# What each ransomware readiness control maps to in the CISA and NIST guidance

Control mapping, edition 16 November 2026

**The short answer.** The table below maps each of the 36 assessment controls to four published documents: the #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition), NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 (June 2026), CISA's Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 and the CISA Ransomware Readiness Assessment goals. Only identifiers read at source are used. Edition 16 November 2026.

## Which published guidance does each ransomware control map to?

Each row names the section of the #StopRansomware Guide, the NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 subcategory identifiers, the CISA Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 identifiers and the Ransomware Readiness Assessment goal codes that relate to the control. The mapping is a judgment by this site, explained on the [method page](/mapping/method/); it is not a mapping published by CISA or NIST.

| Control | Question (shortened) | StopRansomware Guide section | NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 | CPG 2.0 | RRA goal |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [GV1](/assessment/#governance-4-controls) | Is one named executive accountable for ransomware decisions, with written authority to... | Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents | GV.RR-02, GV.OC-01 | 1.A | RM |
| [GV2](/assessment/#governance-4-controls) | Does your incident response plan carry ransomware and data-extortion procedures... | Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents | ID.IM-04, RS.MA-01 | 1.C | IR |
| [GV3](/assessment/#governance-4-controls) | Was the plan exercised against a ransomware scenario in the last 12 months, with... | Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents | ID.IM-04 | 1.C, 2.C | IR |
| [GV4](/assessment/#governance-4-controls) | Are your legal reporting duties for a ransomware event written down, with the clock... | Reporting and Notification | GV.OC-03, RS.CO-02 | 5.B | IR |
| [ID1](/assessment/#identity-and-access-4-controls) | Is phishing-resistant multifactor authentication required for email, remote access... | Initial Access Vector: Compromised Credentials | PR.AA-03, PR.AA-01 | 3.F | UM |
| [ID2](/assessment/#identity-and-access-4-controls) | Do administrators use separate accounts from their daily email and web accounts, and... | General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | PR.AA-05 | 3.G, 3.H | UM |
| [ID3](/assessment/#identity-and-access-4-controls) | Are domain controllers and the identity platform hardened, restricted to a small admin... | General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | PR.AA-05, DE.CM-03 | 3.H | UM |
| [ID4](/assessment/#identity-and-access-4-controls) | Are default passwords changed, passwords unique and long, failed logins alerted on... | Initial Access Vector: Compromised Credentials | PR.AA-01 | 3.A, 3.B, 3.C, 3.D, 3.E | UM |
| [BR1](/assessment/#backups-and-recovery-4-controls) | Are encrypted backups of critical systems kept offline or immutable, out of reach of... | Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents | PR.DS-11 | 3.O | DB |
| [BR2](/assessment/#backups-and-recovery-4-controls) | Has a full restore of your critical systems been tested in the last 12 months, with... | Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents | RC.RP-03, PR.DS-11 | 3.O, 6.A | DB |
| [BR3](/assessment/#backups-and-recovery-4-controls) | Do you hold golden images, infrastructure-as-code templates and installers with... | Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents | RC.RP-02 | 3.O | DB |
| [BR4](/assessment/#backups-and-recovery-4-controls) | Is there a ranked list of systems to restore, with their dependencies, and identity at... | Detection and Analysis | ID.AM-05, RC.RP-02 | 2.A, 6.A | AM |
| [DT1](/assessment/#detection-4-controls) | Is endpoint detection or centrally managed anti-malware on servers and endpoints, with... | Initial Access Vector: Precursor Malware Infection | DE.CM-09, DE.AE-02 | 4.A | AI |
| [DT2](/assessment/#detection-4-controls) | Are logs from critical systems, firewalls, VPN and identity collected centrally and... | General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | PR.PS-04 | 3.Q | NM |
| [DT3](/assessment/#detection-4-controls) | Do you alert on ransomware precursors: new privileged accounts, backup or shadow-copy... | Detection and Analysis | DE.AE-02, DE.CM-01 | 4.B | NM |
| [DT4](/assessment/#detection-4-controls) | Does the on-call route reach a person with authority to isolate systems outside... | Reporting and Notification | RS.MA-01 | 5.A | IR |
| [SG1](/assessment/#segmentation-and-platform-4-controls) | Is the network segmented so that a compromised workstation cannot reach servers... | General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | PR.IR-01 | 3.I | NM |
| [SG2](/assessment/#segmentation-and-platform-4-controls) | Is every internet-facing service inventoried, with remote desktop closed to the... | Initial Access Vector: Internet-Facing Vulnerabilities and Misconfigurations | PR.PS-02, ID.AM-02 | 3.S, 2.B | PM |
| [SG3](/assessment/#segmentation-and-platform-4-controls) | Do you patch known exploited vulnerabilities on internet-facing systems within a time... | Initial Access Vector: Internet-Facing Vulnerabilities and Misconfigurations | ID.AM-02, PR.PS-02 | 2.B | PM |
| [SG4](/assessment/#segmentation-and-platform-4-controls) | Is software execution restricted by allowlisting, and are hypervisors, PowerShell and... | Initial Access Vector: Precursor Malware Infection; General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | PR.PS-05 | 3.P | AI |
| [EE1](/assessment/#email-and-edge-4-controls) | Does email filtering block risky attachments, flag external senders and disable macros... | Initial Access Vector: Phishing | DE.CM-09 | 3.M, 3.L | PP |
| [EE2](/assessment/#email-and-edge-4-controls) | Are SPF, DKIM and DMARC set on all mail domains, with DMARC at reject? | Initial Access Vector: Phishing | none cited | 3.L | PP |
| [EE3](/assessment/#email-and-edge-4-controls) | Does training cover phishing and advanced social engineering such as help desk... | Initial Access Vector: Phishing; Initial Access Vector: Advanced Forms of Social Engineering | PR.AT-01 | 3.J | PP |
| [EE4](/assessment/#email-and-edge-4-controls) | Is protective DNS or web filtering in place, with remote management tool ports blocked... | Initial Access Vector: Advanced Forms of Social Engineering | ID.AM-03, DE.CM-01 | none | BM |
| [RR1](/assessment/#response-readiness-4-controls) | Is there an out-of-band way to reach responders and staff, and a paper contact list... | Detection and Analysis; Reporting and Notification | RS.CO-02, RC.CO-03 | 5.A | IR |
| [RR2](/assessment/#response-readiness-4-controls) | Do you have an incident response firm and breach counsel on retainer or pre-agreed... | Reporting and Notification | RS.CO-02, RS.CO-03, GV.RM-03 | 6.A | IR |
| [RR3](/assessment/#response-readiness-4-controls) | Is there a written path for a ransom payment decision, including a sanctions screening... | Reporting and Notification | DE.AE-04, GV.RM-02 | 5.B | RM |
| [RR4](/assessment/#response-readiness-4-controls) | Can responders capture memory and disk images and keep a time-stamped decision log... | Containment and Eradication | RS.MI-01 | none | IR |
| [TP1](/assessment/#third-parties-4-controls) | Do vendor and service provider contracts require incident notice within a set time? | Initial Access Vector: Third Parties and Managed Service Providers | GV.SC-02, GV.SC-08 | 1.D | RM |
| [TP2](/assessment/#third-parties-4-controls) | Is managed service provider access limited by least privilege, MFA and logging, and do... | Initial Access Vector: Third Parties and Managed Service Providers | DE.CM-06, GV.SC-02 | 1.E | UM |
| [TP3](/assessment/#third-parties-4-controls) | If a provider keeps your backups or runs your systems, does the contract require the... | Initial Access Vector: Third Parties and Managed Service Providers | GV.SC-08 | 1.E | DB |
| [TP4](/assessment/#third-parties-4-controls) | Are key providers on your contact list and in your exercises, and is cyber insurance... | Reporting and Notification | GV.SC-08, GV.RM-03 | 1.D | RM |
| [OT1](/assessment/#operational-technology-4-controls) | Are IT and OT networks separated by a demilitarized zone, with industrial protocols... | General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | PR.IR-01 | 3.I | NM |
| [OT2](/assessment/#operational-technology-4-controls) | Have you tested running the plant manually, and isolating OT from IT, within the last... | General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | RC.RP-01 | 6.A, 1.C | IR |
| [OT3](/assessment/#operational-technology-4-controls) | Is there a current inventory of OT assets and a network topology diagram, stored offline? | General Best Practices and Hardening Guidance | ID.AM-03 | 2.A, 2.E | AM |
| [OT4](/assessment/#operational-technology-4-controls) | Are backups and gold images of controllers, HMIs and engineering workstations kept... | Preparing for Ransomware and Data Extortion Incidents | PR.DS-11, RC.RP-03 | 3.O | DB |

Thirty-six controls. Identifiers as printed in the documents read on 16 November 2026.

## Which documents and editions were read?

Four documents were read on 16 November 2026. The table gives the edition of each and the kind of identifier used.

| Document | Edition read | Identifiers used |
| --- | --- | --- |
| CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI, NSA: #StopRansomware Guide | September 2023 edition; page read 16 November 2026 | Section titles of Part 1 and Part 2 |
| NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, Ransomware Risk Management: A CSF 2.0 Community Profile | Final, June 2026 (11 June 2026) | CSF 2.0 subcategory IDs such as PR.DS-11 |
| CISA Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 | Goal list read on cisa.gov 16 November 2026; the page states no edition date | Goal IDs 1.A to 6.A |
| CISA Ransomware Readiness Assessment, in CSET | CSET v10.3 release, announced 30 June 2021 | Ten goal codes such as DB and IR |

## Which CISA performance goals do the controls cover?

The CPG 2.0 list has 34 goals. 29 map to at least one assessment control and 5 do not, because the assessment is about ransomware rather than all of cybersecurity. The last column shows the controls that touch each goal; cost, impact and ease are CISA's ratings.

| CPG 2.0 | Goal title | Cost | Impact | Ease | Assessment controls |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1.A | Establish Cybersecurity Responsibilities | Low | High | Moderate | GV1 |
| 1.B | Manage Cybersecurity Oversight | Low | High | Moderate | none |
| 1.C | Manage Incident Response Plans | Low | High | Moderate | GV2, GV3, OT2 |
| 1.D | “Supply Chain Incident Reporting & Vulnerability Disclosure” | Moderate | Moderate | Complex | TP1, TP4 |
| 1.E | Manage Risks from Managed Service Providers | Moderate | Moderate | Complex | TP2, TP3 |
| 2.A | Manage Organizational Assets | Low | High | Moderate | BR4, OT3 |
| 2.B | Mitigate Known Vulnerabilities | High | High | Complex | SG2, SG3 |
| 2.C | Obtain Independent Validation of Cybersecurity Controls | High | High | Complex | GV3 |
| 2.D | “Maintain Vulnerability Disclosure/Reporting Process” | Low | Low | Moderate | none |
| 2.E | Document Network Topology | Low | High | Moderate | OT3 |
| 3.A | Changing Default Passwords | Low | High | Simple | ID4 |
| 3.B | Establish Minimum Password Strength | Low | High | Simple | ID4 |
| 3.C | Create Unique Credentials | Low | High | Simple | ID4 |
| 3.D | Revoking Credentials for Departing Staff | Low | High | Moderate | ID4 |
| 3.E | Monitor Unsuccessful (Automated) Login Attempts | Moderate | High | Moderate | ID4 |
| 3.F | Implement Multi-factor Authentication | Moderate | High | Moderate | ID1 |
| 3.G | Administrators Maintain Separate User and Privileged Accounts | Low | High | Simple | ID2 |
| 3.H | Implement the Principles of Least Privilege | Low | High | Simple | ID2, ID3 |
| 3.I | Implement Logical/Physical Network Segmentation | High | High | Complex | SG1, OT1 |
| 3.J | Implement Cybersecurity Training | Low | High | Moderate | EE3 |
| 3.K | Utilize Strong Encryption | Moderate | High | Complex | none |
| 3.L | Enable Email Security | Low | High | Moderate | EE1, EE2 |
| 3.M | Disable Autorun & Macros By Default | Low | Moderate | Simple | EE1 |
| 3.N | Establish Change Management Processes | Moderate | High | Complex | none |
| 3.O | Maintain System Backups & Restoration Ability | High | High | Moderate | BR1, BR2, BR3, OT4 |
| 3.P | Maintain Hardware & Software Approval Process | Moderate | High | Moderate | SG4 |
| 3.Q | Maintain Log Collection & Storage | Moderate | High | Moderate | DT2 |
| 3.R | Prohibit Connection of Unauthorized Devices | Moderate | High | Complex | none |
| 3.S | Secure Internet Facing Devices | Moderate | High | Complex | SG2 |
| 4.A | Establish Malicious Code Detection | Moderate | High | Moderate | DT1 |
| 4.B | Identify Adverse Events | Moderate | High | Complex | DT3 |
| 5.A | Establish Incident Communication Procedures | Low | High | Moderate | DT4, RR1 |
| 5.B | Establish Incident Reporting Procedures | Moderate | High | Moderate | GV4, RR3 |
| 6.A | Incident Planning and Preparedness | Moderate | High | Complex | BR2, BR4, RR2, OT2 |

## Which NIST IR 8374 identifiers are used?

The document as read cites 43 distinct subcategory identifiers. The controls use 34. Not used: GV.OC-02, ID.RA-01, ID.RA-04, ID.RA-06, ID.RA-09, PR.AA-06, PR.PS-01, RC.CO-04, RS.MI-02. Those are mostly broader risk assessment, physical access and communication outcomes that the 36 questions do not test directly.

## Which RRA goals do the controls cover?

| RRA code | Goal (this site's wording) | Assessment controls |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DB | Data backup | BR1, BR2, BR3, TP3, OT4 |
| BM | Web browser management and DNS filtering | EE4 |
| PP | Phishing prevention and awareness | EE1, EE2, EE3 |
| NM | Network perimeter monitoring | DT2, DT3, SG1, OT1 |
| AM | Asset management | BR4, OT3 |
| PM | Patch and update management | SG2, SG3 |
| UM | User and access management | ID1, ID2, ID3, ID4, TP2 |
| AI | Application integrity and allowlisting | DT1, SG4 |
| IR | Incident response | GV2, GV3, GV4, DT4, RR1, RR2, RR4, OT2 |
| RM | Risk management | GV1, RR3, TP1, TP4 |

The exact goal titles in CISA's CSET data are on the RRA walk-through.

The exact titles are on the [RRA walk-through](/readiness/cisa-ransomware-readiness-assessment-rra/). Question-level RRA identifiers are not used; they sit inside CSET.

## Cite this

Ransomware Readiness Assessment, "Ransomware control mapping", edition 16 November 2026, https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/mapping/ (CC BY 4.0).

## Related pages

- [How the mapping was built](/mapping/method/)
- [The assessment](/assessment/)
- [Download the mapping](/datasets/)
- [NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1](/readiness/nist-ransomware-readiness-assessment/)
- [The CISA RRA](/readiness/cisa-ransomware-readiness-assessment-rra/)
- [Ransomware Readiness Assessment: home](/)

## Sources

- CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026)
- NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1, Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Community Profile (CSRC record): https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8374/r1/final (read 16 November 2026)
- NIST IR 8374r1, full text (June 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8374r1.pdf (read 16 November 2026)
- CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026)
- CISA alert, 30 June 2021: CSET adds the Ransomware Readiness Assessment: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2021/06/30/cisas-cset-tool-sets-sights-ransomware-threat (read 16 November 2026)
- CISA CSET repository: maturity model data, RRA goal titles: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cisagov/cset/main/CSETWebApi/CSETWeb_Api/CSETWebCore.UpgradeLibrary/VersionUpgrader/SQL/1021_to_1030_data.sql (read 16 November 2026)
- CISA CSET repository: RRA mini user guide text: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cisagov/cset/main/CSETWebNg/src/app/dialogs/rra-mini-user-guide/rra-mini-user-guide.component.html (read 16 November 2026)

Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/mapping/
