TemplateChecked
The ransomware response plan template below is complete and ready to fill in
Is there a ransomware response plan template?
Yes. The full text is below, and the same text is in the Word file. Copy it into your own document system, fill in every bracket, have the CEO or equivalent approve it, and keep a printed copy offline.
Download: Ransomware Response Plan template (.docx). The file holds the same 13 sections, with tables, and opens in Word, LibreOffice or Google Docs.
What does the template say?
1Document control
Record who owns this plan, who approved it and where the offline copies are kept. The #StopRansomware Guide asks that the plan be reviewed and approved in writing by the CEO or equivalent, and that a hard copy and an offline version are available.
| Field | Entry | |
|---|---|---|
| Plan owner (role and name) | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Entry. |
| Approved by (CEO or equivalent), date | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Entry. |
| Version and date | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Entry. |
| Last exercised, and scenario used | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Entry. |
| Next review due (at least annually) | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Entry. |
| Offline copies held by (names and places) | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Entry. |
Drawn from: #StopRansomware Guide, CISA CPG 2.0 (1.C).
2Purpose and scope
State what the plan covers: ransomware and data-extortion incidents affecting [organization], its subsidiaries, its cloud tenants and the systems run on its behalf by third parties. State what it does not cover (for example a safety incident with no cyber cause) and where that is handled.
- Scope: [sites, business units, cloud accounts, operational technology]
- Linked documents: [general incident response plan, communications plan, business continuity plan, crisis plan]
- Definitions: ransomware event, data-extortion event, declared incident
Drawn from: #StopRansomware Guide.
3Authority and decision rights
NIST says everyone should understand their role, responsibility and authority before an event. Fill in who decides each item, who stands in, and the longest time the decider may take.
| Decision | Decider | Deputy | Time limit | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Isolate affected systems or segments | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Decider, Deputy, Time limit. |
| Take the network offline at the switch level | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Decider, Deputy, Time limit. |
| Disable VPN, remote access and single sign-on | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Decider, Deputy, Time limit. |
| Engage the incident response firm and breach counsel | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Decider, Deputy, Time limit. |
| Notify the cyber insurer | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Decider, Deputy, Time limit. |
| Contact law enforcement and CISA | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Decider, Deputy, Time limit. |
| Authorize any payment talks (see section 8) | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Decider, Deputy, Time limit. |
| Approve external statements | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Decider, Deputy, Time limit. |
| Declare the incident over | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Decider, Deputy, Time limit. |
Drawn from: NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 (GV.RR-02), #StopRansomware Guide.
4Roles and 24-hour contacts
Keep this table on paper and in a place that does not depend on the network. The guide provides a response contacts table with 24x7 numbers and lists CISA, the FBI field office, the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, the U.S. Secret Service, state and local law enforcement, managed security providers and the cyber insurer.
| Role or party | Name | 24-hour phone | Backup | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Incident commander | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Name, 24-hour phone, Backup. |
| IT lead | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Name, 24-hour phone, Backup. |
| Security lead | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Name, 24-hour phone, Backup. |
| Identity and directory lead | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Name, 24-hour phone, Backup. |
| Backup and recovery lead | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Name, 24-hour phone, Backup. |
| Breach counsel | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Name, 24-hour phone, Backup. |
| Incident response firm | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Name, 24-hour phone, Backup. |
| Cyber insurer and broker | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Name, 24-hour phone, Backup. |
| Communications lead | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Name, 24-hour phone, Backup. |
| Human resources | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Name, 24-hour phone, Backup. |
| Local FBI field office | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Name, 24-hour phone, Backup. |
| CISA: report at cisa.gov/report, Central@cisa.gov, 1-844-Say-CISA (1-844-729-2472) | [ ] | 1-844-729-2472 | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Name, Backup. |
| Key vendors and managed service providers | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Name, 24-hour phone, Backup. |
Drawn from: #StopRansomware Guide, NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 (RS.CO-02).
5Triggers: when this plan is declared
Name the events that start the plan. Examples drawn from the guide's threat hunting list and the usual victim notice are below. Add your own.
- A ransom note, extortion email or leak-site listing naming [organization]
- Files encrypted on more than [number] systems, or on any domain controller or backup server
- Alerts for new privileged accounts, deleted shadow copies or backups, or unexpected remote management software
- Large unexplained outbound data transfer
Drawn from: #StopRansomware Guide.
6The first hour
The guide says to move through its first three steps in sequence. This section restates them for [organization].
- Determine which systems are affected and isolate them. If several systems or subnets appear affected, take the network offline at the switch level. For cloud resources, snapshot volumes for later forensic review.
- Coordinate isolation using out-of-band communication such as phone calls, so the attacker is not tipped off that they have been discovered.
- Triage impacted systems for restoration from the predefined critical asset list.
- Examine detection and prevention systems and logs for earlier-stage malware and signs of data theft.
- Start the decision log (see the decision log template) and note the time of every action.
- Power systems down only if they cannot be disconnected. The guide notes this loses volatile memory evidence.
Drawn from: #StopRansomware Guide.
7Scoping, containment and eradication
Responders follow the guide's containment and eradication steps. Fill in who performs each for [organization].
- Take a system image and memory capture of a sample of affected devices; collect logs and samples of precursor malware
- Preserve volatile evidence such as system memory, Windows Security logs and firewall log buffers
- Ask federal law enforcement about available decryptors, since researchers sometimes find flaws
- Identify the systems and accounts involved in the initial breach, including email accounts
- Contain access routes: disable VPN, remote access servers, single sign-on and public-facing assets if needed
- Look for persistence, both from outside in and from inside out
- Rebuild in priority order from standard images; reset passwords only once the environment is clean
- The designated IT or security authority declares the incident over against criteria set here: [criteria]
Drawn from: #StopRansomware Guide.
8Ransom payment decision path
The FBI does not support paying a ransom, and OFAC says facilitating a payment may violate sanctions regulations. This section does not decide for you. It fixes the order of checks so a decision is not taken in haste.
- The named decider is [ ]. Only the decider may authorize contact with the actor about payment.
- Law enforcement has been contacted and the contact is logged.
- Breach counsel has reviewed sanctions exposure, including OFAC screening of the actor and wallet.
- The insurer has been told and has given its position in writing.
- The estimated impact and scope of the event, and the restore options, have been recorded for the cost-benefit decision NIST describes.
- The reasons for the decision are written in the decision log.
Drawn from: OFAC ransomware sanctions advisory, FBI IC3 ransomware page, NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 (DE.AE-04).
9Legal and reporting clocks
Counsel completes this table before an event. The rows below show the duties read at source on 16 November 2026. Add contracts, insurer terms and state laws.
| Duty | Applies if | Clock | Recipient | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Form 8-K Item 1.05 | Registrant determines an incident is material | Four business days after the materiality determination | SEC | [ ] |
| HIPAA breach notice to individuals | Covered entity discovers a breach of unsecured protected health information | No later than 60 calendar days after discovery | Individuals | [ ] |
| HIPAA notice to HHS | Same | 500 or more individuals: contemporaneously with individual notice. Fewer than 500: within 60 days after the end of the calendar year | HHS | [ ] |
| HIPAA business associate notice | Business associate discovers a breach | No later than 60 calendar days after discovery | The covered entity | [ ] |
| CIRCIA report | Not yet required: the final rule is not in effect | 72 hours for incidents and 24 hours for ransom payments, as the statute directs and CISA proposed | CISA | [ ] |
| State breach notice | Personal information of residents involved | Per state law, read by counsel | Individuals and regulators | [ ] |
| Insurer notice | Per policy | Per policy | Insurer | [ ] |
| Customer and contract notices | Per contract | Per contract | Customers | [ ] |
Drawn from: SEC cybersecurity incident reporting rule, 45 CFR 164.404, 45 CFR 164.408, 45 CFR 164.410, CIRCIA, NCSL breach notification laws.
10Communications
CPG 5.A asks for a plan naming stakeholders and mechanisms, regular updates to senior leadership and media procedures. Prepare the holding statements now.
- Staff message, sent by phone tree if email is down: [text]
- Customer holding statement, approved by counsel: [text]
- Regulator and insurer contact script: [text]
- Media holding statement and spokesperson: [text]
- Update rhythm to senior leaders: every [ ] hours
Drawn from: CISA CPG 2.0 (5.A), #StopRansomware Guide.
11Recovery
Recovery follows a predefined critical asset list that includes health and safety, revenue and other critical services and their dependencies.
| Order | System or service | Depends on | Restore from | Target time | Owner | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Identity and directory services | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: Depends on, Restore from, Target time, Owner. |
| 2 | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: System or service, Depends on, Restore from, Target time, Owner. |
| 3 | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: System or service, Depends on, Restore from, Target time, Owner. |
| 4 | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | Fill in on the printed copy: System or service, Depends on, Restore from, Target time, Owner. |
- Verify backup integrity and scan restored systems before reconnecting them (NIST RC.RP-03)
- Put only clean systems in any new recovery VLAN
- Restore from offline, encrypted backups in priority order
Drawn from: #StopRansomware Guide, NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1.
12After the incident
CPG 6.A asks for post-incident analysis that refines the plan. The guide asks organizations to document lessons learned and consider sharing indicators of compromise with CISA or their sector ISAC.
- Hold a lessons-learned review within [ ] days
- Update this plan, the playbook and the assessment scores
- Share indicators with CISA or the sector ISAC where appropriate
- Record dates for each fix and the owner
Drawn from: #StopRansomware Guide, CISA CPG 2.0 (6.A).
13Appendices to attach
Attach and keep offline:
- Critical asset list and dependencies
- Network diagrams, including third-party connections
- Backup inventory with installation media and license keys
- Decision log (blank)
- Holding statements
What does a ransomware incident response plan example look like?
Here is one filled-in extract so the format is clear. The organization and values are fictional and illustrate the layout only; they are not data.
Extract from section 3 for "Example Foods Ltd" (fictional): Isolate affected systems: decider is the Chief Operating Officer; deputy is the Head of IT; time limit is 15 minutes from the first confirmed encryption alert; the decision is logged by the incident commander. Take the network offline at the switch level: decider is the Head of IT; deputy is the network manager; time limit is 30 minutes; the Chief Operating Officer is told by phone, not email.
The values are illustrative. The principle is that every decision has a named person, a stand-in and a time limit before the event.
Related pages
Sources
Read 16 November 2026, the day this page was last reviewed, unless a line shows another date.
- CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026)
- CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list
- NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026)
- OFAC: Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments, 21 September 2021
- Federal Register: SEC final rule on cybersecurity risk management, strategy, governance and incident reporting (4 August 2023)
- eCFR: 45 CFR 164.404, notification to individuals
- CISA: Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA)
Last reviewed 16 November 2026.