Control mappingChecked
What each ransomware readiness control maps to in the CISA and NIST guidance
Which published guidance does each ransomware control map to?
Each row names the section of the #StopRansomware Guide, the NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 subcategory identifiers, the CISA Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 identifiers and the Ransomware Readiness Assessment goal codes that relate to the control. The mapping is a judgment by this site, explained on the method page; it is not a mapping published by CISA or NIST.
| Control | Question (shortened) | StopRansomware Guide section | NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 | CPG 2.0 | RRA goal |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GV1Weight 3 | Is one named executive accountable for ransomware decisions, with written authority to... | Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents | GV.RR-02, GV.OC-01 | 1.A | RM |
| GV2Weight 3 | Does your incident response plan carry ransomware and data-extortion procedures... | Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents | ID.IM-04, RS.MA-01 | 1.C | IR |
| GV3Weight 2 | Was the plan exercised against a ransomware scenario in the last 12 months, with... | Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents | ID.IM-04 | 1.C, 2.C | IR |
| GV4Weight 2 | Are your legal reporting duties for a ransomware event written down, with the clock... | Reporting and Notification | GV.OC-03, RS.CO-02 | 5.B | IR |
| ID1Weight 3 | Is phishing-resistant multifactor authentication required for email, remote access... | Initial Access Vector: Compromised Credentials | PR.AA-03, PR.AA-01 | 3.F | UM |
| ID2Weight 3 | Do administrators use separate accounts from their daily email and web accounts, and... | General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | PR.AA-05 | 3.G, 3.H | UM |
| ID3Weight 2 | Are domain controllers and the identity platform hardened, restricted to a small admin... | General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | PR.AA-05, DE.CM-03 | 3.H | UM |
| ID4Weight 1 | Are default passwords changed, passwords unique and long, failed logins alerted on... | Initial Access Vector: Compromised Credentials | PR.AA-01 | 3.A, 3.B, 3.C, 3.D, 3.E | UM |
| BR1Weight 3 | Are encrypted backups of critical systems kept offline or immutable, out of reach of... | Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents | PR.DS-11 | 3.O | DB |
| BR2Weight 3 | Has a full restore of your critical systems been tested in the last 12 months, with... | Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents | RC.RP-03, PR.DS-11 | 3.O, 6.A | DB |
| BR3Weight 2 | Do you hold golden images, infrastructure-as-code templates and installers with... | Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents | RC.RP-02 | 3.O | DB |
| BR4Weight 2 | Is there a ranked list of systems to restore, with their dependencies, and identity at... | Detection and Analysis | ID.AM-05, RC.RP-02 | 2.A, 6.A | AM |
| DT1Weight 3 | Is endpoint detection or centrally managed anti-malware on servers and endpoints, with... | Initial Access Vector: Precursor Malware Infection | DE.CM-09, DE.AE-02 | 4.A | AI |
| DT2Weight 2 | Are logs from critical systems, firewalls, VPN and identity collected centrally and... | General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | PR.PS-04 | 3.Q | NM |
| DT3Weight 2 | Do you alert on ransomware precursors: new privileged accounts, backup or shadow-copy... | Detection and Analysis | DE.AE-02, DE.CM-01 | 4.B | NM |
| DT4Weight 2 | Does the on-call route reach a person with authority to isolate systems outside... | Reporting and Notification | RS.MA-01 | 5.A | IR |
| SG1Weight 2 | Is the network segmented so that a compromised workstation cannot reach servers... | General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | PR.IR-01 | 3.I | NM |
| SG2Weight 3 | Is every internet-facing service inventoried, with remote desktop closed to the... | Initial Access Vector: Internet-Facing Vulnerabilities and Misconfigurations | PR.PS-02, ID.AM-02 | 3.S, 2.B | PM |
| SG3Weight 2 | Do you patch known exploited vulnerabilities on internet-facing systems within a time... | Initial Access Vector: Internet-Facing Vulnerabilities and Misconfigurations | ID.AM-02, PR.PS-02 | 2.B | PM |
| SG4Weight 1 | Is software execution restricted by allowlisting, and are hypervisors, PowerShell and... | Initial Access Vector: Precursor Malware Infection; General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | PR.PS-05 | 3.P | AI |
| EE1Weight 2 | Does email filtering block risky attachments, flag external senders and disable macros... | Initial Access Vector: Phishing | DE.CM-09 | 3.M, 3.L | PP |
| EE2Weight 1 | Are SPF, DKIM and DMARC set on all mail domains, with DMARC at reject? | Initial Access Vector: Phishing | none cited | 3.L | PP |
| EE3Weight 2 | Does training cover phishing and advanced social engineering such as help desk... | Initial Access Vector: Phishing; Initial Access Vector: Advanced Forms of Social Engineering | PR.AT-01 | 3.J | PP |
| EE4Weight 1 | Is protective DNS or web filtering in place, with remote management tool ports blocked... | Initial Access Vector: Advanced Forms of Social Engineering | ID.AM-03, DE.CM-01 | none | BM |
| RR1Weight 3 | Is there an out-of-band way to reach responders and staff, and a paper contact list... | Detection and Analysis; Reporting and Notification | RS.CO-02, RC.CO-03 | 5.A | IR |
| RR2Weight 2 | Do you have an incident response firm and breach counsel on retainer or pre-agreed... | Reporting and Notification | RS.CO-02, RS.CO-03, GV.RM-03 | 6.A | IR |
| RR3Weight 2 | Is there a written path for a ransom payment decision, including a sanctions screening... | Reporting and Notification | DE.AE-04, GV.RM-02 | 5.B | RM |
| RR4Weight 1 | Can responders capture memory and disk images and keep a time-stamped decision log... | Containment and Eradication | RS.MI-01 | none | IR |
| TP1Weight 2 | Do vendor and service provider contracts require incident notice within a set time? | Initial Access Vector: Third Parties and Managed Service Providers | GV.SC-02, GV.SC-08 | 1.D | RM |
| TP2Weight 3 | Is managed service provider access limited by least privilege, MFA and logging, and do... | Initial Access Vector: Third Parties and Managed Service Providers | DE.CM-06, GV.SC-02 | 1.E | UM |
| TP3Weight 2 | If a provider keeps your backups or runs your systems, does the contract require the... | Initial Access Vector: Third Parties and Managed Service Providers | GV.SC-08 | 1.E | DB |
| TP4Weight 1 | Are key providers on your contact list and in your exercises, and is cyber insurance... | Reporting and Notification | GV.SC-08, GV.RM-03 | 1.D | RM |
| OT1Weight 3 | Are IT and OT networks separated by a demilitarized zone, with industrial protocols... | General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | PR.IR-01 | 3.I | NM |
| OT2Weight 3 | Have you tested running the plant manually, and isolating OT from IT, within the last... | General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | RC.RP-01 | 6.A, 1.C | IR |
| OT3Weight 2 | Is there a current inventory of OT assets and a network topology diagram, stored offline? | General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | ID.AM-03 | 2.A, 2.E | AM |
| OT4Weight 2 | Are backups and gold images of controllers, HMIs and engineering workstations kept... | Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents | PR.DS-11, RC.RP-03 | 3.O | DB |
Which documents and editions were read?
Four documents were read on 16 November 2026. The table gives the edition of each and the kind of identifier used.
| Document | Edition read | Identifiers used |
|---|---|---|
| CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI, NSA: #StopRansomware Guide | September 2023 edition; page read 16 November 2026 | Section titles of Part 1 and Part 2 |
| NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, Ransomware Risk Management: A CSF 2.0 Community Profile | Final, June 2026 (11 June 2026) | CSF 2.0 subcategory IDs such as PR.DS-11 |
| CISA Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 | Goal list read on cisa.gov 16 November 2026; the page states no edition date | Goal IDs 1.A to 6.A |
| CISA Ransomware Readiness Assessment, in CSET | CSET v10.3 release, announced 30 June 2021 | Ten goal codes such as DB and IR |
Which CISA performance goals do the controls cover?
The CPG 2.0 list has 34 goals. 29 map to at least one assessment control and 5 do not, because the assessment is about ransomware rather than all of cybersecurity. The last column shows the controls that touch each goal; cost, impact and ease are CISA's ratings.
| CPG 2.0 | Goal title | Cost | Impact | Ease | Assessment controls |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.A | Establish Cybersecurity Responsibilities | Low | High | Moderate | GV1 |
| 1.B | Manage Cybersecurity Oversight | Low | High | Moderate | none |
| 1.C | Manage Incident Response Plans | Low | High | Moderate | GV2, GV3, OT2 |
| 1.D | “Supply Chain Incident Reporting & Vulnerability Disclosure” | Moderate | Moderate | Complex | TP1, TP4 |
| 1.E | Manage Risks from Managed Service Providers | Moderate | Moderate | Complex | TP2, TP3 |
| 2.A | Manage Organizational Assets | Low | High | Moderate | BR4, OT3 |
| 2.B | Mitigate Known Vulnerabilities | High | High | Complex | SG2, SG3 |
| 2.C | Obtain Independent Validation of Cybersecurity Controls | High | High | Complex | GV3 |
| 2.D | “Maintain Vulnerability Disclosure/Reporting Process” | Low | Low | Moderate | none |
| 2.E | Document Network Topology | Low | High | Moderate | OT3 |
| 3.A | Changing Default Passwords | Low | High | Simple | ID4 |
| 3.B | Establish Minimum Password Strength | Low | High | Simple | ID4 |
| 3.C | Create Unique Credentials | Low | High | Simple | ID4 |
| 3.D | Revoking Credentials for Departing Staff | Low | High | Moderate | ID4 |
| 3.E | Monitor Unsuccessful (Automated) Login Attempts | Moderate | High | Moderate | ID4 |
| 3.F | Implement Multi-factor Authentication | Moderate | High | Moderate | ID1 |
| 3.G | Administrators Maintain Separate User and Privileged Accounts | Low | High | Simple | ID2 |
| 3.H | Implement the Principles of Least Privilege | Low | High | Simple | ID2, ID3 |
| 3.I | Implement Logical/Physical Network Segmentation | High | High | Complex | SG1, OT1 |
| 3.J | Implement Cybersecurity Training | Low | High | Moderate | EE3 |
| 3.K | Utilize Strong Encryption | Moderate | High | Complex | none |
| 3.L | Enable Email Security | Low | High | Moderate | EE1, EE2 |
| 3.M | Disable Autorun & Macros By Default | Low | Moderate | Simple | EE1 |
| 3.N | Establish Change Management Processes | Moderate | High | Complex | none |
| 3.O | Maintain System Backups & Restoration Ability | High | High | Moderate | BR1, BR2, BR3, OT4 |
| 3.P | Maintain Hardware & Software Approval Process | Moderate | High | Moderate | SG4 |
| 3.Q | Maintain Log Collection & Storage | Moderate | High | Moderate | DT2 |
| 3.R | Prohibit Connection of Unauthorized Devices | Moderate | High | Complex | none |
| 3.S | Secure Internet Facing Devices | Moderate | High | Complex | SG2 |
| 4.A | Establish Malicious Code Detection | Moderate | High | Moderate | DT1 |
| 4.B | Identify Adverse Events | Moderate | High | Complex | DT3 |
| 5.A | Establish Incident Communication Procedures | Low | High | Moderate | DT4, RR1 |
| 5.B | Establish Incident Reporting Procedures | Moderate | High | Moderate | GV4, RR3 |
| 6.A | Incident Planning and Preparedness | Moderate | High | Complex | BR2, BR4, RR2, OT2 |
Which NIST IR 8374 identifiers are used?
The document as read cites 43 distinct subcategory identifiers. The controls use 34. Not used: GV.OC-02, ID.RA-01, ID.RA-04, ID.RA-06, ID.RA-09, PR.AA-06, PR.PS-01, RC.CO-04, RS.MI-02. Those are mostly broader risk assessment, physical access and communication outcomes that the 36 questions do not test directly.
Which RRA goals do the controls cover?
| RRA code | Goal (this site's wording) | Assessment controls |
|---|---|---|
| DB | Data backup | BR1, BR2, BR3, TP3, OT4 |
| BM | Web browser management and DNS filtering | EE4 |
| PP | Phishing prevention and awareness | EE1, EE2, EE3 |
| NM | Network perimeter monitoring | DT2, DT3, SG1, OT1 |
| AM | Asset management | BR4, OT3 |
| PM | Patch and update management | SG2, SG3 |
| UM | User and access management | ID1, ID2, ID3, ID4, TP2 |
| AI | Application integrity and allowlisting | DT1, SG4 |
| IR | Incident response | GV2, GV3, GV4, DT4, RR1, RR2, RR4, OT2 |
| RM | Risk management | GV1, RR3, TP1, TP4 |
The exact titles are on the RRA walk-through. Question-level RRA identifiers are not used; they sit inside CSET.
Cite this
Ransomware Readiness Assessment, "Ransomware control mapping", edition 16 November 2026, https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/mapping/ (CC BY 4.0).
Related pages
Sources
Read 16 November 2026, the day this page was last reviewed, unless a line shows another date.
- CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026)
- NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Community Profile (CSRC record)
- NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026)
- CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list
- CISA alert, 30 June 2021: CSET adds the Ransomware Readiness Assessment
- CISA CSET repository: maturity model data, RRA goal titles
- CISA CSET repository: RRA mini user guide text
Last reviewed 16 November 2026.