deadlines? The sources read do not print state deadlines in a form that can be checked on this page. Some states also have additional reporting requirements for cybersecurity incidents; NCSL footnotes that some states have additional statutory cybersecurity reporting requirements, and that its chart does not include student data breach statutes. Put the deadlines for your states into the clock table in the [plan template](/plan/ransomware-response-plan-template/). ## Related pages - [Ransomware reporting duties: who to tell and when](/reporting/ransomware-reporting-duties/) - [SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05 and ransomware: the four-day clock](/reporting/sec-form-8-k-item-1-05/) - [HIPAA breach notification and healthcare ransomware](/reporting/hipaa-breach-notification-ransomware/) - [CIRCIA ransomware reporting: status on 16 November 2026](/reporting/circia-ransomware-reporting-status/) - [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) ## Sources - National Conference of State Legislatures: Security Breach Notification Laws: https://www.ncsl.org/technology-and-communication/security-breach-notification-laws (read 16 November 2026) - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/reporting/state-breach-notification-laws/ --- # Who offers ransomware readiness assessments and ransomware response as a service? Providers, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Sixteen firms are listed alphabetically with the same four fields, read from each firm's own pages on 16 November 2026: ransomware response named, negotiation named, a readiness assessment or tabletop named, and a retainer named. The page ranks nobody, and a blank means no match on the pages read. Cells for pages that did not load say so. ## Who offers ransomware readiness assessments and ransomware response? The sixteen firms below describe incident response or ransomware services on their own pages. The list is alphabetical and every firm gets the same test. It is not a recommendation, a score or a ranking, and it is not complete: other firms offer these services. | Firm | Pages loaded | Ransomware response named | Negotiation named | Readiness assessment or tabletop named | Retainer named | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [Arctic Wolf](https://arcticwolf.com/) | 10 | Named: [page](https://arcticwolf.com/solutions/incident-response-retainer/) | Named: [page](https://arcticwolf.com/solutions/incident-response-retainer/) | Named: [page](https://arcticwolf.com/solutions/incident-response-retainer/) | Named: [page](https://arcticwolf.com/solutions/incident-response-retainer/) | | [Booz Allen Hamilton](https://www.boozallen.com/) | 8 | Named: [page](https://www.boozallen.com/markets/commercial-solutions/incident-response.html) | Not on the pages read: [page 1](https://www.boozallen.com/), [page 2](https://www.boozallen.com/markets/commercial-solutions/incident-response.html) | Named: [page](https://www.boozallen.com/markets/commercial-solutions/incident-response.html) | Named: [page](https://www.boozallen.com/markets/commercial-solutions/incident-response.html) | | [Charles River Associates](https://www.crai.com/) | 10 | Named: [page](https://www.crai.com/services/information-security-and-privacy/cybersecurity/incident-response/) | Named: [page](https://www.crai.com/engagements/reduced-8m-cyber-extortion-losses-for-life-sciences-firm/) | Not on the pages read: [page 1](https://www.crai.com/), [page 2](https://www.crai.com/services/information-security-and-privacy/cybersecurity/incident-response/), [page 3](https://www.crai.com/engagements/reduced-8m-cyber-extortion-losses-for-life-sciences-firm/) | Named: [page](https://www.crai.com/services/information-security-and-privacy/cybersecurity/incident-response/) | | [Check Point Incident Response](https://www.checkpoint.com/) | 8 | Not on the pages read: [page 1](https://www.checkpoint.com/), [page 2](https://www.checkpoint.com/services/incident-response/), [page 3](https://marketplace.microsoft.com/en-us/product/checkpointhqunitedstates1780929740900.incident_response?tab=Overview) | Not on the pages read: [page 1](https://www.checkpoint.com/), [page 2](https://www.checkpoint.com/services/incident-response/), [page 3](https://marketplace.microsoft.com/en-us/product/checkpointhqunitedstates1780929740900.incident_response?tab=Overview) | Not on the pages read: [page 1](https://www.checkpoint.com/), [page 2](https://www.checkpoint.com/services/incident-response/), [page 3](https://marketplace.microsoft.com/en-us/product/checkpointhqunitedstates1780929740900.incident_response?tab=Overview) | Named: [page](https://marketplace.microsoft.com/en-us/product/checkpointhqunitedstates1780929740900.incident_response?tab=Overview), read 10 November 2026 | | [Cisco Talos Incident Response](https://talosintelligence.com/) | 6 | Named: [page](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/ir-trends-q3-2026/) | Not on the pages read: [page 1](https://talosintelligence.com/), [page 2](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/ir-trends-q3-2026/), [page 3](https://talosintelligence.com/incident_response/services) | Named: [page](https://talosintelligence.com/incident_response/services) | Named: [page](https://talosintelligence.com/incident_response/services) | | [Coveware](https://www.coveware.com/) | 8 | Named: [page](https://www.coveware.com/retained-services) | Named: [page](https://www.coveware.com/retained-services) | Named: [page](https://www.coveware.com/retained-services) | Named: [page](https://www.coveware.com/retained-services) | | [CrowdStrike](https://www.crowdstrike.com/) | 10 | Not on the pages read: [page 1](https://www.crowdstrike.com/), [page 2](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/crowdstrike-achieves-ncsc-cir-certification-for-incident-response/), [page 3](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/services/falcon-complete-mdr/) | Not on the pages read: [page 1](https://www.crowdstrike.com/), [page 2](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/crowdstrike-achieves-ncsc-cir-certification-for-incident-response/), [page 3](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/services/falcon-complete-mdr/) | Named: [page](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/crowdstrike-achieves-ncsc-cir-certification-for-incident-response/) | Named: [page](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/services/falcon-complete-mdr/) | | [IBM X-Force](https://www.ibm.com/services/incident-response) | 8 | Named: [page](https://www.ibm.com/services/incident-response) | Not on the pages read: [page 1](https://www.ibm.com/services/incident-response) | Named: [page](https://www.ibm.com/services/incident-response) | Named: [page](https://www.ibm.com/services/incident-response) | | [Kroll](https://www.kroll.com/) | 0 | Not checked: pages did not load. Tried [page 1](https://www.kroll.com/), [page 2](https://www.kroll.com/en/services/cyber/enterprise-risk-retainer/cyber-incident-response-retainer) | Not checked: pages did not load. Tried [page 1](https://www.kroll.com/), [page 2](https://www.kroll.com/en/services/cyber/enterprise-risk-retainer/cyber-incident-response-retainer) | Not checked: pages did not load. Tried [page 1](https://www.kroll.com/), [page 2](https://www.kroll.com/en/services/cyber/enterprise-risk-retainer/cyber-incident-response-retainer) | From the 10 November 2026 reading: [page](https://www.kroll.com/en/services/cyber/enterprise-risk-retainer/cyber-incident-response-retainer) | | [Mandiant (Google Cloud)](https://cloud.google.com/security/mandiant) | 6 | Named: [page](https://cloud.google.com/security/mandiant) | Named: [page](https://cloud.google.com/security/mandiant) | Named: [page](https://cloud.google.com/security/consulting/mandiant-retainer) | Named: [page](https://cloud.google.com/security/consulting/mandiant-incident-response-services) | | [Microsoft](https://www.microsoft.com/security) | 9 | Named: [page](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/03/27/microsoft-incident-response-retainer-is-generally-available/) | Named: [page](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/03/27/microsoft-incident-response-retainer-is-generally-available/) | Not on the pages read: [page 1](https://www.microsoft.com/security), [page 2](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/03/27/microsoft-incident-response-retainer-is-generally-available/) | Named: [page](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/03/27/microsoft-incident-response-retainer-is-generally-available/) | | [Mitiga](https://www.mitiga.io/) | 10 | Named: [page](https://www.mitiga.io/company) | Not on the pages read: [page 1](https://www.mitiga.io/), [page 2](https://www.mitiga.io/company), [page 3](https://www.mitiga.io/resources/lemonade-chooses-mitiga-for-cloud-incident-readiness-and-response), [page 4](https://www.mitiga.io/blog/3-ways-that-mitiga-outworks-your-incident-response-retainer) | Named: [page](https://www.mitiga.io/resources/lemonade-chooses-mitiga-for-cloud-incident-readiness-and-response) | Named: [page](https://www.mitiga.io/blog/3-ways-that-mitiga-outworks-your-incident-response-retainer) | | [NCC Group](https://www.nccgroup.com/) | 10 | Named: [page](https://www.nccgroup.com/incident-response/cyber-incident-response-retainer/) | Not on the pages read: [page 1](https://www.nccgroup.com/), [page 2](https://www.nccgroup.com/incident-response/cyber-incident-response-retainer/) | Named: [page](https://www.nccgroup.com/incident-response/cyber-incident-response-retainer/) | Named: [page](https://www.nccgroup.com/incident-response/cyber-incident-response-retainer/) | | [Palo Alto Networks Unit 42](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/) | 6 | Named: [page](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42/respond/incident-response) | Named: [page](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42/respond/incident-response) | Named: [page](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42/retainer) | Named: [page](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42/respond/incident-response) | | [Secureworks](https://www.sophos.com/en-us/secureworks) | 0 | Not checked: pages did not load. Tried [page 1](https://assets.sophos.com/X24WTUEQ/at/6s69xwv3xkkjsbnv4m7wffpc/sophos-security-services-retainer-br.pdf), [page 2](https://www.sophos.com/en-us/products/incident-response-services), [page 3](https://www.sophos.com/en-us/secureworks/legal/product-terms), [page 4](https://www.sophos.com/en-us/secureworks) | From the 10 November 2026 reading: [page](https://www.sophos.com/en-us/products/incident-response-services) | From the 10 November 2026 reading: [page](https://assets.sophos.com/X24WTUEQ/at/6s69xwv3xkkjsbnv4m7wffpc/sophos-security-services-retainer-br.pdf) | From the 10 November 2026 reading: [page](https://www.sophos.com/en-us/secureworks/legal/product-terms) | | [Sygnia](https://www.sygnia.co/?utm_source=ransomwarereadinessassessment.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=directory) | 10 | Named: [page](https://www.sygnia.co/?utm_source=ransomwarereadinessassessment.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=directory) | Named: [page](https://www.sygnia.co/incident-response-services-lp/?utm_source=ransomwarereadinessassessment.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=directory) | Named: [page](https://www.sygnia.co/?utm_source=ransomwarereadinessassessment.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=directory) | Named: [page](https://www.sygnia.co/?utm_source=ransomwarereadinessassessment.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=directory) | Test: a keyword and context match on up to ten of the firm's own pages used in this site's fact base, plus facts read on 10 November 2026 where a page did not load. Every link was read on 16 November 2026 unless a cell shows another date. Legend: Named means the test found a match on the linked page. Not on the pages read means the test found no match on the pages linked in that cell. Not checked: pages did not load means none of the firm's pages could be read on 16 November 2026 and no fact from 10 November 2026 exists for that cell, so nothing is said about the firm. ## How was each field tested? Each field is a yes or no test on page text, applied the same way to every firm. - Ransomware response named: the page text puts "ransomware" within a sentence of response, recovery, incident or extortion. - Negotiation named: the page puts negotiation within a sentence of ransom, extortion or threat actor. - Readiness assessment or tabletop named: the page names a ransomware readiness or preparedness assessment, a readiness assessment, or a tabletop exercise. - Retainer named: the page uses the word retainer. Pages from Kroll and Secureworks did not load for this test on 16 November 2026, so their cells rest on facts read on 10 November 2026, with that date shown. A blank there reflects the reading, not the firm's offer. ## What should you ask any provider? Ask what a readiness assessment includes, who does the work, what you receive, whether the retainer covers ransomware negotiation, and how the firm screens payments for sanctions. The [negotiation page](/decisions/ransomware-negotiation/) lists eight questions. The [cost page](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-assessment-cost/) explains what drives price. ## Related pages - [The assessment](/assessment/) - [Assessment tools compared](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-assessment-tool/) - [Ransomware negotiation](/decisions/ransomware-negotiation/) - [What drives cost](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-assessment-cost/) - [How firms are listed](/method/) - [Ransomware Readiness Assessment: home](/) ## Sources - Arctic Wolf: a page cited in the table: https://arcticwolf.com/solutions/incident-response-retainer/ (read 16 November 2026) - Booz Allen Hamilton: a page cited in the table: https://www.boozallen.com/markets/commercial-solutions/incident-response.html (read 16 November 2026) - Charles River Associates: a page cited in the table: https://www.crai.com/services/information-security-and-privacy/cybersecurity/incident-response/ (read 16 November 2026) - Check Point Incident Response: a page cited in the table: https://marketplace.microsoft.com/en-us/product/checkpointhqunitedstates1780929740900.incident_response?tab=Overview (read 10 November 2026) - Cisco Talos Incident Response: a page cited in the table: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/ir-trends-q3-2026/ (read 16 November 2026) - Coveware: a page cited in the table: https://www.coveware.com/retained-services (read 16 November 2026) - CrowdStrike: a page cited in the table: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/crowdstrike-achieves-ncsc-cir-certification-for-incident-response/ (read 16 November 2026) - IBM X-Force: a page cited in the table: https://www.ibm.com/services/incident-response (read 16 November 2026) - Kroll: a page cited in the table: https://www.kroll.com/en/services/cyber/enterprise-risk-retainer/cyber-incident-response-retainer (read 10 November 2026) - Mandiant (Google Cloud): a page cited in the table: https://cloud.google.com/security/mandiant (read 16 November 2026) - Microsoft: a page cited in the table: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/03/27/microsoft-incident-response-retainer-is-generally-available/ (read 16 November 2026) - Mitiga: a page cited in the table: https://www.mitiga.io/company (read 16 November 2026) - NCC Group: a page cited in the table: https://www.nccgroup.com/incident-response/cyber-incident-response-retainer/ (read 16 November 2026) - Palo Alto Networks Unit 42: a page cited in the table: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42/respond/incident-response (read 16 November 2026) - Secureworks: a page cited in the table: https://www.sophos.com/en-us/products/incident-response-services (read 10 November 2026) - Sygnia: a page cited in the table: https://www.sygnia.co/ (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/providers/ --- # The control set, scoring rules and control mapping, as CSV and JSON Datasets, edition 16 November 2026 **In short.** Four datasets, edition 16 November 2026, under CC BY 4.0: the 36-control assessment, its scoring rules and bands, the control mapping to CISA and NIST identifiers, and CISA's cost, impact and ease ratings for 34 CPG 2.0 goals. Every row carries its read date. Cite as shown below. ## Where can you download the ransomware readiness data? Each dataset is a CSV file and a JSON file with the same rows. The JSON wrapper states the edition, the license and the cite line. Use them in a spreadsheet, a risk register or your own scoring script. | Dataset | Rows | CSV | JSON | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Ransomware Readiness Assessment: control set | 36 | [ransomware-readiness-controls.csv](/datasets/ransomware-readiness-controls.csv) | [ransomware-readiness-controls.json](/datasets/ransomware-readiness-controls.json) | | Scoring rules and bands | 13 | [ransomware-readiness-scoring.csv](/datasets/ransomware-readiness-scoring.csv) | [ransomware-readiness-scoring.json](/datasets/ransomware-readiness-scoring.json) | | Ransomware control mapping | 36 | [ransomware-control-mapping.csv](/datasets/ransomware-control-mapping.csv) | [ransomware-control-mapping.json](/datasets/ransomware-control-mapping.json) | | CISA CPG 2.0 goal ratings with mapped controls | 34 | [cisa-cpg-2-0-goal-ratings.csv](/datasets/cisa-cpg-2-0-goal-ratings.csv) | [cisa-cpg-2-0-goal-ratings.json](/datasets/cisa-cpg-2-0-goal-ratings.json) | ## Cite this Ransomware Readiness Assessment, "Ransomware readiness datasets", edition 16 November 2026, https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/datasets/ (CC BY 4.0). For how the scoring works, read the [scoring method](/assessment/method/); for how the mapping was built, read the [mapping method](/mapping/method/). ## Related pages - [The assessment](/assessment/) - [Dated news items](/news/) - [The control mapping](/mapping/) - [Scoring method](/assessment/method/) - [Mapping method](/mapping/method/) - [Glossary](/glossary/) - [Ransomware Readiness Assessment: home](/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/datasets/ --- # How this ransomware reference reads, dates and labels its sources Method, read 16 November 2026 **In short.** Every fact about a framework, law or firm is read from the issuing body on the date shown, and printed with its address. If a page will not load, the fact is left out and the page says so. Company figures are labeled as that company's own. Firms are listed alphabetically with the same fields. Edition 16 November 2026. ## How are sources read and dated? Each page lists its sources with the web address and the date read. Primary sources are preferred: cisa.gov, csrc.nist.gov, ofac.treasury.gov, the Federal Register, the eCFR, ncsc.gov.uk, mitre.org and firms' own pages. Dates are those on which the page was read, which is the only date given where a source states none. ## What could not be read? Several pages did not load on 16 November 2026 and are not used as sources: the HHS HIPAA ransomware fact sheet (access denied), the SEC press release and fact sheet on the cybersecurity rule (blocked, so the Federal Register publication of the final rule is used), the FBI ransomware page (a challenge page, so the IC3 ransomware page is used), CISA's OT ransomware fact sheet (not available at the address tried) and the CISA RRA landing page (not found at the address tried). ## How are firms listed? Alphabetically, with the same four fields for every firm, from the firm's own pages. There are no scores or verdicts. See the [providers page](/providers/). Sygnia's pages were read through cdn.sygnia.co, because [www.sygnia.co](https://www.sygnia.co/?utm_source=ransomwarereadinessassessment.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=method) returned an access error to the reader; its links point to [www.sygnia.co](https://www.sygnia.co/?utm_source=ransomwarereadinessassessment.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=method). ## How are numbers from companies handled? A number a company publishes is described as that company's figure from its own cases, with its date. The Coveware Q3 2026 article is an example. ## How are the original assets built? The two assets each have a method page, and both are released as data. - [The assessment](/assessment/) and its [scoring method](/assessment/method/). - The [control mapping](/mapping/) and its [method](/mapping/method/). - Both are released under CC BY 4.0 on the [datasets page](/datasets/). ## Related pages - [Editorial policy](/editorial-policy/) - [Dated news items](/news/) - [Scoring method](/assessment/method/) - [Mapping method](/mapping/method/) - [Providers, A to Z](/providers/) - [Corrections](/corrections/) - [Ransomware Readiness Assessment: home](/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Community Profile (CSRC record): https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8374/r1/final (read 16 November 2026) - CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) - OFAC: Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments, 21 September 2021: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/912981/download?inline (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/method/ --- # Ransomware glossary: terms with a sourced example Glossary, read 16 November 2026 **In short.** 23 ransomware terms, each defined in plain words with an example taken from CISA, NIST, OFAC, the SEC, MITRE or a response firm, and the source printed with its read date of 16 November 2026. Use it alongside the assessment and the plan. ## What do ransomware terms mean? Ransomware terms describe how attacks work, how defenders prepare and which legal ideas apply. Each of the terms below has a plain definition and a sourced example, and links to the pages that use it. The [FAQ](/faq/) answers the questions people ask most. - [Community Profile](/glossary/community-profile/): A Community Profile is a set of cybersecurity outcomes chosen from NIST's Cybersecurity Framework for a partic - [Covered cyber incident](/glossary/covered-cyber-incident/): A covered cyber incident is the kind of incident, at a covered entity, that CIRCIA will require to be reported - [Critical asset list](/glossary/critical-asset-list/): A critical asset list ranks the systems the organization cannot do without, with their dependencies, so recove - [Data exfiltration extortion](/glossary/data-exfiltration-extortion/): Data exfiltration extortion is an attack where criminals steal data and demand payment not to publish it, with - [Domain controller](/glossary/domain-controller/): A domain controller is a server that holds the Active Directory and approves logins across a Windows network, - [Double extortion](/glossary/double-extortion/): Double extortion is a ransomware attack that combines encryption with data theft, so the victim faces two dema - [Golden image](/glossary/golden-image/): A golden image is a preconfigured operating system with its software, kept as a template so a server or virtua - [Immutable backup](/glossary/immutable-backup/): An immutable backup is a copy that cannot be changed or deleted for a set period, even by an administrator or - [Initial access broker](/glossary/initial-access-broker/): An initial access broker is a criminal who gains entry to networks and sells that access to others, who may th - [Lateral movement](/glossary/lateral-movement/): Lateral movement is an intruder's travel from the first compromised system to others, usually with stolen cred - [Living off the land](/glossary/living-off-the-land/): Living off the land means attackers use tools already on the system, such as PowerShell, instead of bringing n - [Materiality determination](/glossary/materiality-determination/): A materiality determination is a public company's decision on whether a cybersecurity incident is material to - [Network segmentation](/glossary/network-segmentation/): Network segmentation splits a network into parts with filtered links between them, so an intruder in one part - [Offline backup](/glossary/offline-backup/): An offline backup is a copy stored where the network, and so ransomware, cannot reach it, such as disconnected - [Out-of-band communication](/glossary/out-of-band-communication/): Out-of-band communication is contact over a channel that does not depend on the compromised network, such as a - [Phishing-resistant MFA](/glossary/phishing-resistant-mfa/): Phishing-resistant multifactor authentication is a sign-in method that cannot be tricked into handing a code o - [Ransomware](/glossary/ransomware/): Ransomware is malicious software or an attack that encrypts an organization's data and demands payment to rest - [Ransomware as a service](/glossary/ransomware-as-a-service/): Ransomware as a service is a model where developers license ransomware to affiliates who carry out attacks and - [Remote monitoring and management software](/glossary/remote-monitoring-and-management/): Remote monitoring and management (RMM) software lets administrators control computers from afar, and attackers - [Sanctions nexus](/glossary/sanctions-nexus/): A sanctions nexus exists when a transaction involves a sanctioned person, group or jurisdiction, which can mak - [SDN List](/glossary/sdn-list/): The Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List is OFAC's list of persons with whom U.S - [Tabletop exercise](/glossary/tabletop-exercise/): A tabletop exercise is a discussion-based rehearsal in which participants talk through a scenario and their ro - [Threat hunting](/glossary/threat-hunting/): Threat hunting is the active search for signs of an intruder that automatic alerts have not raised. ## Related pages - [FAQ](/faq/) - [Dated news items](/news/) - [The assessment](/assessment/) - [Ransomware readiness](/readiness/ransomware-readiness/) - [Ransomware incident response](/response/ransomware-incident-response/) - [Ransomware Readiness Assessment: home](/) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/ --- # Community Profile, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A Community Profile is a set of cybersecurity outcomes chosen from NIST's Cybersecurity Framework for a particular risk or group, such as ransomware. NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 is titled "Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Community Profile" and was finalized in June 2026. Read on 16 November 2026. Related terms are linked at the foot of this page. ## What does Community Profile mean? A Community Profile is a set of cybersecurity outcomes chosen from NIST's Cybersecurity Framework for a particular risk or group, such as ransomware. ## A sourced example NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 is titled "Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Community Profile" and was finalized in June 2026. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 as an assessment](/readiness/nist-ransomware-readiness-assessment/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Covered cyber incident](/glossary/covered-cyber-incident/) - [Critical asset list](/glossary/critical-asset-list/) ## Sources - csrc.nist.gov: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8374/r1/final (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/community-profile/ --- # Covered cyber incident, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A covered cyber incident is the kind of incident, at a covered entity, that CIRCIA will require to be reported to CISA once the final rule takes effect. CISA's CIRCIA page says the statute requires reports no later than 72 hours after the entity reasonably believes the incident occurred, but reporting is not required until the final rule takes effect. ## What does covered cyber incident mean? A covered cyber incident is the kind of incident, at a covered entity, that CIRCIA will require to be reported to CISA once the final rule takes effect. ## A sourced example CISA's CIRCIA page says the statute requires reports no later than 72 hours after the entity reasonably believes the incident occurred, but reporting is not required until the final rule takes effect. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [CIRCIA status](/reporting/circia-ransomware-reporting-status/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Community Profile](/glossary/community-profile/) - [Critical asset list](/glossary/critical-asset-list/) - [Data exfiltration extortion](/glossary/data-exfiltration-extortion/) ## Sources - cisa.gov: https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories/information-sharing/cyber-incident-reporting-critical-infrastructure-act-2022-circia (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/covered-cyber-incident/ --- # Critical asset list, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A critical asset list ranks the systems the organization cannot do without, with their dependencies, so recovery follows a plan rather than a rush. The guide asks that restoration follow a predefined critical asset list covering systems critical for health and safety, revenue generation or other critical services. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What does critical asset list mean? A critical asset list ranks the systems the organization cannot do without, with their dependencies, so recovery follows a plan rather than a rush. ## A sourced example The guide asks that restoration follow a predefined critical asset list covering systems critical for health and safety, revenue generation or other critical services. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [Ransomware recovery order](/decisions/ransomware-recovery-order/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Community Profile](/glossary/community-profile/) - [Covered cyber incident](/glossary/covered-cyber-incident/) - [Data exfiltration extortion](/glossary/data-exfiltration-extortion/) - [Domain controller](/glossary/domain-controller/) ## Sources - cisa.gov: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/critical-asset-list/ --- # Data exfiltration extortion, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Data exfiltration extortion is an attack where criminals steal data and demand payment not to publish it, with little or no encryption of systems. Coveware reported that nearly 80% of the pure data-exfiltration incidents it supported in Q3 2026 were resolved without a ransom payment. Read on 16 November 2026. Related terms are linked at the foot of this page. ## What does data exfiltration extortion mean? Data exfiltration extortion is an attack where criminals steal data and demand payment not to publish it, with little or no encryption of systems. ## A sourced example Coveware reported that nearly 80% of the pure data-exfiltration incidents it supported in Q3 2026 were resolved without a ransom payment. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [Double extortion and the response](/decisions/double-extortion/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Covered cyber incident](/glossary/covered-cyber-incident/) - [Critical asset list](/glossary/critical-asset-list/) - [Domain controller](/glossary/domain-controller/) - [Double extortion](/glossary/double-extortion/) ## Sources - coveware.com: https://coveware.com/2026/10/the-silent-ransom-group-leak-shows-why-paying-for-silence-fails/ (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/data-exfiltration-extortion/ --- # Domain controller, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A domain controller is a server that holds the Active Directory and approves logins across a Windows network, so its compromise gives wide control. The guide says malicious actors often target domain controllers and use them as a staging point to spread ransomware network wide. Read on 16 November 2026. Related terms are linked at the foot of this page. ## What does domain controller mean? A domain controller is a server that holds the Active Directory and approves logins across a Windows network, so its compromise gives wide control. ## A sourced example The guide says malicious actors often target domain controllers and use them as a staging point to spread ransomware network wide. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [Active Directory recovery readiness](/readiness/ransomware-backup-and-identity-recovery-readiness/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Critical asset list](/glossary/critical-asset-list/) - [Data exfiltration extortion](/glossary/data-exfiltration-extortion/) - [Double extortion](/glossary/double-extortion/) - [Golden image](/glossary/golden-image/) ## Sources - cisa.gov: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/domain-controller/ --- # Double extortion, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Double extortion is a ransomware attack that combines encryption with data theft, so the victim faces two demands: one for the key and one for silence. CISA's guide says actors sometimes use access sold by malware operators to exfiltrate data and threaten to release it publicly before ransoming the network. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What does double extortion mean? Double extortion is a ransomware attack that combines encryption with data theft, so the victim faces two demands: one for the key and one for silence. ## A sourced example CISA's guide says actors sometimes use access sold by malware operators to exfiltrate data and threaten to release it publicly before ransoming the network. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [Double extortion and the response](/decisions/double-extortion/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Data exfiltration extortion](/glossary/data-exfiltration-extortion/) - [Domain controller](/glossary/domain-controller/) - [Golden image](/glossary/golden-image/) - [Immutable backup](/glossary/immutable-backup/) ## Sources - cisa.gov: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/double-extortion/ --- # Golden image, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A golden image is a preconfigured operating system with its software, kept as a template so a server or virtual machine can be rebuilt quickly. The #StopRansomware Guide asks organizations to maintain and regularly update golden images of critical systems and to keep image templates available for rebuilding. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What does golden image mean? A golden image is a preconfigured operating system with its software, kept as a template so a server or virtual machine can be rebuilt quickly. ## A sourced example The #StopRansomware Guide asks organizations to maintain and regularly update golden images of critical systems and to keep image templates available for rebuilding. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [Backup and identity recovery readiness](/readiness/ransomware-backup-and-identity-recovery-readiness/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Domain controller](/glossary/domain-controller/) - [Double extortion](/glossary/double-extortion/) - [Immutable backup](/glossary/immutable-backup/) - [Initial access broker](/glossary/initial-access-broker/) ## Sources - cisa.gov: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/golden-image/ --- # Immutable backup, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** An immutable backup is a copy that cannot be changed or deleted for a set period, even by an administrator or an attacker holding admin credentials. Microsoft advises being able to restore the entire enterprise from immutable storage, which neither the cybercriminal nor you can modify. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What does immutable backup mean? An immutable backup is a copy that cannot be changed or deleted for a set period, even by an administrator or an attacker holding admin credentials. ## A sourced example Microsoft advises being able to restore the entire enterprise from immutable storage, which neither the cybercriminal nor you can modify. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [Backup and identity recovery readiness](/readiness/ransomware-backup-and-identity-recovery-readiness/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Double extortion](/glossary/double-extortion/) - [Golden image](/glossary/golden-image/) - [Initial access broker](/glossary/initial-access-broker/) - [Lateral movement](/glossary/lateral-movement/) ## Sources - learn.microsoft.com: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/ransomware/protect-against-ransomware-phase1 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/immutable-backup/ --- # Initial access broker, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** An initial access broker is a criminal who gains entry to networks and sells that access to others, who may then deploy ransomware. CISA's guide says operators of advanced malware such as Bumblebee, Dridex, Emotet and QakBot will often sell access to a network. Read on 16 November 2026. Related terms are linked at the foot of this page. ## What does initial access broker mean? An initial access broker is a criminal who gains entry to networks and sells that access to others, who may then deploy ransomware. ## A sourced example CISA's guide says operators of advanced malware such as Bumblebee, Dridex, Emotet and QakBot will often sell access to a network. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [Responder procedure](/response/ransomware-incident-response-procedure/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Golden image](/glossary/golden-image/) - [Immutable backup](/glossary/immutable-backup/) - [Lateral movement](/glossary/lateral-movement/) - [Living off the land](/glossary/living-off-the-land/) ## Sources - cisa.gov: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/initial-access-broker/ --- # Lateral movement, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Lateral movement is an intruder's travel from the first compromised system to others, usually with stolen credentials and legitimate tools. Coveware reported lateral movement observed in 71% of the Q3 2026 cases it supported, tied with data exfiltration as the most frequent tactic. Read on 16 November 2026. The source of the example is listed below with its read date. ## What does lateral movement mean? Lateral movement is an intruder's travel from the first compromised system to others, usually with stolen credentials and legitimate tools. ## A sourced example Coveware reported lateral movement observed in 71% of the Q3 2026 cases it supported, tied with data exfiltration as the most frequent tactic. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [Ransomware incident response](/response/ransomware-incident-response/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Immutable backup](/glossary/immutable-backup/) - [Initial access broker](/glossary/initial-access-broker/) - [Living off the land](/glossary/living-off-the-land/) - [Materiality determination](/glossary/materiality-determination/) ## Sources - coveware.com: https://coveware.com/2026/10/the-silent-ransom-group-leak-shows-why-paying-for-silence-fails/ (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/lateral-movement/ --- # Living off the land, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Living off the land means attackers use tools already on the system, such as PowerShell, instead of bringing new malware. The guide describes inside-out persistence as including living-off-the-land style modifications and use of PowerShell scripts and the PsTools suite. Read on 16 November 2026. The source of the example is listed below with its read date. ## What does living off the land mean? Living off the land means attackers use tools already on the system, such as PowerShell, instead of bringing new malware. ## A sourced example The guide describes inside-out persistence as including living-off-the-land style modifications and use of PowerShell scripts and the PsTools suite. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [Responder procedure](/response/ransomware-incident-response-procedure/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Initial access broker](/glossary/initial-access-broker/) - [Lateral movement](/glossary/lateral-movement/) - [Materiality determination](/glossary/materiality-determination/) - [Network segmentation](/glossary/network-segmentation/) ## Sources - cisa.gov: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/living-off-the-land/ --- # Materiality determination, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A materiality determination is a public company's decision on whether a cybersecurity incident is material to investors, which starts the Form 8-K clock. The SEC final rule requires the determination to be made without unreasonable delay and the Form 8-K Item 1.05 filing within four business days of it. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What does materiality determination mean? A materiality determination is a public company's decision on whether a cybersecurity incident is material to investors, which starts the Form 8-K clock. ## A sourced example The SEC final rule requires the determination to be made without unreasonable delay and the Form 8-K Item 1.05 filing within four business days of it. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05](/reporting/sec-form-8-k-item-1-05/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Lateral movement](/glossary/lateral-movement/) - [Living off the land](/glossary/living-off-the-land/) - [Network segmentation](/glossary/network-segmentation/) - [Offline backup](/glossary/offline-backup/) ## Sources - federalregister.gov: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/08/04/2023-16194/cybersecurity-risk-management-strategy-governance-and-incident-disclosure (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/materiality-determination/ --- # Network segmentation, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Network segmentation splits a network into parts with filtered links between them, so an intruder in one part cannot freely reach another. CPG 3.I notes that segment boundaries can contain a breach and can even allow segments to be shut down during an intrusion. Read on 16 November 2026. Related terms are linked at the foot of this page. ## What does network segmentation mean? Network segmentation splits a network into parts with filtered links between them, so an intruder in one part cannot freely reach another. ## A sourced example CPG 3.I notes that segment boundaries can contain a breach and can even allow segments to be shut down during an intrusion. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [Ransomware in OT environments](/decisions/ransomware-in-ot-environments/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Living off the land](/glossary/living-off-the-land/) - [Materiality determination](/glossary/materiality-determination/) - [Offline backup](/glossary/offline-backup/) - [Out-of-band communication](/glossary/out-of-band-communication/) ## Sources - cisa.gov: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/network-segmentation/ --- # Offline backup, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** An offline backup is a copy stored where the network, and so ransomware, cannot reach it, such as disconnected media or a separate environment. The guide asks for offline, encrypted backups of critical data because many ransomware variants try to find and delete or encrypt accessible backups. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What does offline backup mean? An offline backup is a copy stored where the network, and so ransomware, cannot reach it, such as disconnected media or a separate environment. ## A sourced example The guide asks for offline, encrypted backups of critical data because many ransomware variants try to find and delete or encrypt accessible backups. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [Backup and identity recovery readiness](/readiness/ransomware-backup-and-identity-recovery-readiness/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Materiality determination](/glossary/materiality-determination/) - [Network segmentation](/glossary/network-segmentation/) - [Out-of-band communication](/glossary/out-of-band-communication/) - [Phishing-resistant MFA](/glossary/phishing-resistant-mfa/) ## Sources - cisa.gov: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/offline-backup/ --- # Out-of-band communication, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Out-of-band communication is contact over a channel that does not depend on the compromised network, such as a phone call. The guide says to isolate systems in a coordinated manner using out-of-band communication such as phone calls, to avoid tipping off actors that they were discovered. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What does out-of-band communication mean? Out-of-band communication is contact over a channel that does not depend on the compromised network, such as a phone call. ## A sourced example The guide says to isolate systems in a coordinated manner using out-of-band communication such as phone calls, to avoid tipping off actors that they were discovered. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [The first hour](/decisions/first-hour-of-ransomware/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Network segmentation](/glossary/network-segmentation/) - [Offline backup](/glossary/offline-backup/) - [Phishing-resistant MFA](/glossary/phishing-resistant-mfa/) - [Ransomware](/glossary/ransomware/) ## Sources - cisa.gov: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/out-of-band-communication/ --- # Phishing-resistant MFA, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Phishing-resistant multifactor authentication is a sign-in method that cannot be tricked into handing a code or approval to a fake site, such as FIDO or WebAuthn keys. CPG 3.F lists phishing-resistant MFA, for example FIDO/WebAuthn or PKI-based methods, as the strongest of its ranked MFA options. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What does phishing-resistant MFA mean? Phishing-resistant multifactor authentication is a sign-in method that cannot be tricked into handing a code or approval to a fake site, such as FIDO or WebAuthn keys. ## A sourced example CPG 3.F lists phishing-resistant MFA, for example FIDO/WebAuthn or PKI-based methods, as the strongest of its ranked MFA options. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [Control ID1 in the assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Offline backup](/glossary/offline-backup/) - [Out-of-band communication](/glossary/out-of-band-communication/) - [Ransomware](/glossary/ransomware/) - [Ransomware as a service](/glossary/ransomware-as-a-service/) ## Sources - cisa.gov: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/phishing-resistant-mfa/ --- # Ransomware, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Ransomware is malicious software or an attack that encrypts an organization's data and demands payment to restore access. Attackers may also steal data and demand a second payment. Read on 16 November 2026. The source of the example is listed below with its read date. Related terms are linked at the foot of this page. ## What does ransomware mean? Ransomware is malicious software or an attack that encrypts an organization's data and demands payment to restore access. Attackers may also steal data and demand a second payment. ## A sourced example NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 describes it as a malicious attack where attackers encrypt an organization's data and demand payment to restore access, and may also steal information and demand an additional payment for not disclosing it. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [What ransomware readiness means](/readiness/what-is-ransomware-readiness/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Out-of-band communication](/glossary/out-of-band-communication/) - [Phishing-resistant MFA](/glossary/phishing-resistant-mfa/) - [Ransomware as a service](/glossary/ransomware-as-a-service/) - [Remote monitoring and management software](/glossary/remote-monitoring-and-management/) ## Sources - csrc.nist.gov: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8374/r1/final (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/ransomware/ --- # Ransomware as a service, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Ransomware as a service is a model where developers license ransomware to affiliates who carry out attacks and share the proceeds. CISA and FBI described DarkSide as ransomware-as-a-service in which the developers receive a share of the proceeds from the affiliates who deploy it. Read on 16 November 2026. Related terms are linked at the foot of this page. ## What does ransomware as a service mean? Ransomware as a service is a model where developers license ransomware to affiliates who carry out attacks and share the proceeds. ## A sourced example CISA and FBI described DarkSide as ransomware-as-a-service in which the developers receive a share of the proceeds from the affiliates who deploy it. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [Ransomware in OT environments](/decisions/ransomware-in-ot-environments/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Phishing-resistant MFA](/glossary/phishing-resistant-mfa/) - [Ransomware](/glossary/ransomware/) - [Remote monitoring and management software](/glossary/remote-monitoring-and-management/) - [Sanctions nexus](/glossary/sanctions-nexus/) ## Sources - cisa.gov: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-131a (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/ransomware-as-a-service/ --- # Remote monitoring and management software, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Remote monitoring and management (RMM) software lets administrators control computers from afar, and attackers use it for the same purpose. The guide says RMM software is commonly used by malicious actors to maintain persistence and asks organizations to audit remote access tools and block common RMM ports. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What does remote monitoring and management software mean? Remote monitoring and management (RMM) software lets administrators control computers from afar, and attackers use it for the same purpose. ## A sourced example The guide says RMM software is commonly used by malicious actors to maintain persistence and asks organizations to audit remote access tools and block common RMM ports. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [Responder procedure](/response/ransomware-incident-response-procedure/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Ransomware](/glossary/ransomware/) - [Ransomware as a service](/glossary/ransomware-as-a-service/) - [Sanctions nexus](/glossary/sanctions-nexus/) - [SDN List](/glossary/sdn-list/) ## Sources - cisa.gov: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/remote-monitoring-and-management/ --- # Sanctions nexus, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A sanctions nexus exists when a transaction involves a sanctioned person, group or jurisdiction, which can make a payment unlawful for a U.S. person. OFAC's advisory says license applications involving ransomware payments are reviewed case by case with a presumption of denial. Read on 16 November 2026. The source of the example is listed below with its read date. ## What does sanctions nexus mean? A sanctions nexus exists when a transaction involves a sanctioned person, group or jurisdiction, which can make a payment unlawful for a U.S. person. ## A sourced example OFAC's advisory says license applications involving ransomware payments are reviewed case by case with a presumption of denial. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [Ransom payment and sanctions](/decisions/ransom-payment-and-sanctions/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Ransomware as a service](/glossary/ransomware-as-a-service/) - [Remote monitoring and management software](/glossary/remote-monitoring-and-management/) - [SDN List](/glossary/sdn-list/) - [Tabletop exercise](/glossary/tabletop-exercise/) ## Sources - ofac.treasury.gov: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/912981/download?inline (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/sanctions-nexus/ --- # SDN List, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** The Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List is OFAC's list of persons with whom U.S. persons are generally barred from transacting. The advisory says U.S. persons are generally prohibited from transactions with persons on the SDN List and notes OFAC designated SUEX, a virtual currency exchange, in September 2021. Read on 16 November 2026. ## What does SDN List mean? The Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List is OFAC's list of persons with whom U.S. persons are generally barred from transacting. ## A sourced example The advisory says U.S. persons are generally prohibited from transactions with persons on the SDN List and notes OFAC designated SUEX, a virtual currency exchange, in September 2021. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [Ransom payment and sanctions](/decisions/ransom-payment-and-sanctions/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Remote monitoring and management software](/glossary/remote-monitoring-and-management/) - [Sanctions nexus](/glossary/sanctions-nexus/) - [Tabletop exercise](/glossary/tabletop-exercise/) - [Threat hunting](/glossary/threat-hunting/) ## Sources - ofac.treasury.gov: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/912981/download?inline (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/sdn-list/ --- # Tabletop exercise, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** A tabletop exercise is a discussion-based rehearsal in which participants talk through a scenario and their roles without touching live systems. CISA offers tabletop exercise packages with template objectives, scenarios and discussion questions, and says available scenarios include ransomware. Read on 16 November 2026. The source of the example is listed below with its read date. ## What does tabletop exercise mean? A tabletop exercise is a discussion-based rehearsal in which participants talk through a scenario and their roles without touching live systems. ## A sourced example CISA offers tabletop exercise packages with template objectives, scenarios and discussion questions, and says available scenarios include ransomware. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [The response plan](/plan/ransomware-response-plan/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [Sanctions nexus](/glossary/sanctions-nexus/) - [SDN List](/glossary/sdn-list/) - [Threat hunting](/glossary/threat-hunting/) ## Sources - cisa.gov: https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/services/cisa-tabletop-exercise-packages (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/tabletop-exercise/ --- # Threat hunting, defined Glossary term, read 16 November 2026 **The short answer.** Threat hunting is the active search for signs of an intruder that automatic alerts have not raised. The guide starts hunting after isolation, with checks for new AD accounts, anomalous VPN logins, backup-impairing commands and unexpected remote management software. Read on 16 November 2026. The source of the example is listed below with its read date. ## What does threat hunting mean? Threat hunting is the active search for signs of an intruder that automatic alerts have not raised. ## A sourced example The guide starts hunting after isolation, with checks for new AD accounts, anomalous VPN logins, backup-impairing commands and unexpected remote management software. ## Where does this term appear on the site? These pages use the term in practice. - [Responder procedure](/response/ransomware-incident-response-procedure/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [All ransomware terms](/glossary/) ## Related terms - [SDN List](/glossary/sdn-list/) - [Tabletop exercise](/glossary/tabletop-exercise/) ## Sources - cisa.gov: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/glossary/threat-hunting/ --- # Ransomware readiness news: dated items from primary sources News, read 16 November 2026 **In short.** 3 dated items from primary sources, newest first: a response firm's Q3 2026 report article, the CIRCIA town halls of June 2026 and the final NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1. Each item has its source and its effect on readiness work. ## What is new in ransomware readiness? 3 dated items are listed, newest first, each from a primary source. The newest is "Coveware Q3 2026: median ransom payment $400,000, most data-theft cases unpaid", dated 28 October 2026. - [Coveware Q3 2026: median ransom payment $400,000, most data-theft cases unpaid](/news/coveware-q3-2026-report-article/): 28 October 2026 - [CISA holds four CIRCIA town halls; the final rule is still pending](/news/circia-town-halls-june-2026/): 18 June 2026 - [NIST finalizes IR 8374 Rev. 1, its ransomware profile for CSF 2.0](/news/nist-ir-8374-rev-1-final/): 11 June 2026 ## Related pages - [The assessment](/assessment/) - [Reporting duties](/reporting/ransomware-reporting-duties/) - [Glossary](/glossary/) - [FAQ](/faq/) - [Ransomware Readiness Assessment: home](/) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/news/ --- # Coveware Q3 2026: median ransom payment $400,000, most data-theft cases unpaid News, 28 October 2026 **The short answer.** Coveware published its Q3 2026 ransomware report article on 28 October 2026. It says the median ransom payment rose 167% to $400,000 while the average fell 45% to $1,025,278, and that nearly 80% of pure data-exfiltration incidents ended without payment. All figures come from incidents Coveware supported. Coveware, an extortion response firm owned by Veeam, titled its Q3 2026 article "The Silent Ransom Group Leak Shows Why Paying for Silence Fails". It reports that figures are from incidents it supported, so they describe one firm's caseload. On initial access it reports phishing and social engineering at about 29%, remote access compromise at 22 to 23% and compromised credentials at 14 to 15%. It reports lateral movement and data exfiltration each in 71% of cases and impact, such as encryption, in 50%. The readiness reading: identity and remote access controls carry the most weight in the assessment for this reason, and data-theft detection matters as much as backups. - [CISA holds four CIRCIA town halls; the final rule is still pending](/news/circia-town-halls-june-2026/) - [NIST finalizes IR 8374 Rev. 1, its ransomware profile for CSF 2.0](/news/nist-ir-8374-rev-1-final/) - [All dated news items](/news/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [Reporting duties](/reporting/ransomware-reporting-duties/) ## Sources - coveware.com: https://coveware.com/2026/10/the-silent-ransom-group-leak-shows-why-paying-for-silence-fails/ (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/news/coveware-q3-2026-report-article/ --- # CISA holds four CIRCIA town halls; the final rule is still pending News, 18 June 2026 **The short answer.** CISA held four CIRCIA town hall meetings between 15 and 18 June 2026. Covered cyber incident and ransom payment reporting is still not required, because the final rule has not taken effect. CISA says multiple funding lapses affected its ability to do rulemaking and that it continues to work on the rule. CISA announced the town halls in the Federal Register on 13 February 2026 and 26 May 2026. Transcripts, an attendee list and supplemental materials received within seven days are on the rulemaking docket. The proposed rule appeared on 4 April 2024. Until a final rule takes effect, CISA says, organizations are not required to submit covered cyber incident or ransom payment reports, though it encourages voluntary reporting. Action for readers: keep a row for CIRCIA in your reporting clock table, marked not yet in force, and review it when CISA announces a date. - [Coveware Q3 2026: median ransom payment $400,000, most data-theft cases unpaid](/news/coveware-q3-2026-report-article/) - [NIST finalizes IR 8374 Rev. 1, its ransomware profile for CSF 2.0](/news/nist-ir-8374-rev-1-final/) - [All dated news items](/news/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [Reporting duties](/reporting/ransomware-reporting-duties/) ## Sources - cisa.gov: https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories/information-sharing/cyber-incident-reporting-critical-infrastructure-act-2022-circia (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/news/circia-town-halls-june-2026/ --- # NIST finalizes IR 8374 Rev. 1, its ransomware profile for CSF 2.0 News, 11 June 2026 **The short answer.** NIST finalized IR 8374 Rev. 1, Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Community Profile, on 11 June 2026. It supersedes IR 8374 of 23 February 2022, follows a draft of 13 January 2025, and includes six basic ransomware tips and a table of CSF 2.0 outcomes. The profile says it can help gauge an organization's level of readiness to counter ransomware threats and deal with the consequences of events, and can be used in developing a ransomware countermeasure playbook. Section 1.2 gives six basic tips: plan, educate, avoid vulnerabilities, detect and stop, make spread harder and make recovery easier. Table 1 lists CSF 2.0 categories and subcategories with a ransomware application for each. The control mapping on this site uses the subcategory identifiers printed in the final document. - [Coveware Q3 2026: median ransom payment $400,000, most data-theft cases unpaid](/news/coveware-q3-2026-report-article/) - [CISA holds four CIRCIA town halls; the final rule is still pending](/news/circia-town-halls-june-2026/) - [All dated news items](/news/) - [The readiness assessment](/assessment/) - [Reporting duties](/reporting/ransomware-reporting-duties/) ## Sources - csrc.nist.gov: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8374/r1/final (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/news/nist-ir-8374-rev-1-final/ --- # Ransomware readiness and response: questions answered FAQ, read 16 November 2026 **In short.** 19 questions people ask about ransomware readiness assessments, response plans, playbooks and incident response, answered in two or three sentences with a link to the page that gives the sources. Questions come from search suggestions collected on 16 November 2026. ## What do people ask about ransomware readiness? People ask what readiness means, whether there is a tool or checklist, how the CISA and NIST documents relate, and what a plan, playbook and incident response involve. The answers below are short; each links to the full page with its sources. **What is ransomware readiness?** Ransomware readiness is how well an organization can prevent, detect, respond to and recover from a ransomware event. CISA calls its self-assessment a way to see how well equipped an organization is to defend and recover. NIST says its profile helps gauge readiness and deal with consequences. See [what ransomware readiness means](/readiness/what-is-ransomware-readiness/). **What is a ransomware readiness assessment?** A ransomware readiness assessment checks controls against published guidance and returns a score or a list of gaps. This site offers a [36-control assessment](/assessment/) with every point value published; CISA offers the RRA in its CSET tool; NIST offers a profile to assess against. **Is there a ransomware readiness assessment tool?** Yes. CISA, NIST and this site each offer one without charge, and they measure different things. The [tool comparison](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-assessment-tool/) lists what each one measures and returns. **What is the CISA Ransomware Readiness Assessment (RRA)?** The RRA is a module in CISA's Cyber Security Evaluation Tool, announced 30 June 2021. It has ten goals and practices tiered basic, intermediate and advanced, answered yes or no. See the [RRA walk-through](/readiness/cisa-ransomware-readiness-assessment-rra/). **Is there a NIST ransomware readiness assessment?** NIST has no scored test, but NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, finalized 11 June 2026, is a CSF 2.0 profile you can assess against. See the [NIST page](/readiness/nist-ransomware-readiness-assessment/). **Is there a ransomware readiness checklist?** Yes. A [leadership checklist](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-checklist/) has 15 items and a [technical checklist](/readiness/ransomware-preparedness-checklist/) has 29, both cut from the 36-control assessment. **What is a ransomware preparedness assessment?** It is a readiness assessment under another name. CISA and NIST say "readiness"; the #StopRansomware Guide says "preparing". The [tool page](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-assessment-tool/) explains the wording. **How ready is healthcare for ransomware?** No sector-wide readiness measure was found in the sources read. CISA lists healthcare sector-specific goals, and HIPAA sets notification clocks of up to 60 days. See [HIPAA and healthcare readiness](/reporting/hipaa-breach-notification-ransomware/). **What is ransomware incident response?** It is the coordinated work of finding affected systems, stopping the spread, preserving evidence, notifying the right parties, removing the attacker and restoring operations. See the [overview](/response/ransomware-incident-response/). **What are the steps of ransomware incident response?** Detect and analyze, report and notify, contain, eradicate, recover and review. The #StopRansomware Guide says to move through its first three checklist steps in sequence. See the [steps](/response/ransomware-incident-response-steps/). **What goes in a ransomware incident response checklist?** Isolation, out-of-band coordination, triage, log review, notifications, imaging, access cut-off, persistence search, rebuild plan and backup protection. The 12-line list is on the [first 24 hours page](/response/first-24-hours/). **What is a ransomware incident response plan?** It is the ransomware-specific part of an incident response plan: who decides, how systems are isolated, who is told, how a payment question is handled and in what order systems return. See the [plan guide](/plan/ransomware-response-plan/). **What does a ransomware incident response plan example look like?** The [plan template page](/plan/ransomware-response-plan-template/) includes a short filled-in extract with a fictional organization, after the full 13-section template. **Is there a ransomware response plan template?** Yes. The full text is in HTML and as a Word file on the [template page](/plan/ransomware-response-plan-template/). **What is a ransomware playbook?** A short ordered set of steps and decision points for a ransomware event, narrower than a response plan. See [what a playbook is](/playbook/what-is-a-ransomware-playbook/) and the [11-step playbook](/playbook/ransomware-playbook/). **What does a ransomware playbook flowchart look like?** The [flowchart page](/playbook/ransomware-playbook-flowchart/) gives eight decision nodes as a table, each with a yes and a no path. **What does the NIST ransomware playbook say?** NIST has not published a playbook by that name; IR 8374 Rev. 1 says its profile can be used to develop one. The [NIST-keyed playbook](/playbook/ransomware-playbook-nist/) maps actions to subcategory IDs. **What is the Microsoft ransomware playbook?** Microsoft Learn lists ransomware incident response playbooks on its ransomware hub. Its playbooks use a four-part format: prerequisites, workflow, checklist and investigation steps. See [what a playbook is](/playbook/what-is-a-ransomware-playbook/). **Is there a ransomware incident report template?** Yes. The [report template](/playbook/ransomware-incident-report-template/) has ten sections and the fields the FBI IC3 asks victims to supply. ## Related pages - [The assessment](/assessment/) - [Dated news items](/news/) - [Glossary](/glossary/) - [Ransomware readiness](/readiness/ransomware-readiness/) - [The response plan](/plan/ransomware-response-plan/) - [The playbook](/playbook/ransomware-playbook/) - [Ransomware Readiness Assessment: home](/) ## Sources - CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026) - NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Community Profile (CSRC record): https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8374/r1/final (read 16 November 2026) - CISA alert, 30 June 2021: CSET adds the Ransomware Readiness Assessment: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2021/06/30/cisas-cset-tool-sets-sights-ransomware-threat (read 16 November 2026) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/faq/ --- # About Ransomware Readiness Assessment About, read 16 November 2026 **In short.** Ransomware Readiness Assessment is a reference on ransomware readiness for security leads. It publishes a 36-control self-assessment with its scoring rules, a table mapping each control to CISA and NIST guidance, a ransomware response plan template, a playbook and guides to the decisions and reporting duties that follow an attack. Read on 16 November 2026. The site answers practical ransomware questions with sources. Every fact about a standard, a law or a firm is read from the primary source, printed with its web address and the date it was read. Two original assets sit at its center. The [assessment](/assessment/) is a set of 36 controls with points, weights and bands. The [control mapping](/mapping/) shows which published identifier each control relates to. Both are free to download as CSV and JSON from the [datasets page](/datasets/) under CC BY 4.0. The site ranks nobody. The [providers page](/providers/) lists firms alphabetically and gives each the same fields. See the [editorial policy](/editorial-policy/) for the rules and the [method page](/method/) for how sources are read. The publisher is Ransomware Readiness Assessment. Write to editor@ransomwarereadinessassessment.com. ## Related pages - [Editorial policy](/editorial-policy/) - [Corrections](/corrections/) - [Contact](/contact/) - [Privacy](/privacy/) - [Terms](/terms/) - [How sources are read](/method/) - [Ransomware Readiness Assessment: home](/) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/about/ --- # Editorial policy Editorial policy, read 16 November 2026 **In short.** Every fact on this site comes from a primary source read on the date shown. Firms are listed alphabetically with identical fields. Nothing is ranked or scored. Figures from a company are labeled as that company's figures. The site gives no legal advice. Corrections are logged on the corrections page. Read on 16 November 2026. Sources. A fact about a framework, a law or agency guidance is read from the issuing body: cisa.gov, csrc.nist.gov, ofac.treasury.gov, the Federal Register, the eCFR, ncsc.gov.uk and similar. A fact about a firm is read from the firm's own pages. If a source cannot be loaded, the fact is left out and the page says so. Dates. Each source is listed with a read date. Where a page carries its own edition date, such as the September 2023 edition of the #StopRansomware Guide, that date is printed as well. No ranking. The site does not rank, score or recommend firms. The [providers page](/providers/) uses one test for every firm, in alphabetical order. Company figures. Numbers published by a firm, such as a median ransom payment, are described as that firm's figures from its own cases. Law. Pages on reporting duties read the rule text and say what was not read. They are not legal advice; ask counsel. Scoring. The assessment's points, weights and bands are editorial choices, published on the [method page](/assessment/method/) so anyone can reproduce or dispute them. Errors. See [corrections](/corrections/). ## Related pages - [About](/about/) - [Corrections](/corrections/) - [Contact](/contact/) - [Privacy](/privacy/) - [Terms](/terms/) - [How sources are read](/method/) - [Ransomware Readiness Assessment: home](/) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/editorial-policy/ --- # Corrections Corrections, read 16 November 2026 **In short.** If a page is wrong, write to editor@ransomwarereadinessassessment.com with the page address and the correct source. Corrections are made on the page, and the change is described on this page with its date. No corrections have been logged since publication on 16 November 2026. Send the address of the page, the sentence that is wrong and the primary source that shows the right text. A correction changes the page text, updates the last reviewed date on that page and adds a line to the log below. Material changes to the assessment points, weights or bands are also recorded on the [assessment method page](/assessment/method/). ## Correction log No entries. First edition published 16 November 2026. For other matters see [contact](/contact/) and the [editorial policy](/editorial-policy/). ## Related pages - [About](/about/) - [Editorial policy](/editorial-policy/) - [Contact](/contact/) - [Privacy](/privacy/) - [Terms](/terms/) - [How sources are read](/method/) - [Ransomware Readiness Assessment: home](/) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/corrections/ --- # Contact Contact, read 16 November 2026 **In short.** Write to editor@ransomwarereadinessassessment.com for corrections, source suggestions, requests to cite the datasets, or questions about a page. The address is monitored for editorial matters. It cannot give legal advice or handle an active incident. Victims should report to law enforcement and CISA. Read on 16 November 2026. Email: editor@ransomwarereadinessassessment.com. If you are dealing with an attack now, do not wait for a reply. The [first 24 hours guide](/response/first-24-hours/) lists the first steps, and the [reporting duties page](/reporting/ransomware-reporting-duties/) lists whom to tell. CISA takes reports at cisa.gov/report or 1-844-Say-CISA (1-844-729-2472). See also the [corrections page](/corrections/) and the [about page](/about/). ## Related pages - [About](/about/) - [Editorial policy](/editorial-policy/) - [Corrections](/corrections/) - [Privacy](/privacy/) - [Terms](/terms/) - [How sources are read](/method/) - [Ransomware Readiness Assessment: home](/) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/contact/ --- # Privacy Privacy, read 16 November 2026 **In short.** The site asks for no account and no personal details. The assessment is a form on the page and the answers you tick are not sent to this site. If you email the editor, the message is used to reply and kept as long as needed for the matter. Hosting may record standard technical logs. Read on 16 November 2026. What the pages collect. The pages ask for no name, email address or payment. Downloads are static files. Email. If you write to editor@ransomwarereadinessassessment.com, your address and message are used to reply and to handle the matter, and are kept for as long as that takes. Technical logs. Like any website, the host may record the address of the device making a request, the page requested and the time. These are used for security and to understand which pages are read. Links. Pages link to sites run by others, which have their own policies. Changes. If this policy changes, the date on this page changes. See [terms](/terms/) and [about](/about/). ## Related pages - [About](/about/) - [Editorial policy](/editorial-policy/) - [Corrections](/corrections/) - [Contact](/contact/) - [Terms](/terms/) - [How sources are read](/method/) - [Ransomware Readiness Assessment: home](/) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/privacy/ --- # Terms of use Terms, read 16 November 2026 **In short.** The text and datasets on this site are provided for information, not as legal, security or insurance advice. Datasets are licensed CC BY 4.0: you may copy and adapt them with attribution using the cite line on each. Sources belong to their publishers. Use of the site is at your own risk. Read on 16 November 2026. No advice. Pages on law and reporting summarize rules read at source and may be out of date. Scores from the assessment are a prompt for work, not a certification or a guarantee. License. The datasets (the control set, the control mapping and the CPG goal ratings) are released under CC BY 4.0. Cite them as given on each page. Quotations from CISA, NIST, OFAC, the SEC and others remain theirs. Links. Links to other sites are for reference. This site does not control them. Availability. The site is provided as is. Pages may change; the last reviewed date is on each. See [privacy](/privacy/) and [corrections](/corrections/). ## Related pages - [About](/about/) - [Editorial policy](/editorial-policy/) - [Corrections](/corrections/) - [Contact](/contact/) - [Privacy](/privacy/) - [How sources are read](/method/) - [Ransomware Readiness Assessment: home](/) Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/terms/