# A ransomware preparedness checklist for IT lists the controls an administrator can verify in a day

Checklist, read 16 November 2026

**The short answer.** The ransomware preparedness checklist below lists controls from the assessment that IT staff can verify with logs, configuration screens and a restore test. Each names the published document that asks for it. Start with identity and backups, because attackers go after both. Read on 16 November 2026.

## What is a ransomware preparedness checklist for IT?

A technical preparedness checklist turns published guidance into things an administrator can check. The items below come from the assessment and are grouped as in the assessment, so results can be entered there afterwards.

The #StopRansomware Guide groups its Part 1 advice by how attackers get in: internet-facing weaknesses, compromised credentials, phishing, precursor malware, advanced social engineering and third parties.

- ID1, weight 3: Is phishing-resistant multifactor authentication required for email, remote access, administrator accounts and cloud consoles?
- ID2, weight 3: Do administrators use separate accounts from their daily email and web accounts, and are privileges reviewed at least quarterly?
- ID3, weight 2: Are domain controllers and the identity platform hardened, restricted to a small admin group and kept off the internet?
- ID4, weight 1: Are default passwords changed, passwords unique and long, failed logins alerted on, and leavers cut off promptly?
- BR1, weight 3: Are encrypted backups of critical systems kept offline or immutable, out of reach of your domain administrator credentials?
- BR2, weight 3: Has a full restore of your critical systems been tested in the last 12 months, with the elapsed time recorded?
- BR3, weight 2: Do you hold golden images, infrastructure-as-code templates and installers with license keys, stored offline?
- BR4, weight 2: Is there a ranked list of systems to restore, with their dependencies, and identity at the front of it?
- DT1, weight 3: Is endpoint detection or centrally managed anti-malware on servers and endpoints, with alerts that reach a person at any hour?
- DT2, weight 2: Are logs from critical systems, firewalls, VPN and identity collected centrally and kept for at least a year?
- DT3, weight 2: Do you alert on ransomware precursors: new privileged accounts, backup or shadow-copy deletion, unexpected remote management tools, large outbound transfers?
- DT4, weight 2: Does the on-call route reach a person with authority to isolate systems outside business hours?
- SG1, weight 2: Is the network segmented so that a compromised workstation cannot reach servers, backups and management interfaces directly?
- SG2, weight 3: Is every internet-facing service inventoried, with remote desktop closed to the internet and VPN and edge devices patched?
- SG3, weight 2: Do you patch known exploited vulnerabilities on internet-facing systems within a time limit you set, and scan for gaps?
- SG4, weight 1: Is software execution restricted by allowlisting, and are hypervisors, PowerShell and remote tools hardened and logged?
- EE1, weight 2: Does email filtering block risky attachments, flag external senders and disable macros by default?
- EE2, weight 1: Are SPF, DKIM and DMARC set on all mail domains, with DMARC at reject?
- EE3, weight 2: Does training cover phishing and advanced social engineering such as help desk impersonation, and do staff report without blame?
- EE4, weight 1: Is protective DNS or web filtering in place, with remote management tool ports blocked at the perimeter?
- RR1, weight 3: Is there an out-of-band way to reach responders and staff, and a paper contact list with 24-hour numbers?
- RR4, weight 1: Can responders capture memory and disk images and keep a time-stamped decision log from the first hour?
- TP1, weight 2: Do vendor and service provider contracts require incident notice within a set time?
- TP2, weight 3: Is managed service provider access limited by least privilege, MFA and logging, and do you audit remote management tools?
- TP3, weight 2: If a provider keeps your backups or runs your systems, does the contract require the same backup practices you use?
- OT1, weight 3: Are IT and OT networks separated by a demilitarized zone, with industrial protocols barred from the IT network?
- OT2, weight 3: Have you tested running the plant manually, and isolating OT from IT, within the last 12 months?
- OT3, weight 2: Is there a current inventory of OT assets and a network topology diagram, stored offline?
- OT4, weight 2: Are backups and gold images of controllers, HMIs and engineering workstations kept offline and restore-tested?

## Which checks should be done first?

Start with backups and identity. The guide says many ransomware variants try to delete or encrypt accessible backups, and that malicious actors often use domain controllers as a staging point. A restore test and a domain controller review show quickly whether the two weakest points are covered.

Then confirm that someone sees alerts out of hours. The [first hour page](/decisions/first-hour-of-ransomware/) shows what that person must be able to do.

## Related pages

- [Ransomware readiness: what it covers and how to test it](/readiness/ransomware-readiness/)
- [Ransomware readiness assessment tools and what they test](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-assessment-tool/)
- [Ransomware readiness checklist for a leadership review](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-checklist/)
- [Ransomware readiness for a small business](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-for-small-business/)
- [Ransomware readiness board briefing: questions to ask](/readiness/ransomware-readiness-board-briefing/)
- [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/)
- [The control mapping](/mapping/)

## Sources

- CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026)
- CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026)
- NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026)
- CISA and FBI advisory AA21-131A: DarkSide ransomware, best practices for preventing business disruption: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-131a (read 16 November 2026)

Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/readiness/ransomware-preparedness-checklist/
