# Ransomware reaches plants through the IT network, and the first move is to protect operations and safety

Guide, read 16 November 2026

**The short answer.** Ransomware in OT environments usually starts on the IT network, then threatens operations through shared connections or precautionary shutdowns. A CISA and FBI advisory on DarkSide says the pipeline company disconnected certain OT systems proactively. Segmentation, manual operation tests and offline OT backups come first. Read on 16 November 2026.

## How does ransomware reach OT environments?

Mostly by way of the IT network. In the May 2021 advisory on a pipeline company, CISA and the FBI said DarkSide actors deployed ransomware against the IT network, there was no indication of direct effects on OT networks, and the company proactively disconnected certain OT systems for their safety. Disconnecting to protect safety can itself halt operations.

Some malware is built to affect industrial software. MITRE ATT&CK records that EKANS, a ransomware variant first seen in mid-December 2019 and used against energy, healthcare and automotive manufacturing, had a hard-coded kill-list of processes that included some tied to common ICS software platforms, and that it stopped database, backup, antivirus and ICS-related processes.

## What should you do first when ransomware threatens a plant?

1. Protect safety and decide who owns the plant-side decisions. CPG 1.C says OT incident response plans account for safety and containment considerations that differ from IT plans.
2. Isolate OT from IT at the boundary if the connection creates risk to safe and reliable operation, using the workarounds and manual controls prepared in advance (AA21-131A).
3. Confirm the OT network can operate at the capacity needed even if IT is compromised.
4. Secure OT backups: the advisory asks that backups on both IT and OT networks be isolated and tested.
5. Apply the [first hour](/decisions/first-hour-of-ransomware/) steps on the IT side, with plant engineers in the call.

## What readiness controls matter most for OT?

Six controls matter most, with their sources and the matching assessment IDs.

| Control | Source | Assessment ID |
| --- | --- | --- |
| A demilitarized zone between IT and OT, zones by criticality, no industrial protocols on the IT network | AA21-131A; CPG 3.I | OT1 |
| Manual controls tested so critical functions run if ICS or OT must go offline | AA21-131A; CPG 6.A (degraded operation) | OT2 |
| Inventory of OT assets; network topology across IT and OT, reviewed annually | CPG 2.A and 2.E | OT3 |
| Backups and gold images of OT systems, offline and tested | AA21-131A | OT4 |
| Compensating controls where patching is not possible | CPG 2.B (OT note) | SG3 |
| Default passwords changed on IT assets used in OT, including OT admin web pages | CPG 3.A | ID4 |

OT controls from the assessment, with sources.

Score the four OT controls in the [assessment](/assessment/). If you run no operational technology, mark that group not applicable; it is then left out of your total. The [control mapping](/mapping/) shows how each maps to CPG 2.0 and NIST.

## Related pages

- [Should you pay a ransom? Legal and practical checks](/decisions/should-you-pay-ransomware/)
- [Ransomware and cyber insurance: what to arrange first](/decisions/ransomware-and-cyber-insurance/)
- [Ransomware recovery order: what to restore first](/decisions/ransomware-recovery-order/)
- [First hour of a ransomware attack: isolate or shut down?](/decisions/first-hour-of-ransomware/)
- [The ransomware readiness assessment](/assessment/)
- [The control mapping](/mapping/)

## Sources

- CISA and FBI advisory AA21-131A: DarkSide ransomware, best practices for preventing business disruption: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-131a (read 16 November 2026)
- MITRE ATT&CK: EKANS, software S0605: https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605/ (read 16 November 2026)
- CISA: Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (CPG 2.0) goal list: https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-2-0-cpg-2-0 (read 16 November 2026)
- CISA, MS-ISAC, FBI and NSA: #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023 edition, page read 16 November 2026): https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (read 16 November 2026)

Last reviewed 16 November 2026. Canonical: https://ransomwarereadinessassessment.com/decisions/ransomware-in-ot-environments/
